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Resolving Recognitive-Power Dilemmas: The Everyday Experience of Sunni 
Muslim Individuals in Dublin,  
Ireland 
 
Des Delaney 
 
Abstract 
 
In recent years, due to the increased visibility of immigrants and the rise of Islamic 
terrorism, there has been a dramatic increase in studies that aim to gain a deeper 
understanding of Muslim populations in the West. In the European context, such 
empirical studies invariably focus on core nation-states whilst a dearth of research 
pertains to peripheral countries, such as the Republic of Ireland. In addition, the Irish 
literature tends to be scant whilst European studies are overly reliant upon 
communitarian and security paradigms.   
 
To fill the above research gap, this study aims to demonstrate the complexity of 
recognition relations by examining how Sunni Muslim individuals living in Dublin 
perceive how they are recognised within various spheres of everyday interaction i.e., 
within the spheres of love, legal respect and social esteem and how such perceptions of 
recognition provide a deeper insight into identity formation and maintenance. To 
conduct such a study, Axel Honneth’s social critical theory of recognition has been 
utilised to frame a range of grassroot interviews and focused discussion groups. Such a 
grounded qualitative study, with emancipatory intent, challenges the communitarian 
assumption that minority groups simply seek to have their “particular” culture and 
associated beliefs endorsed by a majority and the security paradigm that narrowly views 
Muslims in Europe through the lens of political extremism.   
 
In terms of research findings, this study highlights the fact that forms of disrespect and 
misrecognition permeate multiple social spheres to varying degrees with the vast 
majority of criticisms directed towards the wider societal sphere of interaction. The 
participant narratives, particularly the use of small stories, verify that misrecognition 
negatively affects an individual’s relation-to-self leading to a struggle to regain positive 
forms of recognition, relation-to-self and perceived self-worth.  
 
The study also gains a deep understanding of the complex intertwinement between 
recognition, power and integration processes. Individuals (and groups) strive to gain 
recognition from others yet must negotiate the powers that reside within each sphere of 
interaction. Such powers legitimate and regulate social norms and “normalised” identity 
standards. This complex interlacing creates a variety of recognitive-power dilemmas 
that must be resolved by individuals-in-context. In terms of top-down power, the 
empirical information illustrates how domineering social pathologies exist extensively 
in terms of public discrimination, patriarchy and exclusionary civic stratification whilst 
the nation-state’s constitutive power shapes the ‘good citizen’ within the legal arena and 
traditional authority figures shape the ‘good Muslim’ within the familial and community 
spheres.  
 
 
xii 
 
A substantial additional finding is that individual and collective resistive power is 
identified in the process by which 2
nd
 generation youth are resisting traditional 
authorities and redirecting their legitimating recognition towards counter-authorities that 
facilitate greater social flexibility. Such agentic bottom-up power aids an identity 
transformation in which Muslim youth are returning to a “purified” form of Islam and 
filtering-out “negative” ethno-cultural traditions in order to gain positive recognition 
from multiple social spheres of interaction e.g., to strengthen their recognition to God, 
to enhance and create a common-ground to their Islamic family, friends and community 
and also to extract deeply-embedded civic principles, from an interpretation of the 
Islamic sources, in order to gain recognition as active Muslim citizens, who can 
positively participate within and contribute to Irish society.  
 
Such an identity movement helps Sunni Muslim individuals avoid total assimilation and 
isolation by enabling the creation of a balanced integration strategy – referred to as 
integration without dilution. This alternative form of integration helps Muslims interact 
and participate within the Irish-European context but with the added benefit of being 
able to maintain and strengthen an Islamic identity. It does so by placing more emphasis 
on an Islamic-civic identity rather than accentuating interconnections between a 
religious identity and ethno-cultural and/or nationalistic affinities.  
 
Generally the above findings illustrate how recognition, power and identity intersect 
within everyday life and also verify that humans are not static entities but remain 
dynamic – fluid beings – in constant forms of transformation due to the interactive 
context of everyday life. Such insights are pivotal in proving that although such an 
identity shift may be construed as “natural” – when viewed through a recognitive lens – 
it becomes apparent that such transformations are an identity construction, which aim to 
resolve recognitive-power dilemmas that occur within the immanent context of 
everyday life.    
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Chapter 1                        Introduction 
 
Inherent in our everyday language is a sense that human integration owes its 
existence, at a deep level, to the patterns of approval and recognition that we 
have been attempting to distinguish. For up to the present day, in the self-
descriptions of those who see themselves as having been wrongly treated by 
others, the moral categories that play a dominant role are those – such as ‘insult’ 
or ‘humiliation’ – that refer to forms of disrespect, that is, to the denial of 
recognition. Negative concepts of this kind are used to designate behaviour that 
represents an injustice not simply because it harms subjects or restricts their 
freedom to act, but because it injures them with regard to the positive 
understanding of themselves that they have acquired intersubjectively. 
 
Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition 
 
1.1 The Research Agenda 
 
In recent years, due to the increased visibility of immigrants and the rise of Islamic 
terrorism, there has been a dramatic increase in studies that aim to gain a deeper 
understanding of the experience of Muslim populations living in the West. In the 
European context, such studies invariably focus on either terrorism, security and/or 
issues relating to multiculturalism within core nation-states such as the United Kingdom 
(UK), France and Germany, who have large immigrant populations, whilst a dearth of 
research pertains to the everyday experiences of individuals, who belong to the 
grassroots of various Muslim communities residing within peripheral European 
countries such as the Republic of Ireland (ROI).
1
 The above is exacerbated by the fact 
that much of the existing Irish literature tends to be overly descriptive and lacking in 
theoretical, methodological and empirical sophistication. This results in a loss of a more 
nuanced understanding about the Muslim experience in Ireland. To remedy the above 
situation, innovative studies are needed to expand our knowledge about how the Muslim 
                                                 
1
 See Delaney, D. Perceptions of Mis/Recognition: The Experience of Sunni Muslim Individuals 
in Dublin, Ireland. Chapter 7 IN:  Martikainen, T., Mapril, J. and Khan, A.H. (eds). 2015. 
Muslims at the Margins of Europe: Finland, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Leiden: Brill. 
Throughout the rest of the thesis, the term “Ireland” refers only to the Republic of Ireland. It is 
also important to clarify that italics will be used to emphasise or highlight words of importance 
whilst inverted commas (“ ”) will be used for voicings that reside within quotations and for 
phrases that are relative to individual perceptions of experience such as “being”; “to be”; “who 
one is”; “a good life” etc. 
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“Other”2 is recognised within the bounded and particular context of the Irish nation-
state.  
A gap-in-knowledge has been identified and this study aims to challenge it by 
critiquing two academic paradigms. By utilising Axel Honneth’s theoretical frame, this 
thesis challenges the Taylorian multiculturalist communitarian view, which assumes 
that minority groups simply seek to have their culture and beliefs endorsed by the 
majority community. Furthermore, through the use of an emancipatory perspective, the 
study makes concerted efforts to give a more rounded account of the experience of 
Sunni Muslim individuals in Dublin and openly challenges the dominant paradigm that 
narrowly views such people through the lens of political extremism. Thus, with the 
above in mind, the research agenda and challenge to be explored is as follows:  
 
To demonstrate the complexity of recognition relations in regards to the 
experience of Sunni Muslim individuals in Dublin, Ireland, with particular focus 
on three distinct spheres of interaction: 
 
 Relations to the non-Muslim community in regards to interaction as 
citizens within the legal sphere and as particular individuals within the 
wider social sphere. 
 
 Relations to an abstract spiritual deity. 
 
 Relations between the 1st and 2nd generations’ within the Sunni Muslim 
community with particular attention be paid to familial and community 
interaction. 
 
1.2 Exploring the Research Challenge 
 
It can be questioned as to why anyone should care about the outlined research agenda 
that aims to critically challenge the multicultural and security paradigms? The question 
is valid and can be answered affirmatively by stating that such knowledge is important 
for all individuals within Irish society in that it will create more understanding about the 
                                                 
2
 The concept of being “Othered” or “Othering” has been defined by various academics from 
many different intellectual traditions. The following is a comprehensive definition, stated by 
Jenson, who defines “Othering” as ‘discursive processes by which powerful groups, who may or 
may not make up a numerical majority, define subordinate groups into existence in a 
reductionist way, which ascribe problematic and/or inferior characteristics to these subordinate 
groups. Such discursive processes affirm the legitimacy and superiority of the powerful and 
condition identity formation among the subordinate’. See Jensen, S.Q. 2011. Othering, identity 
formation and agency. Qualitative Studies 2(2): pp. 63-78. 
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experience of a religious and ethnically diverse minority in Ireland. It may develop a 
better insight into integration processes that emerge from below and also generate a 
fuller appreciation of how recognition and respect matter, especially in foreseeing and 
limiting the rise of social suffering and conflict. Furthermore, and most importantly, we 
should care about understanding recognition dynamics as it is an indicator of the degree 
of democratic freedom and non-domination that enables individuals “to be” themselves 
within multiple spheres of life as lived in Ireland.  
Another question to be asked relates to how the research is to be examined what 
theoretical frame, methodological stance and empirical data will be utilised, deployed 
and interpreted in order to bring the research agenda to fruition? In brief, the research is 
a qualitative study that is inspired by Axel Honneth’s social critical theory of 
recognition, particularly its multi-dimensional perspective on social life and critical aim 
of identifying social pathologies that disrupt individual freedom. In other words, the 
research sets out to understand how Sunni Muslim individuals in Dublin perceive the 
everyday recognition order
3
 that they live and intersubjectively interact within. To 
empirically explore the above aim, the study relies on qualitatively interpreting the 
‘moral grammar’ that has been sequentially collected through a range of pilot 
interviews; semi-structured interviews and focused discussion groups.  
 
1.3 Summary of the Findings 
 
In terms of the main findings, this qualitative study utilising grassroot narratives and 
framed by Axel Honneth’s multidimensional modes of recognition (love; legal respect 
and social esteem) demonstrates the complexity of recognition relations by making 
visible a deeper understanding of the experiences of Sunni Muslim individuals in 
Dublin, who utilise the language of recognition to convey their everyday struggles 
within various social spheres. Such a grounded qualitative study, with emancipatory 
intent, challenges the communitarian assumption that minority groups simply seek to 
have their “particular” culture and associated beliefs endorsed by a majority. It also 
                                                 
3
 The term recognition order refers to the respect and esteem “dispositive” that exists within any 
particular society. As Zurn states, such an order is a ‘reigning set of interpretations of the 
specific principles that society uses to accord respect and esteem’.  Zurn, C.F. 2015.  Axel 
Honneth: A Critical Theory of the Social. UK: Polity Press. p. 133.  
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challenges the security paradigm, spurred on by the “War on Terror”, that too narrowly 
views Muslims in Europe through the lens of political extremism.   
Alternatively to such perspectives, this study provides a space for the research 
participants to voice their everyday concerns and experiences of misrecognition within 
multiple social spheres i.e., within the spheres of love; legal respect and social esteem. 
The everyday narrative evidence illustrates how intersubjectivity is pivotal for all 
human beings, who strive to be recognised as the “same” – in terms of being fully 
recognised as legal citizens endowed with “universal” rights and obligations to others – 
yet also as “different” to others – in terms of having one’s meritocratic underlying 
abilities and associated achievements recognised as contributing positively to the 
generalised value-horizon of society. In other words, there is a need to be seen 
“universally” as human and to be recognised for one’s meritocratic “particularity”.  
With this said however, this study highlights the fact that forms of disrespect 
and misrecognition permeate multiple social spheres to varying degrees. The research 
participants, particularly through the use of small stories, verify that misrecognition 
negatively affects an individual’s relation-to-self leading to a struggle to regain 
recognition and a positive relation-to-self. Such a process can vary and involve violent 
or non-violent action.  
By focusing on negative forms of recognition a range of social pathologies are 
identified that enable a deeper understanding of how misrecognition and power 
intertwine. The narratives illustrate how domineering power exists extensively in terms 
of public discrimination, patriarchy and exclusionary civic stratification whilst 
constitutive power is identified in terms of the nation-state shaping the ‘good citizen’ 
within the legal sphere and authority figures shaping the ‘good Muslim’ within the 
familial and community spheres. Importantly, the study also conclusively shows how 
forms of individual and collective resistive power agentically contest domineering and 
constitutive top-down power.  
The most compelling sociological finding emanating from this study relates to 
resistive power, particularly in relation to how Muslim youth utilise individual and 
collective agency to resist domineering social pathologies and forms of constitutive 
power, which thereby creates space to enact a new Muslim identity that corresponds 
positively to various intersubjective social spheres within the Irish-European context. It 
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has been identified that an identity transformation is in-process within the Sunni 
Muslim community in Dublin, particularly in relation to 2
nd
 generation Muslim youth, 
who are actively attempting to return to a “purer” form of Islamic identity by filtering-
out perceived “negative” forms of ethno-cultural tradition that are viewed as distorting 
the “correct” practise of Islam and spiritual recognition to God. Such an identity 
transition relates to recognition in that this process is a way to resolve recognitive-
power dilemmas that manifest within a variety of social contexts. It is a form of resistive 
power in that young Muslims must agentically resist and struggle against inflexible 
social norms and static identities within the love and wider societal spheres by 
bypassing traditional authority figures and redirect their legitimating recognition to a 
plurality of decentered counter- authorities. Advanced media technology facilitates such 
resistance and enables young Muslims to contest the inflexible social norms and rigid 
socialised traditional identities that formulate what it is to be a ‘good citizen’ or a ‘good 
Muslim’. This new terminology emphasises how individuals strive for positive 
recognition; yet simultaneously, they must negotiate the authoritative domineering and 
constitutive powers (plus forms of misrecognition and associated social pathologies) 
residing within interactive arenas that socially regulate norms and identities to formulate 
what is considered “normal” and worthy of replication. 
By returning to the “real” Islam, such individuals are strengthening their 
recognition to God; enhancing and creating a common-ground to their Islamic family, 
friends and community and also extracting deeply-embedded civic principles, from an 
interpretation of the Islamic sources, that facilitates recognition as active Muslim 
citizens, who can positively participate within and contribute to Irish society. This 
identity transformation helps such individuals avoid total assimilation and isolation by 
enabling the creation of a balanced integration strategy – referred to as integration 
without dilution. This alternative form of integration strategy helps Muslims interact 
within the Irish-European context but with the benefit of maintaining and strengthening 
their core foundational Islamic identity. It does so by placing more emphasis on an 
Islamic-civic identity than a religious identity that accentuates interconnections between 
ethno-cultural or nationalist tendencies. This is a substantial finding as it illustrates how 
recognition, power and identity intersect within everyday life and verifies that humans 
are not static entities but remain dynamic – fluid beings – in constant forms of 
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transformation due to the interactive context of everyday life. Such findings are pivotal 
in proving that although this identity shift may be perceived as “natural” – when 
narratively viewed through a recognitive lens – it becomes apparent that such 
transformations are an identity construction, which aim to resolve everyday social 
dilemmas.  
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
 
The following section concisely outlines the structure of the thesis, which is constituted 
by ten chapters that, when taken together, fully examine the aim of the research. After 
this introduction, Chapter 2 gives a descriptive account of the existing literature that 
examines the Muslim population broadly in Ireland and then specifically within the 
Dublin region. The limitations of the Irish literature will then be explored and the 
chapter ends by examining the security and emancipatory paradigms that broadly 
structure the wider European literature.  
Chapter 3 will give an overview of the development of recognition theory, 
particularly by critiquing Charles Taylor’s multiculturalist communitarian model of 
recognition and then justifying the selection of Axel Honneth’s structured 
multidimensional model as an inspirational theoretical frame. Particular attention will 
be paid to the theory’s tripartite typology that separates social life into three distinct 
spheres of recognition, constituted by the normative criteria of love, legal respect and 
social esteem. Lastly, the chapter will elaborate briefly on the various critiques of 
Honneth’s work and then focus on a continuing concern related to his conception of 
power. This will be explored and critiqued with reference to Foucault’s more nuanced 
understanding of power and by McBride’s focus on authority and social norms.  
Chapter 4 descriptively outlines the qualitative methodology employed with 
particular attention being paid to justifying the case study, units of analysis and 
elaborating on the conduction of the fieldwork – comprising pilot and semi-structured 
interviews and multiple focused discussion groups. This chapter will also contain a brief 
section on the interpretation of everyday narratives.  
Chapters 5 to 8 are empirical chapters that recount the everyday narrative 
recognition experiences of Sunni Muslim individuals in Dublin. Chapter 5 explores 
narratives related to societal and legal recognition; Chapter 6 explores the comforting 
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and coping mechanism related to spiritual recognition; whilst Chapter 7 explores 
intergenerational recognition relations in terms of how the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 generations’ 
critically perceive and relate to each other. The last empirical chapter – Chapter 8 – 
explores how Muslim youth have redirected their legitimising recognition to a plurality 
of online sources, thereby, challenging the Islamic identity and practice espoused by 
local authority figures. Such resistance produces creative space for Muslim youth to 
filter “negative” ethno-cultural traditions and to search for an “authentic” form of Islam 
that complements a European democratic context.   
 Chapter 9 is a discussion chapter that will use narrative examples to illustrate 
and synthesise how recognitive relations are embedded and acted out within a complex 
range of power relations. In this regard, three dynamics of power and their associated 
positive and negative actions will be examined i.e., power over the actions of others in 
terms of domineering and constitutive power as well as bottom-up resistive power that 
works from within forms of top-down power and is inextricably connected to how 
research participants recognise varying authorities or counter-authorities, who give 
legitimacy to competing social norms and identities.  
  Chapter 10 concludes the thesis by summarising the main findings, assessing 
how this study contributes to the existing literature, determining the research project’s 
influence on local policy, and recommending avenues for future research to pursue, that 
may have social and political implications at national and international levels.  
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Chapter 2                    Literature Review 
 
This chapter will explore the existing literature related to the Muslim community living 
in Ireland. The first section will give an account of the Muslim population in Ireland, 
focusing on how it developed historically. The second section will focus in on the case 
study – the Sunni Muslim community in Dublin – and aim to differentiate it from the 
Muslim communities residing outside of Ireland’s capital city. The chapter identifies 
that the existing Irish literature related to Muslims in Ireland is sparse when compared 
to the extensive output in the UK and mainland Europe. The last section will take a 
closer look at the literature related to the experience of Muslim communities in Europe 
and identify the security and emancipatory paradigms that broadly structure this 
literature. To conclude, the chapter focuses specifically on relevant theoretical and 
empirical research conducted by Tariq Ramadan and Konrad Pędziwiatr, respectively. 
 
2.1 The Muslim Population in Ireland  
 
Since the 1950s, in similarity to other countries within the European continent, the 
Republic of Ireland’s population demographic has slowly transformed into a 
multicultural environment, spurred on by the Celtic Tiger economic boom of the 1990s 
and by economic globalisation generally. This process has seen Ireland move away 
from being an extremely homogenous Caucasian society, dominated by a conservative 
Catholic ethos, to one of increasing population heterogeneity in race, religion and 
culture. In the 20
th
 Century, a portion of the new entrees into the Irish community were 
of the Muslim faith and of a variety of ethno-cultural backgrounds that differed from 
Irish cultural norms. Although remaining inconspicuous, to the point of invisibility, 
over time the Muslim community has increased in size. Examples of this include elite 
recognition of the Muslim population, the construction of facilities by the new 
community, and the establishment of social provisions such as Islamic education, 
provision of halal food within public institutions and demarcation of burial sites.
4
 Today 
                                                 
4
 Ireland’s integration policy at local and national is firmly based around interculturalism and 
interreligious interaction. For an official account of this policy, see Office of the Minister of 
Integration. 2008. Migration Nation: Statement on Integration Strategy and Diversity 
Management. Dublin. Stationery Office. For an in-depth academic report that specifically 
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in modern Ireland, the visibility of different people signifies a new transformed society 
that runs parallel to the globalising tendencies, which are manifest throughout the rest of 
Europe and the world, generally. This study aims to explore such processes through the 
individual perceptions of the lived experience emanating from the grassroots of a 
minority religious group that finds itself at the apex of cultural fluctuations. Academics 
interested and cognisant of such social and economic change, such as Kuhling and 
Keohane, have reclassified the Irish nation as, ‘Cosmopolitan Ireland’.5 Although 
critical of the Ireland’s transformation in terms of the persistence of economic 
inequality and the ‘short-sightedness of Irish immigration policy’, they recognise that 
since the 1990s the Irish Republic has experienced: 
 
Major social and cultural changes, which in some ways has secularised, 
liberalised and cosmopolitanised Ireland: emigration was reversed, which 
facilitated a ‘new multiculturalism’; divorce and homosexuality were legalised; 
the shift from the rural to urban patterns of living accelerated. Most 
significantly, Ireland was effectively transformed from a premodern, peasant 
rural community to a postmodern, high-technology urbanised society. The 
period coincided with the Peace Process in Northern Ireland, culminating in the 
Belfast Agreement in 1998, the decommissioning of IRA weapons in 2005, and 
the emergence (albeit fragile) of a post-nationalistic political discourse.
6
 
 
The following two tables – Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 – provide population data that 
illustrates the growth of the Muslim population in Ireland over the last twenty years and 
also presents descriptive statistics from the most recent Irish census conducted in April 
2011.    
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
tackles the Irish hijab debate, see Honohan, I., and Rougier, N. 2012. Tolerance and Cultural 
Diversity in Ireland: Concepts and Practices. Work Package 5 of the Accept Pluralism 
Research Project. Florence: European University Institute (EUI). Importantly, this report states 
that ‘there has been limited research on Muslims in Ireland and few surveys on the perceptions 
of Muslims in Ireland’. p. 58.  
5
 Kuhling, C. & Keohane, K. 2007. Cosmopolitan Ireland: Globalisation and Quality of Life. 
London: Pluto Press. For an analysis of historical transformations in Ireland during the 20
th
 
Century, see Ferriter, D. 2005. The Transformation of Ireland 1900-2000. London: Profile 
Books. For an overview of contemporary Ireland as a “changing society”, see O’Malley, E. 
2011. Contemporary Ireland. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.  
6
 Ibid., p. 1.    
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Table 2.1: Muslim Population in Ireland 1991-2011
7
 
 
Year 1991 2002 2006 2011 
Population 3, 875 19, 147 32, 539 49, 204 
Percent 0.1% 0.49% 0.78% 1.1% 
 
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Muslim Population in Ireland, 2011
8  
 
Age Range Population 
0-14 16, 584 
15-34 18, 804 
  35-85+ 13, 816 
                         Total 49, 204 
Irish     18, 223 Male          28, 127 
Non-Irish     29, 143 Female          21, 077 
 
It must be acknowledged that the Muslim population in Ireland is extremely 
heterogeneous, composed of over fifty different nationalities and incorporating regional 
links to Europe, (South)Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
9
 The Sunni sect of Islam is 
by far the most populous group, whilst a few thousand Shia and a growing Sufi 
population are also present.
10
 In parallel with other European countries, immigration to 
Ireland was initiated due to economic and professional necessity. The first migrants to 
Ireland were medical students, practicing doctors, aircraft mechanics and businessmen. 
However, it must be borne in mind that discriminatory practices within the South 
African apartheid regime acted as a catalyst for South Africans’ of Pakistani origin to 
immigrate to Ireland in the 1950s in search of better social and economic opportunities. 
Today, many Muslims are well-represented in occupations within the health, sales and 
personal/child care services.
11
 
                                                 
7
 Central Statistics Office (CSO). 2011. Profile 7: Religion, Ethnicity and Irish Travellers. 
Census. Dublin: Stationery Office.  
8
 Ibid.  
9
CSO. 2006. Volume 13 – Religion. Census. Dublin: Stationery Office. A dataset combining 
national and religious attributes is available from the author upon request.    
10
 Sakaranaho, T. 2006. Religious freedom, multiculturalism, Islam: Cross-reading Finland and 
Ireland. Leiden: Brill. 
11
 CSO. 2006. Op. cit.  
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Historically, Ireland’s Muslim community traces its origins back to the late 
1950s, when a small group of South African students attending the Royal College of 
Surgeons (RCSI), established an Islamic committee, known as the ‘Dublin Islamic 
Society’ (DIS), to organise religious needs for the Muslim holidays and weekly prayers 
on Fridays. After many years of national and international fundraising,
12
 the DIS 
changed its name to the ‘Islamic Foundation of Ireland’ (IFI) and established the first 
Islamic centre on the southside of the city known as the Dublin City Mosque.
13
 
However, the Muslim community remained a small invisible community in Ireland until 
the early 1990s, when the country’s economic fortunes began to change: 
 
The Irish economy grew by an average 6.8 per cent per annum, peaking at 11.1 
per cent in 1999. Unemployment fell from 18 per cent in the late 1980s to 4.2 
per cent in 2005, and the Irish Debt/GDP ratio fell from 92 per cent in 1993 to 
38 per cent in 1999. This rapid economic growth meant that labour market 
demand began to exceed what the Irish labour market could supply, which 
encouraged the Irish government actively to seek to encourage migrant workers 
to relocate to Ireland.
14
 
 
As the Irish economy transformed throughout the 1990s, the Muslim population 
increased dramatically due to an influx of political refugees, particularly from Bosnia, 
Somalia and Albania, who were fleeing their war-torn countries. By the end of the 
decade, there was a substantial increase in asylum seeker applications from individuals 
emanating from Africa and the Middle East.
15
 This increase brought with it practical 
and logistical issues relating to physical and religious space i.e., the limits of space 
within existing mosques and the lack of Islamic education and corresponding facilities. 
In November 1996, the second purpose-built mosque in Ireland,
16
 the Islamic Cultural 
                                                 
12
 As well as personal donations, international donations were received from the Qatari and 
Kuwaiti authorities. 
13
 For a detailed history of the development of the Muslim community in Ireland, see Flynn, K. 
2006. Understanding Islam in Ireland. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations. 17(2), pp. 223-
238. 
14
Crowley, U., Gilmartin., M & Kitchin., R. 2006. Vote Yes for Commonsense Citizenship: 
Paradoxes at the Heart of Ireland’s “Céad Mile Fáilte”. Maynooth: National University of 
Ireland (NUIM). p. 12.  IN: Kuhling, C. & Keohane, K. 2007. Op. cit., p. 54.   
15
 After 9/11 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, refugees from these war-
torn countries began to also seek asylum. 
16
 In 1987, the Ballyhaunis mosque became the first purpose-built mosque in the Republic of 
Ireland. The mosque was built by businessman Mohammed Sher Rafique and catered for the 
Muslim population living and working within the County Mayo town.  
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Centre of Ireland (ICCI) was officially opened. This large purpose-built mosque, 
located in the middle-class Dublin suburb of Clonskeagh, was initially administered by 
the IFI but was then subsequently managed by the al-Maktoum Foundation, which is 
closely linked to and receives funding from authorities in the United Arab Emirates. 
Since the 1990s, advances have been made in opening and increasing the space 
available for the Muslim community not only in Dublin but throughout the island of 
Ireland. At present, there are four large mosques.
17
 Three of the larger mosque 
complexes and many of the smaller prayer halls are located in Dublin whilst the first 
purpose-built mosque – the Ballyhaunis mosque – and at least sixteen small prayer halls 
are located in major towns and cities throughout the country.
18
 
Outside of Dublin, Muslim communities have developed in towns that contain 
regional economic resources and associated opportunities. For example, Cavan town has 
a Muslim population, who benefit from close proximity to a hospital that provides 
medical services for the wider provincial area. Also in County Kerry, the small town of 
Tralee has a significant Muslim population, who avail of the important tourist industry 
in which the sales and services thrive. A local newspaper published an article on the 
Muslim population increase in the town by stating that ‘in the county capital [Tralee], 
Islam has overtaken Protestantism to become the second most practised religion in the 
town’.19  
 
2.2 The Muslim Population in Dublin 
 
Today in the 21
st
 century, Dublin has a rapidly growing and permanent Muslim 
community, which is composed of multiple and identifiable generations – the 1st 
generation being immigrants that settled in Ireland and their offspring – the 2nd 
generation – being those who were born or primarily raised in Ireland.  
                                                 
17
 Ballyhaunis Mosque; Dublin City Mosque (IFI); Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre (Shia Hussainia); 
and the Clonskeagh (ICCI) mosque complex. Recently, planning permission has been granted to 
construct Ireland’s largest mosque to date in Clongriffin Dublin 13, which will cater for 
Muslims that live on the northside of the city and its surrounding hinterland. This €40 million 
development will construct a three-storey domed mosque that can cater to up to three thousand 
visitors during the Eid festival.  
18
 See Islamic Foundation of Ireland (IFI). 2015. Mosques and Prayers Rooms. Dublin: IFI. 
Available at http://islaminireland.com/services/mosques-and-prayer-rooms. 
19
 See ‘Muslim Population in Kerry Doubles in Four Years’. 2007. The Kerryman. December 
5
th
. Available at www.kerryman.ie 
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It must be acknowledged that there are significant differences between the lives 
and experiences of the various Muslim populations inside the metropolitan area of 
Dublin and of those outside the capital city. These fundamental differences can be 
broken down into three distinct elements to consider: (1) the demographic and 
geographic spread, (2) the differences in levels of institutional completeness, and (3) the 
differences in economic and social power concentration.  
Firstly, in terms of Muslim demographic spread within Ireland, the census 
figures of 2011 indicate a balance in the populations resident in the Dublin region – 
which has a population of 25, 471 – and the rest of Ireland  – which has a population of 
23, 733.
20
 Although the numbers balance on paper, it must be acknowledged that the 
Muslim population residing outside of the Dublin area is geographically spread 
throughout a variety of city and town locations. In other words, there are significant 
differences between Dublin and the rest of the country in terms of the geographic spread 
and concentration of their respective Muslim populations.  
Secondly, the institutional completeness of the Muslim community is strong 
primarily within the Dublin region and very much weaker outside of the metropolitan 
area. For example, on the one hand, the capital city contains the three largest mosques 
and affiliated organisations; the main Muslim educational facilities in the country;
21
 
plus the majority of the economic resources, as well as close access to pre-existing 
social and political opportunity structures that have historically resided within the Irish 
capital. On the other hand, the small Muslim communities outside of Dublin are 
institutionally incomplete and lack access to religious, social and educational facilities 
such as those found in Dublin.
22
 
Lastly, the institutional superiority of the Dublin Muslim community 
(particularly the large Sunni population) ensures that the economic and political power-
base remains concentrated in the Dublin region. Subsequently, many of the regional 
                                                 
20
 CSO. 2011. Op. cit.  
21
 Sakaranaho, T. 2006. Op. cit.  
22
 Delaney, D. and Cavatorta, F. The Exclusion of Denizens within the Irish Social and Political 
Opportunity Structure: The Cosmopolitan Case of Muslims in the Republic of Ireland. Chapter 
8. pp. 123-153 IN: Sinclair, K. and Egholm-Feldt, J. (eds.). 2011. Lived Space: Reconsidering 
Transnationalism among Muslim Minorities. Hamburg: Peter Lang. 
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Muslim communities are dependent and reliant upon the Dublin-based Muslim mosque 
organisations for religious, political and economic support.
23
  
Overall, it can be stated therefore that the Dublin Muslim community has far 
more social and political opportunities for recognition than their fellow Muslims spread 
throughout the rest of Ireland. In terms of the research, such opportunities lead us to 
infer that the recognition order in Dublin is more diverse, complex and intersubjective 
due to the concentration of people, institutions and power within a bounded 
metropolitan space. Such concentrated structures and opportunities imply that the 
grassroots of the Muslim community in Dublin have greater access to necessary 
resources to participate fully in political and social life.  
The three elements above have implications for the research in that it is possible 
to infer that there are a variety of Muslim communities embedded within the city 
environment and that these communities, by necessity, must intersubjectively interact 
with themselves and with external others within a defined and bounded metropolitan 
area. Furthermore, it also becomes possible to infer that the recognition order within a 
city – particularly a large capital city – is different to rural locations by being more 
socially dynamic in terms of having a higher population concentration; more 
institutional completeness and higher concentrations of economic and social power. The 
following two tables – Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 – provide recent population data for each 
local authority area in Dublin and also present descriptive statistics from the most recent 
Irish census. 
 
Table 2.3: Dublin Muslim Population per Council Area 2011
24
 
 
Local 
Authority 
Dublin 
City 
Dún 
Laoghaire-
Rathdown 
 
Fingal 
South 
Dublin 
 
Total 
Population 8, 979 2, 753 6, 938 6, 801 25, 471 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 For example, see ‘Why Cork’s Muslim Community wants a Mosque’. 1998. Irish Times. 
February 24
th
. Available at www.irishtimes.com.   
24
 CSO. 2011. Op. cit.  
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics for Muslim Population in Dublin, 2011
25
 
 
Age Range Population 
                          0-14                               8, 182 
15-34                              10, 291 
  35-85+                               6, 998 
                         Total                               25, 471 
Dublin   25, 471 Male                14, 423 
Non-Dublin   23, 733 Female                11, 048 
 
2.3 Limitations of the Irish Literature 
 
In contrast to the focus on Muslims populations in other core European countries, 
academic literature on the Muslim community in Ireland is limited. A common reason 
for this has been the suggestion that such a minority community is too small to facilitate 
new insights into the Muslim European experience. Hence, the Irish literature is scant. 
The literature that does exist tends to be overly descriptive by focusing broadly on 
various immigration issues
26
 or on regional links to the Muslim world.
27
 The work that 
does specifically focus on Muslim communities in Ireland tends to lack theoretical 
framing. For example, the theme of recognition can be identified in much of the 
literature yet it is never explicitly explored. Much of the work in the JMMA special 
edition,
28
 implicitly explores issues relating public (legal and societal) misrecognition of 
Muslims in Ireland yet the issue of intimate familial and internal community forms of 
recognition are largely ignored.
29
 Furthermore, much of the work is either, on the one 
hand, too broadly descriptive, or on the other hand, too one-dimensional. A key 
                                                 
25
 Ibid.  
26
 See Fanning, B. 2007 and 2011. See also Messina, A. 2009. The Politics of Migration to 
Western Europe: Ireland in Comparative Perspective. West European Politics. 32(1), pp. 1-25. 
27
 Miller, R. 2004a. The Politics of Trade and Diplomacy: Ireland’s Evolving Relationship with 
the Muslim Middle East. Irish Studies in International Affairs. 15, pp. 123-145. See also Miller, 
R. 2004b. The Politics of Trade and Diplomacy: Ireland’s Evolving Relationship and Future 
Prospects. Eire-Ireland: A Journal of Irish Studies. 47(2).   
28
 Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs (JMMA). UK: Routledge.  
29
 Hogan, C. 2011. Accommodating Islam in the Denominational Irish Education System: 
Religious Freedom and Education in the Republic of Ireland. Journal of Muslim Minority 
Affairs. 31(4), pp. 554-573. Richardson, E. 2011. Islamic Finance for Consumers in Ireland: A 
Comparative Study of the Position of Retail-level Islamic Finance in Ireland. JMMA. 31(4), pp. 
534-553.  In terms of challenges for and within the Irish educational system, see Selim, A. 2014. 
Islam and Education in Ireland. Dublin: Ali Shehata Abdou Selim.    
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example is James Carr’s work on Islamophobia. Whilst shedding light on the important 
issue of discrimination, this study is one-dimensional in its focus by not exploring 
various social pathologies that exist within other recognitive spheres of everyday life.
30
 
Moreover empirically, the literature tends to focus on descriptions of Islamic 
organizations
31
 and elite perspectives,
32
 thus, there is no bottom-up approach to 
exploring lived Islam by exploring the narratives of the grassroots.
33
  
 
2.4 Diverging Paradigms in the European Literature 
 
In the 1950s, after the catastrophe of World War II that devastated much of Europe, 
many European countries replenished their stocks of working individuals by facilitating 
mass emigration from former colonies. Britain looked towards its former colonies of 
India, Pakistan and the West Indies; France enticed allied war veterans from Algeria 
and West Germany introduced a guest worker (gastarbeiter) program to ensure a steady 
flow of temporary Turkish workers into its refurbished industrial economy. The vast 
majority of transnational migrants, who entered Europe during this time originated from 
postcolonial territories comprising large Muslim populations. For the first time, in 
European history, large numbers of Muslim immigrants were accepted into Europe for 
the purpose of labour. Whilst short-term labour quotas were filled by immigrant 
workers, such international migration policies brought Europe slowly into a new period 
of societal development and instigated a necessary period of social transformation.  
                                                 
30
 Carr, J. 2010. Measuring Islamophobia. Socheolas: Limerick Student Journal of Sociology. 
2(2). pp. 39-57. To understand the need to recognise the reality of Islamophobia, see Allen, C. 
2010. Islamophobia. UK: Ashgate Publishing. Carr also, without substantial evidence, 
categorises the governing apparatus of the Irish state as racist plus he conflates racism and 
Islamophobia into a single term - Anti-Muslim racism. See Carr, J. 2014. Experiences of Anti-
Muslim Racism. Ireland: IRCHSS and the Hate & Hostility Research Group.  
31
 Scharbrodt, O. and Sakaranaho, T. 2011. Islam and Muslims in the Republic of Ireland. 
JMMA. 31(4), pp. 469-485. See also Scharbrodt, O. Islam in Ireland: Organising a Migrant 
Religion. Chapter 17. IN: Cosgrove, O., Cox, L., Kuhling, C., and Mulholland, P. (eds.). 2011. 
Ireland’s New Religious Movements. UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.  
32
 Sakaranaho, T. 2006. Op. cit.  
33
 For an advocation of the need to explore lived Islam in Ireland, see Khan, A.H. 2011. 
Transnational Influences on Irish Muslim Networks: From Local to Global Perspectives. 
JMMA. 31(4), pp. 486-502.  For an interesting analysis on lived Islam within the German and 
Danish context, see Jeldtoft, N. 2011. Lived Islam: religious identity with ‘non-organized’ 
Muslim minorities. Ethnic and Racial Studies 34(7): pp. 1134-1151.  
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Whilst positive about the growth of transnational societies, Castles and Miller 
argue that such transformations have brought significant challenges to the European 
polity.
34
 For example, at the macro-level, such change challenges the myth of 
nationalism and national identity,
35
 whilst at a micro-level, transnationalist practices 
challenge and transform pre-existing homogenous culture.
36
 These problems were 
compounded by the fact that many European nation-states viewed their immigrant 
populations as temporary economic workers, who would eventually return to their 
homecountries.
37
 
It was not until the middle to late 1970s that a small group of sociologists began 
to take an interest in the everyday experiences of Muslim populations resident in the 
European sphere. A pioneer of this advocacy and participatory research was a 
sociologist of Pakistani origin – Muhammad Anwar – who dealt specifically with the 
everyday experiences of the growing number of Pakistani immigrants in the UK. 
Between the periods 1979 to 2009, Anwar produced key sociological work to highlight 
the everyday experience and evolution of the UK-Pakistani community from its state-
sponsored migratory origins away from the hinterland surrounding the Mangla dam in 
the Mirpur region of Kashmir to the detailing of such migrants gaining access to UK 
society whether that be in employment, education or within the political system. Anwar 
exposed the Myth of Return, highlighted issues of discrimination and elaborated on how 
the biraderi-kinship system aided political mobilisation and challenged far-right 
extremists. In his later work, he acknowledged the growing role of Islamic identity, 
particularly after the Rushdie affair.
38
 Whilst highlighting the pathological issues facing 
ethno-Muslim communities in the UK, Anwar also stressed that the plight of Muslims 
in mainland Europe was – in all likelihood – worse considering that a considerable 
number these people lacked legal recognition as citizens: 
 
                                                 
34
 Castles, S and Miller, M.J. 2009. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements 
in the Modern World. UK: Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 1-3. 
35
 Ibid., p. 15. 
36
 Ibid., p. 33. 
37
 Layton-Henry identified how European nation-states’ viewed migrants primarily from an 
economic perspective and limited the recognition of their social and political needs... One of the 
prime challenges made explicit in by Layton-Henry is the differentiation of local and national 
political rights between citizens and non-citizens, who reside in the European polity. Layton-
Henry, Z. (ed.). 1990. The Political Rights of Migrant Workers in Western Europe. UK: Sage. 
38
 Anwar, M. 1979; 1985; 1994; 1998; 2009.  
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Many Muslims face multiple discriminations as they belong to ethnic groups as 
well as to a religious group. Second, if British Muslims as British citizens face 
all the issues outlined above, then what is the situation of Muslims in the rest of 
Western Europe where a vast majority of them are not yet citizens of their home 
countries of residence. All the available evidence shows that their legal and 
socio-economic situation is generally worse compared to British Muslims. The 
recent debate about wearing the headscarf by Muslim girls in French state 
schools is a good example in this context.
39
  
 
With the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1988 and the return of trained 
Muslim jihadists (mujahideen) to their countries of origin, Western academia, 
particularly in the field of International Relations (IR), refocused its attention on the rise 
of Islamic militant fundamentalism and its version of political Islam. The impact of the 
Persian Gulf War in 1990 and the Bosnian war in 1992, had the affect of concentrating 
attention on the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Key texts published in this period 
include John L. Esposito’s account of the characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism and 
its associated myths
40
 and the positivist meta-theory of Samuel Huntington, which 
proposes that the ideological contrasts between socialism and capitalism have come to 
an end with the conclusion of the Cold War and now humanity has entered the ultimate 
Clash of Civilisations between Christian-West and the Islamic-East. Essentially, this 
theory suggests that ‘in the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among 
people are not ideological, political and economic... [but] cultural’.41 Huntington places 
significant emphasis on the religio-cultural clash between the predominantly Muslim 
people of the East and the predominantly Christian people of the West. It is suggested 
that where these two groups live beside each other – in geopolitical space – at the 
borders of the West and East, conflict has often occurred or is expected to continue to 
occur more frequently in the coming future. A good example of a civilisational fault-
line in flux would be the Balkan region and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. 
Huntington identifies the growth and revival of Islam, especially among the youth by 
stating that ‘Muslims in massive numbers... [are] turning toward Islam as a source of 
                                                 
39
 Ibid., pp. 134-135.   
40
 Esposito, J.L. 1992. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
41
 Huntington, S. 1996. The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order. New 
York: Simon & Schuster. p. 21. Furthermore, for the positivist argument that humankind has 
reached the pinnacle of political evolution within a liberal-democratic model, see Fukuyama, F. 
1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.   
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identity, meaning, stability, legitimacy, development, power and hope’.42 However, he 
is also highly sceptical and pessimistic about any positive interaction between the two 
main religio-cultural civilisations, which have strong historical geopolitical 
demarcations: 
 
The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, 
a different civilisation, whose people are convinced of their superiority of their 
culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.
43
  
 
Throughout the 1990s, influenced by Huntington’s hypothesis, numerous academic 
works gave considerable attention to Islamic fundamentalism and the development of 
political Islam in the Middle East and around the world.
44
 After the September 11
th
 
attacks, academics heightened their attention and focus on Islamic fundamentalism and 
political Islam in order to better understand and comprehend existing Islamic terrorist 
networks. This resulted in a plethora of studies on Islamic terrorism, its associated 
fundamentalist ideology and in a broad sense, political Islam.
45
 
The terrorist attacks upon the United States of America (US) and the associated 
evidence that some of the hijackers had lived and planned the attack within Europe
46
 
together with the 2004 Madrid train attacks and 2005 London bombings (the recent 
‘Charlie Hebdo’ attacks in Paris in 2015 can be added to the list) have all prompted 
European nation-states and academics to focus significant resources and attention on 
Islamic fundamentalism and political Islam in Europe. This has created a significant 
problem in that academic accounts have to a large extent been too narrowly concerned 
with viewing Muslims in Europe through the lens of political extremism whilst the 
advocacy and participatory paradigm – developed by Anwar – has had its role and 
significance reduced.  
                                                 
42
 Ibid., p. 109.  
43
 Ibid., p. 217.   
44
 See for example, Maddy-Weitzmann, B. & Inbar, E. (eds.). 1997. Religious Radicalism in the 
Greater Middle East. London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd; See also Esposito, J.L. 1997; Gerges, F.A. 
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B. 2004; Delong-Bas, N.J. 2004; Burgat, F. 2008; Varady, D. 2008.  
46
 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. The 9/11 
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
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In a broad sense, European academic literature has tended to follow two distinct 
trends. The vast majority of the literature follows a positivist security paradigm, which 
explores European security issues and Islamic fundamentalism in the aftermath of the 
European terrorist attacks.
47
 For example, Heinz Gartner and Ian M. Cuthbertson place 
particular focus on the common intergovernmental European Security Strategy (ESS) 
which ‘seeks to improve EU coherence in foreign and security policy’ and to prevent 
further terrorist attacks in Europe.
48
 Freidrich Steinhausler, within his chapter 
contribution on strategic terrorism in the same anthology, stresses the general security 
concerns that exist within the modern European landscape – a continent that has 
transformed radically, in demographic terms, through large-scale transnational 
migration. His risk assessment recommends improvements in intelligence gathering, 
physical protection of sensitive sites, research and development in technical 
countermeasures, and a need to educate and communicate more with the European 
public. This assessment also identifies the whole Muslim population in Europe as a 
possible security threat or suspect community.
49
 Alison Pargeter and Rik Coolsaet 
provide accounts of the continuing rise of Islamic fundamentalism throughout Europe, 
particularly amongst the younger Muslim generations residing in European states. As 
Pargeter states:   
 
Traditions and cultural norms imported from the Islamic world are often still 
applied even within the second and third generation...Isolation and 
marginalisation within Europe and the individual’s response to Western society 
are repeatedly cited as the main drivers behind the radicalisation process.
50
  
 
In terms of the second research paradigm, its aim is to develop a holistic understanding 
of the everyday experience of Muslim populations in Europe. Such an approach belongs 
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to the advocacy and participatory paradigm and stands in contrast to the neorealist 
security-orientated agenda. Although, this form of research does analyse sensitive issues 
such as – radicalisation and integration – overall, the work tends to take an 
emancipatory position. It aligns with critical social theory by striving to understand the 
Muslim population in its everyday relationship and interaction to European society. By 
extracting the negative and positive aspects of this relationship, common themes within 
the literature arise, such as accounts of the experiences of discrimination and 
Islamophobia, access to education and the formation of Islamic schools, access to 
employment and social services provision and the development of political participation 
and community representation.  
Some of the literature takes a broad perspective. Jack Goody explores the 
positive historical and present-day influence of past interactions between Eastern Islam 
and the Western European continent.
51
 Similarly, H.A. Hellyer attempts to understand 
the Muslim experience at a higher European level and defines Muslim populations’ in 
Europe as “Othered”. He states that with increasing terrorist attacks, the ‘idea of a 
dangerous Muslim “Other” [has] become ever more entrenched’52 but that maintaining 
such a conception also has long-term ramifications for ‘the development of European 
civilisation and, consequently, [for] European identity’.53 Hellyer is highly critical of the 
exploitation of the Muslim “Other” for nationalist political gain: 
 
The rise of the extreme right-wing, whether in Holland or in Britain, may use the 
Muslim communities as scapegoats for various issues, but the issue at the root of 
their collective obsession is not really the ‘Muslim Other’. Rather, just as in 
many situations where the ‘Other’ is emphasised, the real issue is the ‘us’; a 
concept of ‘Self’, perceived as withering and emaciating before European eyes. 
European identity has been challenged on several fundamental levels in the last 
fifty years and, as yet, the ambiguity has not been clarified.
54
  
 
Some work is more particular in focus by being state-centric i.e., dedicated to 
understanding Muslim populations living and residing within a specific European state. 
This enables academics to explore a resident Muslim populations’ relationship to a 
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nation-states corresponding recognition order.
55
 Extensive priority and focus has been 
given to the larger core European states (or a combination of these) such as France,
56
 
Great Britain
57
 and Germany
58
 that historically have much larger Muslim populations 
within their borders. However, academia is beginning to refocus its attention onto the 
experience of minority Muslim populations within peripheral European nation-states.
59
 
Furthermore, there has also been a growing interest in research focusing on the 
experiences of Muslims communities within European cities.
60
 
With the advent of further civil division and strife in the Middle East and parts 
of Africa (e.g., in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Sudan), academic focus has begun to take an 
interest in the correlation between such conflicts and the rise of Islamic radicalisation 
amongst a small proportion of Muslim youth across Europe, who have or may leave 
Europe to participate in armed struggles abroad. Certainly, there has been a growing 
interest in how the 2
nd
 generation Muslim youth in Europe are negotiating identity 
issues.
61
 Whilst this issue may seem to be strongly positioned within the remit of the 
security paradigm, two studies – by Tariq Ramadan and Konrad Pędziwiatr – have 
opened up the experience of Muslim youth to the emancipatory paradigm and have also 
enabled a differing perspective on the issue of youth radicalisation.    
Tariq Ramadan’s theoretical advocations have opened up new ways to view the 
future development of the experience of Muslim youth in Europe. He examines how the 
identity of the younger Muslim generation is transforming its relationship to the Islamic 
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religion and to citizenship.
62
 He advocates that Muslim youth should return to the 
Islamic sources – the Qur’an and the Sunna – in order to contextualise and interpret 
Islam to a European environment. He determines that such action will be aided by the 
concept of ijtihad (critical reasoning when the sources are silent) that is gaining more 
traction amongst various Islamic scholars (ulama), who regulate Islamic jurisprudence 
(usul al-fiqh).
63
 In essence, Ramadan is proclaiming that Islam is not a rigid and 
immutable system of belief that is entrenched in time but one that can be flexibly 
interpreted for the European context, without compromising the religion in terms of 
creating excessive innovation (bida). He is highly critical of the “Othering” of Muslims 
in Europe
64
 and the identity struggles between total integration/assimilation and 
isolation that Muslim youth encounter by living ‘in Europe [yet] out of Europe’.65 To 
counter this, he advocates for more participation amongst 2
nd
 generation educated 
Muslim youth, who he determines have the ability to find a balance between the 
interpretation and practise of both a salient Islamic identity and European citizenship; 
and thereby, develop confidence, respect and esteem as new citizens in the European 
context by maintaining their religious identities as Muslim and contributively 
participating in the wider social sphere. As he states on the 2
nd
 generation experience 
within the European context: 
 
The youth are coming back to an Islam which is purified from the accidents of 
its traditional teaching. For the more educated, it no more an Islam of Moroccan, 
Algerian or Pakistani countryside but a return to the basics of Islamic teaching 
through an immediate contact with the sources, Qur’an and the Sunna. This is a 
fundamental development for it sets the seal on the break-up between, on the one 
hand, Islam, and its actualisation in North Africa or Asia and, on the other, the 
way it should be thought, adapted and lived in the West.
66
 
 
The second study of importance relates to Konrad Pędziwiatr’s sociological cross-
comparative study of young educated Muslim elites in London and Brussels.
67
 Through 
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in-depth interviews, this research identifies empirical narrative evidence that young 
educated Muslims in both cities, who are aged between 18 and 36, are fusing their 
salient Islamic identities with the notion of participatory civicness. Such a process of 
identity transformation aims to find a middle-ground between maintaining a salient 
Islamic identity and enabling wider societal civic participation. Pędziwiatr identifies the 
distinct advantage Muslim youth have over their immigrant parents in terms of gaining 
full citizenship at an early stage; but more importantly, by possessing ‘not only full 
citizenship rights [but]...a range of forms of tacit knowledge, competences and taken-
for-granted assumptions’ that enable them to actively use their citizenship to become 
active within wider society.
68
  
Importantly, these young Muslims ‘by socially engaging’ become key players in 
the representation of identities to the wider society. In fact, he assumes that these active 
young Muslims have taken on the societal ‘role of the new religious brokers’.69 Thus, 
the 2
nd
 generation are developing what Pędziwiatr calls Muslim civicness 70 in that they 
are in the process of defining a new identity – a ‘high Islam’ – that is based around 
citizenship as well as a strong normative individualised Islamic faith and identity that 
challenges securitised notions of Muslims as suspect. For Muslim youth, this new 
conception of identity transforms existing power structures by challenging the social 
norms that delineate outsiders from the established whilst also challenging ethno-
cultural influences that emanate from the ‘low Islam’ of 1st generation immigrant 
Muslims.
71
 In terms of participation, Pędziwiatr suggests that the process of 
rediscovering and practicing the Islamic religion, which normally occurs in their teens 
or as adults in university, ensures that young Muslims obtain a more participatory 
element to their identity. As he states on the recognition of authority in Islam and civic 
agency:  
 
by subjecting themselves to [the authority of] Islam they have not only become 
much more assertive religious subjects, but also societal subjects. In other 
words, subjecting themselves to the religious authority did not deprive them of 
agency, but on the contrary, stimulated it positively. Islam, in their case, did not 
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constitute a barrier for interactions with non-Muslim Belgians and Britons, but 
the opposite of it: it encouraged and facilitated such interactions...Their practise 
of Islam enabled them to generate both bonding and bridging social capital [to 
the wider societal sphere].
72
 
 
To conclude, Pędziwiatr reaffirms the challenges that await the young Muslim 
population in Europe, who are determined to ‘self-invent’ and develop their civic 
identities in parallel to their religious identity in order to struggle more efficiently 
against stigmatising and stereotypical caricatures of Islam and Muslims that are 
prevalent within West European societies: 
 
The improvement of the situation of the Muslim communities in Europe will 
depend not only on the effective struggle against at least some of the forms of 
exclusion and disadvantage faced by the members of these communities, but 
also on the results of the Muslims’ efforts to reinvent and position themselves as 
citizens and full members of the European polities. The latter objective is 
particularly difficult to attain. Before European Muslims achieve this goal they 
will need to work tirelessly to reconstruct popular images, assumptions and 
representations of their religion and their communities within wider societies.
73
 
 
The next chapter – Chapter 3 – will give an overview of Axel Honneth’s social critical 
theory of a Struggle for Recognition, which has inspired and framed this study.  
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Chapter 3                     Theoretical Frame 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the theory that acts as the inspiration and the 
general frame for this study. The theory is Axel Honneth’s social critical theory of 
recognition. To begin, this chapter will critique the communitarian recognition model, 
as advocated by Charles Taylor; such an assessment will enable a strong justification for 
utilising Honneth’s structured multi-dimensional typology. Attention will be paid to the 
theory’s advantages, particularly its tripartite structure, which gives a deep 
understanding of the interconnected forms of mis/recognition, relation-to-self and 
disrespect that manifest within the spheres of love, legal respect and social esteem. To 
end, the chapter will elaborate briefly on the varying criticisms of Honneth’s 
philosophical-anthropological work and then pinpoint an ongoing concern about 
Honneth’s conception of power. This will be explored and critiqued with reference to 
Foucault’s nuanced understanding of power and by McBride’s focus on authority and 
social norms.  
 
3.1 The Development of Recognition Theory 
 
Recognition has been a concept of importance for academics for hundreds of years 
going back to Rousseau,
74
 Fichte
75
 and most productively, by Hegel.
76
 In recent years, 
the concept of recognition has come back to the fore, spurred on by Charles Taylor’s 
1992 essay The Politics of Recognition.
77
 Within this work, Taylor reinvigorates the 
intersubjective concept of recognition by exploring its ontological and internalised links 
to identity and how forms of nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm by 
‘imprisoning someone in a false, distorted and reduced mode of being’.78 Taylor 
identifies three forms of recognition to do with relations within the private intimate 
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sphere and relations within two public spheres that he refers to as the ‘Politics of 
Universalism and Difference’, respectively.79 For Taylor, the ‘Politics of Universalism’ 
relates to citizenship and how all people should be the same in terms of having equal 
rights and obligations to each other as citizens whilst the Politics of Difference relates to 
the human need to be recognised for one’s individual and group uniqueness. Through 
acquiring such forms of recognition, people gain a close proximity to an authentic self 
in terms of increasing the potential for self-fulfilment and self-realisation.
80
  
Taylor is highly critical of how the procedural liberal notion of the uniformal 
application of individual equal rights negates and becomes ‘inhospitable to 
difference’.81 Whilst this model does not seek to abolish cultural difference, he 
maintains that it is not culturally neutral and lacks respect for the survival of collective 
cultures of difference. Taylor takes a strong communitarian stance that stresses the need 
to respect minority cultures within a multicultural environment by enabling these 
cultures to reasonably ‘defend themselves’, have their worth respected and to survive 
into the future.
82
 In other words, he advocates for a non-procedural liberalism that is 
committed to equal concern for others but not uniformal treatment. Fundamentally for 
Taylor, all cultures deserve a degree of respect: 
 
The claim is that all human cultures that have animated whole societies over 
some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human 
beings.
83
  
 
Simon Thompson has been highly critical of Taylor’s form of recognition theory for not 
being systematically presented as a structured typology.
84
 Whilst the theory defines an 
intimate and two public spheres of dialogic recognition, such dimensions could have 
been explored further and structured into a viable typology that draws on Hegelian 
philosophy.
85
 By expanding on each sphere in detail, Taylor would have avoided the 
zero-sum rivalry he enacts between the politics of Universalism and Difference, where a 
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gain for one sphere is a loss to the other.
86
 Furthermore, Thompson also identifies that 
Taylor makes a significant error by emphasising the need to respect both universalism 
and difference yet not distinguishing between respect within the universal sphere and 
esteem within the sphere of difference.
87
  
Taylor’s advocation of multiculturalism has come under significant attack in 
recent years as nation-states such as the Netherlands and the UK that once advocated 
strong multicultural positions have turned away from such integration policies that are 
believed to have failed and created parallel ghettoised communities.
88
 Although 
multiculturalism is still strongly advocated by the main mosques in Ireland, Irish 
integration policy – at both local and national levels – is firmly based around 
interculturalism and interreligious interaction.
89
  
 With the above in mind, this study turns to the structured typological recognition 
framework developed by Axel Honneth. Importantly, this study is not a test of the 
theory but is merely inspired by Honneth’s multidimensional and structured perspective, 
which distinguishes between legal respect and social esteem. It also enables the 
identification of social pathologies through an exploration of ‘moral grammar’. It must 
be noted that Honneth’s theoretical frame is broad by encompassing cultural and 
economic considerations;
90
 however, this study has purposively narrowed its focus to 
the cultural dimension of recognition and explicitly endorses Honneth’s view that 
struggles for recognition, particularly in the case of ethno-religious cultural minorities, 
are best understood as struggles for respect and esteem. However, although Honneth has 
proposed that Taylorian cultural struggles may constitute a ‘fourth recognition 
principle’91 understood as ‘revolving around the ‘mutual respect for the cultural 
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particularities of groups or collectivities’,92 he added the caveat that such forms of 
recognition inevitably lay claim to the ‘principle of legal equality’,93 which pressures 
the state to eliminate denigrating and humiliating obstacles that ‘unjustifiably 
disadvantage or have disadvantaged a social group in carrying on its cultural way of life 
relative to the majority culture’.94 Importantly, Honneth stresses that individuals or 
groups cannot meaningfully demand esteem for a particular culture ‘for its own sake’95 
but that certain traits-abilities-achievements,
96
 which emanate from within a particular 
culture can be valued for their contribution to a society’s continually evolving value-
horizon. This point is emphasised in the following statement:  
 
Certainly, cultural minorities can nurture hopes or have expectations of being 
especially valued by the majority for the achievements reflected in the fact of 
developing a distinct language and value orientation.
97
 
 
Turning to Honneth’s theory of recognition itself, which is a Social Critical Theory that 
traces its lineage back to the works of Hegel and Marx and is firmly rooted in the 
heterogeneous and interdisciplinary Frankfurt School tradition,
98
 Joel Anderson has 
assessed the development of this tradition through three successive generations of 
academics, who have applied and developed a critical theoretical perspective within 
their work.
99
 For example, the 1
st
 generation (Horkheimer and Adorno; Fromm; 
Lowenthal; and Marcuse) focused on exposing social pathologies such as 
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totalitarianism, alienation and reification
100
 whilst the 2
nd
 generation (Habermas;
101
 
Schmidt; Apel; and Offe) were primarily concerned with linguistically understanding 
‘the possibilities of democratic politics… [and] the task of revealing the distortions of 
contemporary politics’.102  
For Anderson, there is a new 3
rd
 generation – with Axel Honneth as the 
figurehead – that specifically focuses of social pathologies of misrecognition. 
Furthermore, three central themes of importance highlight the direction of this new 
wave of critical theorists. Firstly, influenced by Hegel, conflicts and struggles for 
recognition by individuals within social groups are deemed to be the motor of progress 
and elevate history towards higher ethical values and a pluralistic conception of a “good 
life”. Secondly, such theorists are interested in topics such as integration, cultural 
identity and nationalism and they have a ‘greater openness to the Other’.103 Thirdly, 
unlike past generations, this new generation is normatively interested in subjective and 
intersubjective experiences.  
A major difference between the new wave in comparison to older generations is 
their relationship to normativity.
104
 The 1
st
 generation suffered from a ‘normative 
deficit’,105 which led the 2nd generation to focus on ‘universalistic principles of morality, 
justice and truth’.106 However, in reaction to the position of the previous generation, the 
3
rd
 generation are ‘skeptical about the abstractness and uniformity’107 of an idealistic 
approach. Instead, the new generation has given much more attention to individual lived 
experiences of respect and disrespect, which leads directly to an investigation of moral 
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claims and social struggle.
108
 As Zurn has stated, despite such differences all the 
successive generations are linked together by the  Frankfurt school tradition that utilises 
an ‘interdisciplinary social theory with emancipatory intent’ to diagnose social 
pathologies that negatively affect individual freedom.
109
  
Honneth’s theory focuses on interpretations of embodied experience and aims to 
explore the existence of a basic need to be recognised that precedes any communicative 
act. The individual need for recognition results in a communicative transaction, which 
leads to recognition, or the opposite result, misrecognition. From this point, the 
relationship is then defined in positive or negative terms, with the negative aspect 
having the potential to lead towards a struggle for recognition.
110
 Figure 3.1 positions 
Axel Honneth’s recognition theory in relation to Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action and provides a good visual illustration of the process: 
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Figure 3.1: Positioning Recognition around Habermas’ Communicative Action  
 
 
 
By reconstructing Hegel and Mead, Honneth developed a theoretical key to unlock three 
modes of recognition – (1) love (2) legal respect and (3) social esteem. These three 
modes systematically correspond to three forms of disrespect or misrecognition – (1) 
abuse and rape (2) denial of rights and exclusion (3) denigration and insult. The 
experiencing of such misrecognition directs social actors into a struggle for recognition 
to regain a positive relation-to-self. The corresponding three aspects of relation-to-self 
are: (1) self-confidence (2) self-respect and (3) self-esteem. The following section will 
briefly outline Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition with particular attention being paid 
to its tripartite multidimensional structure as depicted in his seminal work The Struggle 
for Recognition (SfR).
111
 Of note is that the following section will pay acute attention to 
SfR but efforts will be made to contextualise subsequent amendments and revisions.  
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Table 3.1: The Structure of Relations of Recognition
 112
 
 
Recognition 
Theme 
Love Legal Societal 
Mode of  
Recognition 
Emotional  
Support 
Cognitive  
Respect 
Social  
Esteem 
Dimension of 
Personality 
Needs and 
emotions 
Universal moral 
responsibility 
Particular traits 
and abilities 
 
Forms of 
Recognition 
Primary 
Relationships 
(Family; Friends; 
Lovers) 
Legal Relations 
(Rights;  
Obligations) 
Societal 
Relationship 
(Solidarity; Societal 
value and merit) 
Relation- 
to-Self 
Basic Self-
Confidence 
Self- 
Respect 
Self- 
Esteem 
Forms of  
Disrespect 
Abuse 
and Rape 
Denial of Rights; 
Exclusion 
Denigration; 
Insult 
Personality  
Threat 
Physical 
Integrity 
Social 
Integrity 
“Honour”; 
 Dignity 
Public/ 
Private 
 
Private 
 
Public 
 
Public 
Principles 
of Social Justice 
Neediness 
(Care/Intimacy) 
 
Equality 
Achievement as 
Contribution 
 
3.1.1 Love Recognition 
 
For Honneth, love relationships are defined and confined to primary relationships 
between small groups of people. In his opinion, love recognition ‘represents a symbiosis 
refracted by mutual individuation’,113 which in essence means that recognition is a 
mutual double process by the fact that each social actor within a love relationship is 
released within his or her own individuality yet is also inextricably tied or limited by the 
individual he or she loves. Thus for Honneth, ‘love recognition is ‘an affirmation of 
independence that is guided – indeed supported – by care’’.114 This freeing of the 
individual self yet inextricable link to others through care is seen as an essential element 
for the production of ‘the degree of basic individual self-confidence for autonomous 
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participation in public life’.115 Hegel’s work on love reciprocity and recognition proved 
to be pivotal for Honneth’s own development of the concept within his theory. This 
point is confirmed when he states that 
 
For Hegel, love represents the first stage of reciprocal recognition, because in it 
subjects mutually confirm each other with regard to the concrete nature of their 
needs and thereby recognize each other as needy creatures…The key for 
translating this topic into a context of scientific research is represented by 
Hegel’s formulation, according to which love has to be understood as ‘being 
oneself in another’.116 
 
Similarly to Hegel, Honneth views love relationships as ‘referring to primary 
relationships’ in which there are ‘strong emotional attachments among a small group of 
people’.117 However, unlike Hegel, who dealt with the institution of the family, he 
broadens the conception of love to include not only familial relations but also love 
between friends and erotic lovers. Love relationships are bound together through the 
mutual recognition of need. In other words, ‘subjects know themselves to be united in 
their neediness, in their dependence on each other’.118 For this reason, it can be stated 
that love relationships are based on complex interactions between dependency and 
independency. In terms of the boundaries of love relations, it is important to note that 
love is kept within a bounded space by the fact that these caring relationships, due to 
their intersubjective and mutual content with people close to us, ‘cannot be extended at 
will…to cover a larger number of participants’.119 To support such theoretical thinking, 
Honneth moves away from the work of Mead towards Winnicottian object relations 
theory in order to provide empirical evidence and support for the development of 
intersubjective relations of dependent attachment and independence.  
 
Relation-to-Self: Self-Confidence 
 
Within SfR, Honneth develops love recognition by discussing how the recognition of 
love can mutually benefit individuals by enabling them to ‘acquire basic self-confidence 
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in themselves’.120 The development of this original form of relation-to-self is the 
premise upon which he states that love recognition is ‘both conceptually and genetically 
prior to every other form of reciprocal recognition’.121 Through this statement, love 
recognition is given a primary role. Love is needed by individuals first and foremost 
because it is through this form of recognition that individuals develop a relation-to-self 
in which a basic level of self-confidence is attained, which enables individuals to 
confidently interact within the culture of public life. In other words, love generates 
within all human beings, ‘the psychological foundation for trusting one’s own sense of 
one’s needs and urges’.122 This self-confidence enables the individual to interact as an 
independent and autonomous unit outside of the comforting sphere of love. Honneth 
states this point by writing that ‘the intersubjective experience of love helps 
[constitute]…the psychological precondition for the development of all further attitudes 
of self-respect’.123 Furthermore, love relationships produce ‘the degree of basic self-
confidence [which is] indispensible for autonomous participation in public life’124 i.e., 
the dynamics of love recognition have a powerful influence on an individual’s capacity 
to interact productively within the wider legal and societal spheres.
125
 
 
Disrespect towards the Integrity of Love 
 
In terms of disrespect related to the recognitive sphere of love, Honneth determines that 
physical abuse or ‘forms of practical maltreatment’126 represent a form of 
misrecognition i.e., that disrespect can detrimentally affect a person’s relation-to-self. In 
being physically maltreated, ‘a person is forcibly deprived of any opportunity freely to 
dispose over his or her own body [and this] represent[s] the most fundamental sort of 
personal degradation’.127 In other words, the taking control of another person’s body 
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against their will causes the victim to feel a ‘degree of humiliation’.128 He or she feels a 
sense of shame as their sense of their own worth is reduced. For Honneth, this form of 
disrespect against an individual’s physical integrity, commonly associated with rape, 
spousal abuse and torture is the ‘most destructive’129 form of disrespect that can be 
directed towards a person’s identity because it is physical pain combined with 
psychological control. The victim feels a sense of defencelessness and insecurity related 
to the impending psychological fear of coming under physical abuse. Honneth’s 
theoretical model argues that forms of disrespect through physical maltreatment do 
immense ‘damage to one’s basic self-confidence [learned through love] that one can 
autonomously coordinate one’s own body’.130 In opposition to this disrespect, love 
nurtures the relationship between emotions and the physical body building a sense of 
trust in oneself and towards others. However, the destruction of physical integrity 
breaks what love enabled and this form of suffering can lead to a ‘dramatic breakdown 
in one’s trust in the reliability of the social world’ and bring about ‘a collapse in one’s 
own basic self-confidence’.131 
 
3.1.2 Legal Recognition 
 
Contra to love recognition is the universal recognition of rights. Once again, Honneth 
takes from Hegel and Mead the point that rights and obligations are essentially 
formulated, understood and practiced through the utilisation of mutual recognition in 
that social actors can only come to understand themselves as legal persons and the 
validity of their claimed rights, by taking ‘the perspective of the generalized other’.132 
Within SfR, Honneth adds the clarification that legal relations are inextricably 
composed of mutual recognition through historical development, therefore, they contain 
the added characteristic of being transformative. Thus, the development of equal legal 
rights was founded on a rational agreement between individuals in that modern 
communities regulated by law are grounded ‘on the assumption of the moral 
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accountability of all its members’.133 The ramification of this statement is that all 
individuals under the law are seen as morally responsible entities, which also provides 
the tool for the transformative potential of legal recognition by the fact that morally 
responsible individuals are consistently ‘fleshing out the moral idea’ in terms of legal 
content and advocating for the expansion of the scope of individual rights within the 
collective will-formation of society. As he states on this point: 
 
As a result of the introduction of the principle of equality into modern law, the 
status of a legal person was not only gradually broadened with regard to its 
content, in that it cumulatively incorporated new claims, but was also gradually 
expanded in the social sense that it was extended to an ever increasing number 
of members of society.
134
 
 
Within his reflections on legal recognition, Honneth makes the important differentiation 
between social esteem in both the legal sphere and within the societal sphere of 
recognition. Through legal respect, individuals garner self-respect through the universal 
mutual recognition that the individual is recognised by others in society as a morally 
responsible person with rights claims and the power to advocate for further expansion of 
their rights within society. However, this self-respect must be differentiated from 
esteeming people, which is a more particular and individualist form of recognition. As 
he states in relation to this point: 
 
What makes esteeming someone different from recognising him or her as a 
person is primarily the fact that it involves not the empirical application of 
general, intuitively known norms but rather the graduated appraisal of concrete 
traits and abilities.
135
  
 
Honneth illustrates the strong connection between law and recognition by referring to 
Hegel and Mead, who both viewed law and its development as a form of mutual 
recognition in which we ‘can only come to know ourselves as the bearers of rights’136 to 
the extent that ‘we have taken the perspective of the “generalised other”, which teaches 
us to recognize the other members of the community as the bearers of rights’137 in 
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universal similarity to ourselves. Honneth relates respect to legal recognition by stating 
that legal recognition is a –  
 
…situation in which self and other respect each other as legal subjects for the 
sole reason that they are both aware of the social norms by which rights and 
duties are distributed in their community.
138
 
 
Legal recognition is formed through historical processes of development, which 
Honneth identifies as progressing from traditional law – in which membership of a 
community and legal entitlement were intrinsically connected to the exceptions and 
privileges linked to the division of labour – to post-traditional law in which ‘the 
expression of the universalisable interests of all members of society’139 has come to 
prominence. Within this new universalised system of law, ‘exceptions and privileges are 
no longer admissible’140 and legal norms are codified in agreement with ‘free and equal 
beings’ that reciprocally enter into a lawful relationship ‘based on rights’.141 Honneth 
views the historical development of the legal sphere as a process of deformalisation, 
which involved a decoupling of legal recognition and social esteem and 
universalisation, involving the opening up and democratisation of the legal sphere to 
include all persons based on their existence as human beings.  
 
Relation-to-Self: Self-Respect 
 
As can be viewed above in relation to love recognition, Honneth determined that 
recognition and misrecognition both affect a person’s internal relation-to-self. Love 
recognition enables individuals to develop, through the bond of love, a form of relation-
to-self that is viewed as a basic form of self-confidence. This relation-to-self enables an 
individual to act autonomously outside of various small affective spheres i.e., within 
legal and societal relations. Having identified the processes of deformalisation and 
universalisation, which transformed traditional law into a modern system that is built 
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upon by being open to change and applicable to all, the question must be asked – what 
relation-to-self is related to universal legal recognition?  
Honneth makes a theoretical and conceptual argument, with reference to the 
work of Joel Feinberg, that the granting of and obtainment of rights is intrinsically 
connected to ‘the central psychological phenomenon’142 of self-respect.143 In other 
words, by being granted the same rights as others, the individual comes to learn that he 
or she is respected as an autonomous and morally responsible person by others and that 
this mutual intersubjective recognition creates a sense of self-respect in which ‘one is 
able to respect oneself, because one deserves the respect of everyone else’.144 Therefore, 
as stated by Honneth, the ‘granting of rights’ increases an ‘ability to relate to oneself as 
a morally responsible person’145 and gives the individual, who has been granted legal 
recognition by the conferral of rights, ‘the possibility of seeing their actions as the 
universally respected expression of their own autonomy’.146 In relation to modern law, 
the argument is that duel processes of deformalisation and universalisation have 
deepened and widened the possibility of more individuals and groups experiencing legal 
respect, thereby, gaining a sense of self-respect. However, Honneth is adamant that the 
legal system should not recognise the social status or particular traits-abilities-
achievements of individuals but must view people uniformly as human i.e., people who 
are citizens deserving of mutual rights towards each other. In actual fact, this condition 
is an important differentiation between traditional law and subsequent modern forms of 
legal recognition:   
 
What is required are conditions in which individual rights are no longer granted 
disparately to members of social status groups but are granted equally to all 
people as free beings, only then will the individual legal person be able to see in 
                                                 
142
 Ibid., p. 118.  
143
 Feinberg connects the granting of legal rights to the obtainment of self-respect by using the 
conceptual argument of 'Nowheresville' – an imaginary town, whose inhabitants live a normal 
day-today life apart from one crucial difference – in this town, individual rights do not exist. 
Feinberg’s point is that due to the lack of rights, individuals lack the capacity to develop 
relations of self-respect towards themselves and to others. See Feinberg, J. 1980. The Nature 
and Value of Rights. Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. pp. 143-158. 
144
 Honneth, A. 1995. Op. cit., p. 118. 
145
 Ibid.  
146
 Ibid.  
 
 
42 
 
them an objectivated point of reference for the idea that he or she is recognized 
for having the capacity for autonomously forming judgements.
147
   
 
From a realistic perspective, the above quote does not mean that individuals and groups 
are automatically conferred with legal recognition. In fact, civic stratification has been a 
common tool used by nation-states to regulate the rights and obligations of their 
respective populations by categorising people into a variety of civic statuses such as 
denizens,
148
 refugees and asylum-seekers.
149
 Social struggle is an important process in 
the granting of recognition by others. The historical examples of this are many and 
varied. The most obvious example would be the American civil rights movement of the 
1950s and 1960s, in which dark-skinned people, predominantly African-Americans, 
struggled to attain basic legal recognition on par with light-skinned people, thereby, 
gaining a sense of self-respect as human and as a people, who are equal to others. An 
Irish example would be the civil rights movement that developed in Northern Ireland in 
the 1960s that involved Catholic nationalists publicly protesting against their unequal 
treatment within the predominantly Protestant-controlled province of Northern Ireland. 
Through these examples, it becomes apparent that social struggle, through actions of 
violent or non-violent protest and resistance, are important individual and collective 
tools used to counteract social shame. It is a struggle for recognition of one’s right to be 
legally the same as others i.e., an autonomous human being, who can partake in moral 
decision-making processes as others do. In relation to these struggles, Honneth states 
that  
 
In these exceptional historical situations – such as the one represented by 
discussions in the civil rights movement of the fifties and sixties in the US – the 
psychological significance of legal recognition for the self-respect of excluded 
collectivities breaks the linguistic surface: in the relevant publications one 
regularly finds talk of how the endurance of legal under-privileging necessarily 
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leads to a crippling feeling of social shame, from which one can be liberated 
only through active protest and resistance.
150
 
 
Disrespect towards the Integrity of Universal Value 
 
The next form of disrespect identified by Honneth relates to social integrity within the 
legal sphere. This form of disrespect or misrecognition is intrinsically linked to the 
concept of equality in terms of the conferral of universal rights and being treated the 
same as others within society. Honneth roughly defines rights as  
 
…referring to those individual claims that a person can legitimately expect to 
have socially met because he or she participates, with equal rights, in the 
institutional order as a full-fledged member of the community.
151
 
 
An example of this personal form of disrespect is when an individual is ‘structurally 
excluded from the possession of certain rights within a community’.152 In terms of a 
person’s relation-to-self, this exclusion from obtaining universal rights can affect a 
person’s self-respect in that ‘he or she is not being accorded the same degree of moral 
responsibility as other members of society’,153 therefore, the ostracised individual feels 
that he or she is ‘not enjoying the status of a full-fledged partner to interaction, equally 
endowed with moral rights’.154 Such a denial of rights curtails a person’s capacity to be 
autonomous in their actions, in essence, it is a ‘violation of the intersubjective 
expectation to be recognized as a subject capable of forming moral judgements’.155 This 
loss of self-respect, by being denied universal rights on par with others, impedes the 
ability of ostracised individuals to look upon themselves as fully equipped legal beings, 
who are equal to the people they interact with. This is an important issue because it 
relates to the right to be recognised legally as human and afforded the same rights and 
obligations to others, thereby, not being excluded from the ability to fully interact and 
voice one’s opinion within the social and political opportunities that exist within a 
democratic state. Honneth clarifies that this form differs from disrespect within the love 
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sphere as it is susceptible to historical change, i.e., ‘the semantic content of what counts 
as a morally responsible agent changes with the development of legal relations’.156 
Therefore, this form of disrespect must always be measured in terms of universalisation 
but also in terms of the substantive scope of established rights.
157
  
   
3.1.3 Societal Recognition 
 
The third mode of recognition relates to societal recognition, which was seen by Hegel 
and Mead as a higher mode of recognition that rises above affections of love and 
universal legal identifications by the fact that people have a need for a ‘form of social 
esteem that allows them to relate positively to their concrete traits and abilities’.158 
Honneth develops on his predecessors by suggesting that a key component to social 
recognition is ‘an intersubjective shared-value system’ in which individuals mutually 
esteem each other as unique persons only by sharing ‘an orientation to those values and 
goals that indicate to each other the significance or contribution of their qualities for the 
life of the other’.159 What differentiates societal from legal recognition is the fact that 
this form specifically relates to intersubjective recognition of traits, abilities and 
achievements held by an individual in difference to others. Unlike the universal legal 
form, societal recognition is based on the recognition of difference, uniqueness and 
individuality. Therefore, it is inextricably linked to ‘social esteem which is directed…at 
the particular qualities that characterize people in their personal difference’.160 The 
social esteem of a person’s traits-abilities-achievements are furthermore linked to the 
overall perception that these unique individual characteristics are beneficial to society as 
a whole i.e., they contribute to the value-horizon of society. However, it must be 
considered that a dominant culture may have power-over the direction of a particular 
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value-horizon and be in a position to control what is deemed to be contributory to it. 
Consequently, the larger the degree of plural value-horizons within a society, the larger 
the scope and the more symmetrical these relationships of recognition will be. On this 
point, Honneth suggests that: 
 
The cultural self-understanding of a society provides the criteria that orient the 
social esteem of persons, because their abilities and achievements are judged 
intersubjectively according to the degree to which they can help to realize 
culturally defined values. This form of mutual recognition is thus tied to the 
presupposition of a context of social life, whose members, though their 
orientation towards shared conceptions of their goals, form a community of 
value.
161
 
 
In parallel to the two previous modes, Honneth advocates that societal recognition is 
also an arena of conflict in which societal groups struggle for the dominance and 
hierarchical validity of their own ‘accomplishments and forms of life’ within the public 
sphere. This conflict is a permanent arena of social struggle in which the worth of 
individuals and groups is incorporated or not into the value-horizon of society: 
 
In modern societies, relations to social esteem are subject to a permanent 
struggle, in which different groups attempt, by means of symbolic force and with 
reference to general goals, to raise the value of the abilities associated with their 
way of life…the more successful social movements are at drawing the public 
sphere’s attention to the neglected significance of the traits and abilities they 
collectively represent, the better their chances of raising the social worth or, 
indeed, the standing of their members.
162
 
 
The complexity of social recognition is elaborated by Honneth when he suggests that 
although societal recognition should be an assessment of individual’s traits-abilities-
achievements, it has been consumed into group-orientated status struggles for 
recognition within modern societies. Thus, the unique traits-abilities-achievements of 
the individual are assimilated into a collective in order to advocate to the rest of society 
for the benefits of that “way of life”. As a result, a person’s individual form of honour 
or dignity, which comes to fruition in the form of social esteem for his or her traits-
abilities-achievements, is now collectivised into a form of ‘group-pride and collective 
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honour’.163 Generally speaking, these societal groups are cohesive and generate high 
levels of internal solidarity by the fact that the ‘intersubjective value-horizon’164 
amongst individuals within these groups is mutually recognised. However, he views 
esteem, harnessed by collective lobbying, as having a greater transformative potential 
when applied back to the individual. He states in this regard:  
 
The individual no longer has to attribute [to] an entire collective the respect that 
he or she receives for accomplishments that fit social standards but can refer 
them positively back to him or herself instead. Under these altered conditions, 
the experience of being socially esteemed is accompanied by a felt confidence 
that one’s achievements or abilities will be recognized as ‘valuable’ by other 
members of society. We can meaningfully term this type of practical relation-to-
self ‘self-esteem’.165 
 
With the decoupling of legal recognition and social esteem within the system of modern 
law, the third form of recognition comes into view – social esteem through societal 
recognition. Social esteem is recognition of a person’s particular traits-abilities-
achievements that people need ‘above and beyond the experience of affectionate care 
and legal recognition’.166 Therefore, unlike universal legal recognition, social esteem is 
related to recognising individuals in terms of their ‘particular qualities’167 that 
‘characterize people in their personal difference’.168 Honneth makes the further point 
that social esteem is connected to an ‘intersubjective value-horizon’ in that the 
individual esteeming of self and others must be related to a shared sense of values and 
goals ‘that indicate to each other the significance or contribution of their qualities for 
the life of the other’.169 This ‘open and porous’170 horizon comprises values and goals 
that are accepted as beneficial within society and come to form the cultural 
understanding of that society. It therefore serves as ‘a system of reference for the 
appraisal of particular features’,171 which are perceived as valuable and worthy to the 
mutual attainment of societal goals.  Honneth views the historical development of wider 
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social sphere as a process of individualisation, which emphasises horizontal individual 
attainments of esteem against hierarchical status group esteem; and equalisation, in 
which the scope of who can be esteemed is opened up to individuals within society 
based on merit and not on positions of asymmetrical social status. 
 
Relation-to-Self: Self-Esteem 
 
Honneth argues that the process of social esteem through societal recognition gives an 
individual a sense of self-esteem. However, societal goals can only be obtained through 
group interaction. Therefore, a sense of esteem is obtained by individuals through 
collective group membership, solidarity and action because ‘only the group as a whole 
can feel itself to be the addressee of esteem’.172 Collectives are composed of 
individuals, who stand in solidarity to each other i.e., ‘they esteem each other 
symmetrically’.173 For Honneth, war is a good example of a symmetrical relationship of 
esteem in that it ‘represents a collective event that is able to create spontaneous 
relationships of solidarity and sympathy across social boundaries’.174 However, with the 
individualisation of social esteem, individuals can now associate accomplishments 
‘positively back to himself or herself’175 instead of through a collective status. For 
Honneth, these ‘altered circumstances’176 ensure that ‘the experience of being socially 
esteemed is accompanied by a felt confidence that one’s achievements or abilities will 
be recognized as valuable by other members of society’.177 Therefore, this feeling of 
self-worth is defined as a ‘parallel category to the concepts of basic self-confidence and 
self-respect’.178 He refers to this form of relation-to-self as self-esteem and argues that 
the ‘extent to which every member of society is [in] a position to esteem himself or 
herself, one can speak of a state of societal solidarity’.179 However, it is important to 
note that societal recognition of an individual’s traits-abilities-achievements is not an 
equal practice as unique individuals vary and cannot be accorded an equal level of 
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esteem. Therefore, individuals do not have an immediate right to a standard level of 
esteem, but more realistically, should be given an equal chance or opportunity to obtain 
social esteem from others. Honneth comments on the difference between the principles 
of equality and achievement by stating that: 
 
The fact that ‘symmetrical’ cannot mean here that we esteem each other to the 
same degree is already clear from the essential openness to interpretation of 
every societal value-horizon…‘symmetrical’ must mean instead that every 
subject is free from being collectively denigrated, so that one is given the chance 
to experience oneself to be recognized, in light of one’s own accomplishments 
and abilities, as valuable for society.
180
  
 
Disrespect towards the Integrity of Particular Value 
 
The third type of disrespect identified in Honneth’s theoretical model is related to the 
integrity of an individual’s value. Essentially, what Honneth is talking about here is how 
individuals or members of groups are valued by the society they live within. Disrespect 
comes about when a “way of life” is denigrated by the cultural norms of a society i.e., a 
particular “way of living life” is not valued by others. For Honneth, this ‘form of 
behaviour [is] ordinarily labeled insulting or degrading today’.181 When a person is 
socially esteemed, it modifies a person’s honour or dignity – today commonly called 
status – by the fact that the person’s “way of life” or the person’s manner of self-
realisation is accorded value by the ‘society’s inherited cultural horizon’.182 However, 
the opposite is the case when a person’s “way of life” is socially misrecognised. In this 
instance, the “way of life” of the person (or the collective they belong to) is not valued 
by individuals (or other collectives) within society due to the perception that it is in 
opposition to the shared values and goals that constitute the continuing trajectory of that 
society’s value-horizon. For Honneth, the ramifications of social devaluation are related 
to a person’s self-relation. In this case, societal misrecognition affects a person by 
‘bringing with it a loss of personal self-esteem’.183 In other words, an individual feels 
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that the worth of his or her particular traits-abilities-achievements is undervalued by the 
society he or she resides within.  
 
3.2 Constructive Criticism of the Theoretical Frame 
 
As stated above, this study is positively inspired by Honneth’s recognition theory in 
terms of its structured typology that distinguishes between respect and esteem; its multi-
dimensional perspective on social life; and its ability to identify social pathologies 
through an exploration of everyday ‘moral grammar’. However, there have also been a 
number of substantial critiques of Honneth’s broad theoretical frame over the years. 
This chapter will examine these criticisms. Such an exploration is an important 
undertaking as it enables a positioning of this research project to Honneth’s theory of 
recognition. Since the publication of SfR, Honneth’s theory of recognition has been 
acclaimed but also criticised. Such criticisms have come from outside sources but also 
from within the Critical Theory tradition itself. For the sake of brevity, a detailed 
account of these criticisms will not be conducted but merely listed. Such criticisms 
relate to the questioning of – 
 
 whether the theory is anthropological and/or historical (Petherbridge)184 
 the use of social psychology (Fraser)185 
 the scope of recognition (Laitinen)186 
 the relationship between recognition and redistribution (Fraser)187 
 the political focus of the theory (Deranty and Renault)188 
 the teleological ideal of ethical life (Thompson)189 
 the causal mechanism of a Struggle for Recognition (Thompson)190 
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Of note is that many recognition theorists have claimed that Honneth’s theoretical 
notions are too positive and optimistic.
191
 This chapter will specifically deal with a 
major criticism of Honneth’s theory that has been identified by numerous reviewers of 
his work. This problematic relates to his conception of power. It must be stated that 
Honneth has always been open to debating with others and has remained flexible in 
terms of any amendments that are deemed necessary.
192
 However, the lack of a complex 
understanding of power is a recurring critique, which has not yet been adequately 
tackled by Honneth and has ramifications for this study that is inspired by his 
framework. 
 
3.2.1 The Complexity of Power  
 
Stephen Lukes gives a powerful account of the persistent problems and disagreements 
within academia in terms of how to view the complexity of power.
193
 Inspired by broad 
yet refined Foucauldian insights, Luke’s turns away from the view that power is 
specifically related to power-over others as coercive domination but that power-over 
others can also be positively beneficial and involve agentic resistances.
194
 Returning to 
the Foucauldian view, McNay states that Michel Foucault ‘was concerned to examine 
how power relations of inequality and oppression are created and maintained in more 
subtle and diffuse ways through ostensibly humane and freely adopted social 
practices’.195 As is well known, he penetrated the ‘micropractices’ of power-knowledge 
dynamics enabling his conceptual thinking to evolve overtime from disciplinary power 
to biopolitic power and eventually to governmentality.
196
 Importantly, Foucault 
identified duel forms of power-over others in terms of negative power as domination 
and positive power as a constitutive e.g., as in the asymmetrical relationship between 
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mother and child, doctoral supervisor and student or the legal system and its regulation 
of rights for the benefit of citizens. In McNay’s words, he identified that ‘power 
constrains individuals but it also constitutes the condition of possibility of their 
freedom’.197 Thus, power can be domineering but it can also be productive in that it can 
constitutively shape an individual’s identity and “way of being” as well as forms of 
resistance.    
Even though in his personal life, Foucault agentically engaged and resisted 
forms of domineering power by working within the Information Group on Prisons 
(GIP), enthusiastically supporting the Iranian revolution, and working on behalf of the 
Solidarity movement in Poland;
198
 paradoxically within his later work, he never fully 
sustains power as a positively productive force nor fully examines an agentic margin of 
freedom that enables an individual and/or collective to develop practices to resist. 
Instead, Foucault consistently slips back into an understanding of power-over in terms 
of domination by material or technical control.
199
 
To examine the possibilities of identifying power as domination in contrast to 
top-down productive or bottom-up agentic forms of power, we turn to the work of 
Philip Petit, who defined domineering power as existing only to the extent that the 
domineers have the (1) capacity to intentionally or unintentionally interfere negatively 
with others (2) that the ‘making of things worse’ via interference is done on an arbitrary 
basis (3) and that it is common knowledge that the above interference restricts certain 
choices the other is a position to make.
200
 For Petit, interference can be coercion against 
a body or will or even manipulation that escapes common knowledge and productive 
powers, such as laws and norms that constitute identity, must be established to regulate 
relations and guard against forms of domination.
201
 Examples of Petit’s regulatory 
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power include a culture of legal rights that can protect children and women from 
patriarchal abuse or employment regulations that guarantee appropriate labour 
conditions for workers.
202
 Importantly, the above dynamics are always context-
dependent.
203
 For Petit, non-domination is a ‘gateway good’ in that a mixed constitution 
and a communicative contestatory citizenship act as prerequisites for the realisation of 
social justice in the form of republican freedom.
204
 In terms of everyday interactions, 
Petit mentions that freedom from domination can be examined by the simple use of the 
user-friendly “eyeball” test that requires that 
 
…people will be adequately resourced and protected in the exercise of their 
basic liberties to the extent that, absent excessive timidity or the like, they are 
enabled by the most demanding local standards to look one another in the eye 
without reason for fear or deference. They are able to walk tall [with 
confidence]…enjoying a communal form of recognition that they are each more 
or less proof against the interference of others; in that sense, they command the 
respect of all.
205
 
 
In terms of assessing Honneth’s stance on power dynamics, since the publication of 
SfR, a number of criticisms have been presented that tackle the positioning of the 
concept of power within Honneth’s theory of recognition.206 One of the most succinct 
and in-depth investigations emanates from Danielle Petherbridge. In her latest book, she 
criticises not only the accuracy of Honneth’s reconstructive method but also his 
conception of power and how it developed from his early to most recent work.
207
 She 
contends that his early work had a much more nuanced understanding of power 
reflecting on the work of Habermas and Foucault.
208
 Although he did not share a 
systems-theoretic notion of power like Foucault, his action-theoretic notion of power 
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was highly influenced by Foucault’s claim that the social world is constituted as a field 
of intersubjective struggle.  
In his early work, Honneth is much more aware of social life as revolving 
around action-theoretic forms of micro-power i.e., an individual’s capacity to 
agentically act against domination within an open field of social struggle and 
contestation. However, this perspective is diluted in SfR, when he moves from the 
Habermasian notion of mutual understanding to the concept of mutual recognition and 
from the Foucauldian idea of power/struggle to the Hegelian concept of 
recognition/struggle.
209
 Thus, in Petherbridge’s opinion, a more nuanced conception of 
power is lost in the move from an action-theoretic perspective to the Hegelian notion of 
a struggle for recognition.  
In more recent work, Petherbridge takes notice of Honneth’s re-engagement 
with the ‘problem of power’210 by acknowledging his reformed opinion ‘that 
recognition can take ideological forms and that power can operate in ways that are 
productive of identity’.211 She views Honneth’s article  – Recognition as Ideology  – as 
a gesture ‘towards Foucault’212 in that it attempts to remedy the problem of power 
within recognition theory and to tackle questions such as what counts as a legitimate 
struggle for recognition and how does power impinge upon recognitive relations?
213
  
In this article, Honneth attempts to differentiate between legitimate and 
ideological forms of recognition.
214
 In his assessment, he characterises ideological 
recognition as having four prime characteristics: it must give affirmation to those it 
addresses; it must be credible; it must be contrastive in the sense of being an historical 
progression; and lastly it must contain a degree of rationality to be believed.
215
 
However, although ideological recognition does contain a degree of rationality, Honneth 
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determines that it can be identified and separated from positive forms of recognition by 
acknowledging its irrational core and its inability to fulfil promises. This aspect of 
ideological recognition provides the solution for differentiating it from legitimate and 
ethically justified recognition. The irrationality found within ideological recognition is 
found within the ‘discrepancy between evaluative promises and material fulfilment’.216 
In other words, ideologies may rationally propagate that they contain potential benefit 
(whether that be internal and external), however, in reality, the inherent irrationality 
built into ideology ensures that these promises do not materialise. In brief, ideologies do 
not have any substantive substance. For Honneth, the inability to materialise propagated 
promises is the solution to identifying the irrational core of ideological systems. Such 
forms of recognition identified by Honneth include advertising and neoliberal working 
practices, in which the worker is transformed into an ultra-flexible and self-marketing 
entreployee.
217
  
Despite Honneth’s reformed opinion, Petherbridge remains critical of his 
conception of power as lacking complexity by being overly focused on domineering 
power yet not exploring how top-down constitutive power can be positively beneficial 
by being productive in constituting and shaping identities and also how agentic forms of 
bottom-up resistive power relate and interact with the two forms of power-over in terms 
the legitimation of authority.  
With the limitations of Honneth’s conception of power identified, the work of 
Cillian McBride comes into focus in terms of giving an informative account of the 
interaction between recognition, authority and agentic resistance. In terms of struggles 
over the recognition of our perceived identities and issues of power and authority, 
McBride puts into question whether recognition-sensitive individuals can transparently 
understand their identities and whether they are ‘best placed to possess that 
knowledge’.218 In contrast to Honneth’s developmental account of recognition, 
McBride’s interactionist approach determines that it is through intersubjective relations 
to others that our self-conceptions are adapted and revised ‘in light of our encounters 
with others’,219 leading to enlightening and/or disturbing revelations about “who we 
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really are”.220 Thus, recognitive relations play a pivotal role in the ‘project of 
maintaining and realizing oneself’.221  
For McBride, struggles for recognition are essentially struggles over authority, 
‘firstly, over our self-interpretations, and secondly, over the authority of the normative 
expectations which we have of others and of ourselves, and which others in turn, have 
of us’.222 In other words, recognition from B is valued by claimant A only if A 
recognises the judgemental authority of B and vice versa. Furthermore, he stresses the 
need to take into account the ‘role of objective social norms in our self-
interpretations’.223 In other words, social interaction is composed of informal social 
norms that guide our beliefs and actions about what is acceptable as “normal 
behaviour”. Such norms inform the variety of social roles we occupy and the normative 
expectations brought to bear upon us by occupying such roles.  
Of note is that norms may be related to forms of domineering power. The 
example of “honour killings” within ethno-Muslim communities provides a good 
example of how social norms acted out to obtain social esteem can be socially 
pathological and unreasonably legitimised by the authority of patriarchal power.
224
 On 
the other hand, another example by McBride is the role of “the good mother” and how 
women find themselves dilemmatically subjected to competing demands from various 
authoritative sources e.g., media experts, other mothers, family members, and 
employers etc., who determine how mothers ought to act in order to reach the “correct” 
standard of what constitutes “the good mother”.225 For McBride, it is up to the agency 
of the ‘individual woman’ to resolve such struggles by working out ‘for herself how 
best to define and inhabit the role and cope with the inevitable mixture of recognition 
and misrecognition that must accompany her judgement’.226 Such agency may involve 
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‘an appeal to an alternative audience’;227 thereby, legitimising the authority of one 
source over another in regards to what constitutes “good mothering”. Beneficially for 
this research project, McBride opens up and connects recognition struggles to authority 
and the pressure of social norms. As he states on this matter: 
 
…we must always attend to the way the social world is constituted by social 
norms, the informal rules which govern social interaction, from the ways we eat, 
dress and speak to one another, up to the roles we occupy and the constitution of 
social, economic and political institutions. These unwritten rules govern every 
aspect of our lives in ways we find so familiar that we often do not even notice 
that we are following these rules, applying them to ourselves and to others, and 
having them applied to ourselves in turn.
228
 
 
The next chapter – Chapter 4 – will descriptively outline the research design developed 
to facilitate the conduction of the empirical element of this study.   
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Chapter 4                     Research Design 
 
This chapter will discuss the research design and aims to clarify the methodological 
stance but also to describe the processes through which the research was conducted, 
highlighting the positive outcomes alongside the negative hurdles encountered and 
overcome. The chapter is divided into two sections – the first section will verify the case 
study and units of analysis of interest; the second section will briefly describe the 
methodological approach and discuss the practical side of conducting research in terms 
of the methods and strategies employed in the field. To end, a brief section on the 
interpretation of everyday narratives will be presented.   
 
4.1 The Case Study and Units of Analysis 
 
Like most narrative studies, this project examines particular individuals that constitute a 
group or a case study. This research project focuses on one particular case study – the 
Sunni Muslim community in Dublin – with individual experience within this 
community acting as the unit of analysis for the study.
229
 As has been stated in Chapter 
2, the narrowing of the case study focus to individuals within the Sunni Muslim 
community can be justified by the fact that this element of the Muslim community has 
moved beyond basic needs (1) by being rooted and highly concentrated in the Dublin 
metropolitan area (2) by having high levels of institutional completeness and (3) by 
being the economic, social and symbolic power centre for the Muslim community 
throughout Ireland.   
Within academia, the utilisation of case study research has been debated, 
particularly in terms of the trustworthiness of narrative inquiry and the ability of the 
researcher to generalise to a population from a non-probability sample. An important 
paper by Bent Flyvberg tackles this debate head on and criticises the mainstream 
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approach to generalising.
230
 Within this paper, he discusses five common 
misunderstandings about case-study research. These are that:  
 
1. a case study produces detailed context-dependent knowledge, which can prove 
to be essential for the development of a field or research agenda. 
2. that much academic progression has been built upon by experiments and cases 
that utilise continuous reflection towards data. 
3. that examining particular cases can develop and extend the theory of a general 
problem.  
4. a case study is uniquely related to everyday social life and its advantage is in the 
depth of detail it produces about common social practices. 
5. and lastly, a case study is primarily focused on narrative detail or the 
examination of stories told by participants in the field.
231
  
 
Taking the aspects of this study into consideration – for example, that Honneth’s 
recognition theory has rarely been utilised as a frame and that the academic literature on 
the Muslim community in Ireland, particularly the grassroots, is limited – then 
Flyvberg’s advocation of case study research can be taken as a sound approach that 
connects with the aim of this study. Thus, a detailed case study specifically focused on 
Sunni Muslim individuals in Dublin has the ability to deliver new context-dependent 
knowledge that has remained dormant.  
Furthermore, such a reflexive approach may also open up new directions of 
viewing the case at hand, thereby, expanding knowledge and developing new contextual 
understandings about everyday life as lived by Sunni Muslim individuals in Dublin. 
 
4.2 A Qualitative Approach 
 
In terms of methodology or the strategy utilised to obtain access to knowledge, the 
researcher agrees with positivists or naturalists that the ‘world is filled with repetitions 
and regularities’.232 However, from a constructivist perspective, these patterns ‘are 
socially constructed even as the world appears to us as objective fact’.233 With this said, 
the project aim is to ‘identify these socially constructed patterns in the world, and [to] 
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understand them in light of the contexts that give them meaning’.234 This study takes a 
pragmatic stance in relation to methodology in that ‘the question, the purpose and the 
sources at hand must determine the method’.235 As Bazeley has stated, pragmatists view 
knowledge as tentative and in need of ‘testing against experience’.236 William James, 
John Dewey and G.H. Mead viewed actions of experience as pivotal to understanding 
knowledge as an interactive human construction. Mead viewed a strong link between 
actionable experience and intersubjectivity in that humans come to know their internal 
selves and external society through intersubjective relations to and with others.
237
  
As with many research projects that are grounded in the lives of research 
subjects, this study has had to be flexible in terms of its methodological approach and in 
its ability to adapt to changing circumstances in order to enable the participants to 
interact with trust, ease and in comfort. Thus, methodological flexibility has been a key 
element for this study and the need to add to and subtract from the project, based on 
participant needs and requirements, has been a substantial aspect of such a process. 
Although a mixed-method strategy was initially planned – this strategy aimed to utilise 
in a sequential manner qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey – however, it 
soon became apparent that such an approach lacked feasibility due to the lack of trust 
towards and difficulties in obtaining a useable and reliable survey. Therefore, a decision 
was made to revert back to a fully qualitative research design, which concentrates on a 
tripartite methodological structure that sequentially utilises pilot interviews, semi-
structured interviews and multiple discussion groups. Importantly, in an interview in 
2002 into the role sociology has for empirical investigations, Axel Honneth clarifies the 
importance of qualitative interviews and focused discussion groups that attempt to gain 
new insights into social pathologies. On this point, he states the following: 
 
I believe that empirical research mainly depends on a clear hypothesis of certain 
social developments, preferably social pathologies. The way to prove those 
hypotheses empirically would be by connecting different empirical methods. I 
would say, as a starting point, that traditional methods of structured interviews 
and group discussions would be useful. The latter is a method which we, at the 
Institute for Social Research (IfS), would like to use in a wider way. Group 
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discussion, by giving certain thematic incentives and then letting people discuss 
those questions that were brought to them by the researchers.
238
 
 
The sequential design for this research project is illustrated visually in Figure 4.1 below: 
 
Figure 4.1: A Sequential Qualitative Methodological Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Fieldwork 
 
With a flexible methodological stance initiated, the fieldwork was conducted within 
three sequential stages over a period of time, beginning approximately in June 2011 and 
ending in November 2013. The empirical narrative data was retrieved from the 
following sources – sixteen informal pilot interviews (PIs); twenty-five formal semi-
structured interviews (SSIs), and four focused discussion groups (FDGs). 
Methodologically, these were all qualitative in nature and were specifically 
implemented to capture the everyday subjective experiences of recognition and identity 
from individuals, who belong to the Sunni Muslim community in Dublin.
239
 The 
following screening attributes were identified as the common characteristics that each 
individual unit of analysis should possess in order to be included as an interviewee or 
focus group discussant:    
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Table 4.1: Screening Attributes 
 
 
Pilot Interviews 
 
During the month of June 2011, sixteen pilot interviews were conducted with Sunni 
Muslim individuals throughout Dublin. At this point in the research project, background 
knowledge had been completed through the utilisation of academic books; journals; 
reports and various media articles. Although such knowledge was quite extensive at this 
juncture, the pilot interviews acted as the first instance of interaction – at a personal 
level – with the units of analysis and also initiated the beginning of the fieldwork 
process. As Dexter has stated, ‘field research…always ought to be and frequently is, a 
process of continuing discovery. One is learning how to reformulate or at least modify 
one’s formulation of a problem; one is locating new data’.240 Within the research design 
literature, informal pilot interviews are seen to be a key instrument in progressing 
towards formal semi-structured interviews. The pilot interview is an exploratory tool 
into which preliminary insights can be explored and grounded. Table 4.2 below 
provides the breakdown of the sixteen pilot interviews in terms of generational, gender 
and citizenship status: 
 
Table 4.2: Pilot Interviews by Sex, Generation and Citizenship Status  
 
Generation Male Female Citizen Denizen 
1
st
       (12) 12 0 9 3 
2
nd          
(4) 3 1 3 1 
Total   (16) 15 1 12 4 
 
The sixteen pilot interviews were informal discussions in which no question script had 
been prepared. In fact, these interviews were left open by intention. Commonly, the 
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interviews took place over food and refreshments in various locations around Dublin, 
such as in coffee shops, universities, mosques, or other places of work. The length of 
time for each interview varied, but in general, most exploratory interviews lasted 
approximately an hour. However, some interviews could be much longer. In one 
instance, an interview lasted up to three hours and within that timeframe many topics 
were covered relating to the Muslim community in Ireland and abroad. The participants 
were recruited using a chain-referral sampling method, which is also commonly known 
as a snowball technique.
241
 Of note is that none of the pilot interviews were recorded, 
however, concise mental notes were taken directly after the interview.  
The pilot interviews proved to be extremely beneficial in two instances – (i) in 
building community contacts and social networks and (ii) in redirecting the preliminary 
research question to a matter of primary concern to the everyday lives of the 
participants. In terms of (i), the pilot interviews were the first contact with the subjects 
under study. This initial contact enabled, on the one hand, the building of trust towards 
the research project and, on the other hand, the creation of a list of valuable community 
contacts that would prove to be a reliable social network that could help develop and 
promote the successful completion of the other empirical methods – the semi-structured 
interviews and the multiple discussion groups. Such contacts proved pivotal in keeping 
abreast of developments within the Sunni Muslim community relating to specific 
events, public discussions and general concerns.  
Secondly (ii), the pilot interviews enabled the grounding of the research question 
and allowed it to be explored in terms of its relevance to the Sunni Muslim community. 
At the beginning of the project, the research question was tentatively structured around 
the theme of political participation. The pilot interviews opened an avenue to explore 
the efficacy of this line of research and to determine whether it should, in fact, be a 
relevant question on which to base a thesis. Through the conduction of such interviews, 
it became apparent that the interviewees did not view political participation within the 
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community as a pressing issue of concern. In general, it was perceived as a realm still 
primarily focused on informal practices i.e., lobbying with formalised participation i.e., 
voting in elections at low levels throughout the community. Generally, the primary 
concerns that emanated from the sixteen pilot interviews revolved around the themes of 
recognition, experience and identity than with matters relating to political participation. 
Therefore, it must be stated that the pilot interviews had an important part to play in 
redirecting the research towards the recognition paradigm. 
 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
By the end of June 2011, with the pilot interviews conducted and analysed, the research 
project had found a new direction. Firstly, the informal pilot interviews had highlighted 
the need for the direction of the project to change from being related to political 
participation to themes related to recognition, experience and identity. Secondly, 
through the snowball technique, the pilot interviews had enabled the researcher to make 
useful contacts within the community. This social network could then be utilised to 
facilitate the conduction of the next step in the empirical investigation – the semi-
structured interviews. 
There are many different ways of conducting an interview – from an 
unstructured to a highly structured approach. This study has opted for a flexible middle-
ground approach by utilising semi-structured interviews, which is the most common of 
all qualitative interview techniques within the social sciences. This approach is 
concerned with asking specific questions to retrieve answers that can then be compared 
or contrasted to the answers from other interviewees.
242
 It aims to gain balance between 
asking structured questions yet enabling an element of flexibility ‘so that other 
important information can still arise’.243 In terms of practical application, an interview 
guide should be developed, which is a ‘list of specific questions or a list of topics to 
ensure continuity’.244 The guide is updated throughout the process to ensure important 
topics that arise are incorporated into the research.
245
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Unlike Nadel’s confrontational approach to interviewing, 246 this study utilised 
Lewis Anthony Dexter’s interviewing approach of sympathetic understanding,247 which 
gains co-operation from the respondent by adopting a neutral role and listening without 
judgement,
248
 which thereby enables the interviewee to enjoy the process by taking it as 
an opportunity to adopt the role of teacher and to teach the interviewer about his or her 
everyday life.
249
 Dexter also emphasises how the social distance between the 
interviewer and interviewee enables the building of trust and for sensitive information to 
be transacted without the possibility of being judged or disrespected: 
 
[They] often have no real opportunity to talk to an understanding stranger –
meaning, by a stranger, someone who will presumably make no claims, no use 
of remarks, which will affect the speaker in the future.
250
 
 
Overall, seventeen questions were developed, which together constitute the interview 
guide. These questions incorporated pilot interview topics such as political participation 
and newly discovered topics such as recognition, everyday experience and identity. 
Table 4.3 below is a concise list of the broad themes that were questioned during the 
semi-structured interviews.  
 
Table 4.3: Interview Guide   
 
# Topic 
1 The most important issues and concerns facing the Muslim community at 
present 
2 The lived experience in Ireland as compared to mainland Europe 
3 Representation of Muslims in Irish and/or International Media 
4 Recognition within the Familial, Community, Legal, Societal and Spiritual 
spheres of everyday life 
5 Islamic-civic identity, especially in relation to the work of Tariq Ramadan 
6 The process of returning to a “purer” form of Islam 
7 The importance of usul al-fiqh to develop an Islamic-civic identity 
8 The importance of the concept of ijtihad 
9 The extent of formal and informal political participation 
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10 The development of a national Islamic organisation 
11 The affect of the Arab Spring on the Muslim community in Dublin 
12 The experience of discrimination and Islamophobia in Dublin 
13 Sport and food as integration tools 
14 The relationship with the Gardaí and the Irish Army Intelligence 
15 Feelings related to the future of the Muslim community in Dublin 
16 Are there any questions not asked, that should have been? 
(Self-reflection question) 
 
17 
Are Muslim women at the front of debate about integration? 
The role Muslim women have in countering misunderstanding and 
misrecognition of Islam in Irish society (For females only). 
 
Utilising social networks that had been cultivated by a chain-referral snowball 
technique, the formal stage of interviewing extended over a six-month period. Table 4.4 
is a concise breakdown of the number of interviews conducted throughout each month: 
 
Table 4.4: Semi-Structured Interviews per Month 
 
Month Number of Interviews 
October 17 
November 12 
December 5 
January 2 
February 1 
March 1 
TOTAL 38 
 
In terms of overall numbers, thirty-eight individuals (31 Muslims and 7 non-Muslims) 
were interviewed from various Islamic sects (Sunni, Shia, Sufi and Ahmadiyya) and 
societal organisations such as Sports Against Racism Ireland (SARI) and the integration 
offices within Dublin City Council (DCC) and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). 
Throughout the interviews, males were over-represented, with thirty-two males and only 
six females. In addition, five male interviewees (one from the 1
st
 generation and four 
from the 2
nd
 generation) declined to be audio recorded but consented to recording via 
note-taking. Table 4.5 below gives various descriptive statistics in relation to the thirty-
eight semi-structured interviews:  
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Table 4.5: Formal Interviews by Recording Time 
 
Description Minutes Hours 
Total Recording Time 1793.57 29.89 
Longest Interview 210 3.5 
Shortest Interview 18 0.3 
Average Interview 43 0.71 
 
Through a process of elimination, the interviews were reduced down to a sample of 
twenty-five conducted with Sunni Muslim individuals living in Dublin, who would 
constitute the final sample. Table 4.6 below gives a breakdown of this sample by sex, 
generation and citizenship status:  
 
Table 4.6: Formal Interviews by Sex, Generation and Citizenship Status 
 
Generation Male Female Citizen Denizen 
1
st
          (10) 13 2 11 3 
2
nd            
(15) 7 3 8 3 
Total     (25) 20 5 19 6 
 
 
Table 4.7 below shows the pseudonyms given to each of the interviewee participants 
from the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 generations. Of note is that the symbol * denotes female 
interviewees whilst ^ denotes interviewees, who have denizenship status.  
 
Table 4.7: Pseudonyms of SSI Research Participants 
 
# 1
st
 Generation 2
nd
 Generation 
1 Akhtar^ Mahir 
2 Hakim Ayyub 
3 Sayyid Aziz^ 
4 Mazhab Daleela* 
5 Firaq Aamil 
6 Ubaid Furat* 
7 Nazir Azad 
8 Saad Isra*^ 
9 Yaseen Nurdeen 
10 Adeeb Adam 
11 Dahlia*  
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12 Safeerah*  
13 Kaleem  
14 Iqbal^  
15 Nabeel^  
 
Focused Discussion Groups 
 
At the start of June 2012, the process of developing the third method to be deployed in 
the field – multiple focused discussion groups (FDGs) – began. Krueger and Casey’s 
methodology book proved to be an invaluable guide in bringing this method from the 
design stage to its conduction and eventual completion.
251
 As they have explicitly 
stated the focused discussion group is a special type of method in terms of ‘purpose, 
size, composition and procedures’.252 In terms of purpose, discussion groups are 
conducted in order to ‘listen and gather information’ and as a way ‘to better understand 
how people feel or think about an issue, product or service’.253 For this reason, 
discussion groups are ‘used to gather opinions’.254 However, these opinions are not 
gathered from individuals in isolation but from within a group of participants, who are 
selected because ‘they have characteristics in common that relate to the topic of the 
focus group’.255 Furthermore, in similarity to Dexter’s sympathetic understanding 
interview technique, the environment is one in which participants are actively 
encouraged by the moderator ‘to share perceptions and points of view without 
pressuring participants to vote or reach consensus’.256 Of importance is the point that 
discussions should have a ‘comfortable, permissive environment’ in which the 
moderator is accepting of all statements and should be careful not to be judgemental.  
For Krueger and Casey, the moderator’s role is to ‘ask questions, listen, keep the 
conversation on track and make sure everyone has a chance to speak’.257 Moreover, the 
phrase discussion groups signifies plurality. Therefore, it is important to note that such 
methods are conducted multiple times ‘with similar types of participants so [that] the 
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researcher can identify trends and patterns in perceptions’.258 This ‘careful and 
systematic’259 design, conduction and analysis ‘provide[s] clues and insights as to how a 
product, service or opportunity is perceived by members of the groups’.260 Thereupon, 
Krueger and Casey define the discussion group as – 
 
A carefully planned series of discussions designed to obtain perceptions on a 
defined area of interest in a permissive, nonthreatening environment. Each group 
is conducted with five to ten people led by a skilled interviewer. The discussions 
are relaxed, and often participants enjoy sharing their ideas and perceptions.
261
   
 
Krueger and Casey outline the five fundamental elements of a focused discussion group. 
These are the ingredients of the method and relate to (1) people, who (2) possess certain 
characteristics, (3) provide qualitative data (4) in a focused discussion (5) to help 
understand the topic of interest.  
In essence, this method focuses-in on important questions, which are ‘carefully 
predetermined and sequenced’ and phrased appropriately so that the participant will 
understand the question and its logic.
262
 The researcher should, on the basis of his or her 
research question, theoretical framework and deep lengthy reflection, develop a variety 
of open-ended questions that when combined constitute a natural and sequenced 
questioning route i.e., a conversation guide.
263
 This should make use of general 
questions that open up the conversation within the group but also utilise tailored 
questions to tackle more complex issues. Overall, the discussion group is not attempting 
to discover an ultimate “truth” but its purpose is to obtain a better understanding of the 
opinion, experience and identity of the participants as perceived within their everyday 
intersubjective lives.  
In terms of this project, extensive planning was conducted from April 2012 
onwards. Aspects to be reflected upon include – who are the units of analysis, what 
questions will be asked of these individuals, where will the discussions take place, will 
the discussions be recorded and how will the speaker be connected to the audio 
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recording. September 2012 was set as the deadline for the conduction of the multiple 
discussions groups. Thereby, a six month period was the time-frame allotted to design, 
structure, pilot, attract participants, and finally conduct the discussion groups.  
The number of focused discussion groups to be conducted was finalised to four. 
Each group would last approximately one hour and thirty minutes and contain between 
six to ten participants. In order to compare and contrast emerging topics such as the 
relationship between 1
st
 and 2
nd
 generations; male versus female Muslim experience; 
and various recognitive relationships, a strategic decision was made to keep the groups 
homogeneous by studying Sunni Muslims individuals, who are aged over 18 years and 
who live in Dublin, yet to differentiate between heterogeneous attributes. In other 
words, although each group would be composed of Sunni Muslims, who have lived 
many years in Dublin, each discussion group would have a varying demographic 
makeup. Thus, external variation was created between each discussion group by a 
generational (1
st
/2
nd
) and sex (male/female) division whilst internal variation within 
each discussion group was created by a citizenship status division between citizens and 
denizens. Table 4.8 outlines the design of each of the discussion groups in terms of their 
homogenous and heterogeneous attributes: 
 
Table 4.8: Discussion Group Attributes  
 
 
The next stage involved reflecting on what questions would be asked of the participants. 
Through the pilot and semi-structured interviews, three themes were identified as 
Homogeneous 
Attributes 
Heterogeneous 
Attributes 
 
Sunni Muslim 
 
 
 
Lives in Dublin 
 
 
Over 18 years 
of age 
 
1
st
 Generation (37+) 
Male 
Citizen or Denizen 
1
st
 Generation (37+) 
Female 
Citizen or Denizen 
2
nd
  Generation (18-36) 
Female 
Citizen or Denizen 
2
nd
 Generation (18-36) 
Male 
Citizen or Denizen 
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important and in need of further focus – recognition, experience and identity. A 
conversation guide was worked on throughout the summer of 2012. This contained all 
the questions and sub-questions that would be asked within each of the four discussions. 
Table 4.9 below gives a concise summary of the themes, time allocations and questions 
pertaining to the discussions:  
 
Table 4.9: Conversation Guide 
 
Theme Time Allocation Question 
 
 
Introductions 
 
 
5 
Minutes 
Please state you name, 
something about your 
background and something 
about your interests or 
hobbies. 
 
Experience 
 
20 
Minutes 
In your opinion, what is your 
particular experience of being 
Muslim in Dublin, whatever 
that may be? 
 
Identity 
 
30 
Minutes 
Broad discussion about the 
interrelation between various 
identities 
 
Recognition 
 
30 
Minutes 
 
Recognition within different 
spheres of everyday life 
 
For two weeks in late June 2012, the conversation guide was piloted to young Western 
Muslims attending an academic conference.
264
 Such piloting provided vital feedback 
that enabled the script to be cut, edited and eventually finalised. The first recruitment 
drive took place from July to August 2012 with the discussion groups planned for a 
week in mid-September. Although the recruitment process went better than expected, 
only one focus group – related to 1st generation males – attracted a suitable number of 
participants.  
Consequently, a more flexible approach was adopted, which involved the 
participants taking a lead in organising each group. The remaining discussions were 
obtained slowly over a period of a year – from October 2012 to November 2013. Like 
the semi-structured interviews, each discussion group was recorded to a digital device 
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and then transcribed verbatim. Table 4.10 outlines information about the four finalised 
FDGs:  
 
Table 4.10: Finalised Focused Discussion Groups 
 
 
Table 4.11 below shows the pseudonyms given to each of the discussants from the four 
discussion groups. The symbol ^ denotes discussants, who have denizenship status.  
 
Table 4.11: Pseudonyms of FDG Research Participants 
 
# 1
st
 Gen. Male 1
st
 Gen. Female 2
nd
 Gen. Female 2
nd
 Gen. Male 
1 Idris Dahlia Saiba Nejeed 
2 Labeeb^ Elmira Bisma^ Masud 
3 Abdul Aisha Fusaila Hussein^ 
4 Farid Sadiyya Isha Aswad 
5 Amir Maja Rifa^ Siddiq 
6 Rashid Fazia Mahala^ Azaan 
7  Ghazalah^ Sumayya^ Aban 
8  Saadiqa  Yusuf 
9  Ayan   
10  Meera   
11  Hurriyah   
 
Date 
Conducted 
Number of 
Participants 
 
Location 
Discussion 
Group 
 
Wed 12
th
 
September 
2012 
 
 
6 
 
Dublin City 
University 
(DCU) 
1
st
 Generation 
(37+) 
Male 
4 Citizens/2 Denizens 
 
Thurs 30
th
 
October 
2012 
 
 
11 
 
Local 
Community 
Centre 
1
st
 Generation 
(37+) 
Female 
10 Citizens/1 Denizen 
 
Mon 13
th
 
May 
2013 
 
 
7 
 
Dublin City 
University 
(DCU) 
2
nd
  Generation 
(18-36) 
Female 
4 Citizens/3 Denizens 
 
Sat 23
rd
 
November 
2013 
 
 
8 
 
 
Mosque 
 
2
nd
 Generation 
(18-36) 
Male 
7 Citizens/1 Denizen 
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4.3 Interpreting Everyday Narrative  
 
As a sociological project, this research relies on the interpretation of narrative.
265
 The 
use of narrative has varied over the years – from Labov’s structured narrative analysis to 
the 1980s period that developed a more flexible approach in an attempt to shift away 
from standardised methodologies. The use of narrative is not tied to one particular 
discipline but traverses many i.e., it is interdisciplinary. Running parallel to the 
hermeneutic or interpretative turn in the social sciences, narrative interpretation runs 
counter to realist assumptions of the natural sciences and instead aims at explicating the 
complexity of social life, particularly as human action through discourse.
266
 Reissman 
states that it ‘takes as its object of investigation from the story itself…to first-person 
accounts by respondents of their experience’.267 Due to the fact that researchers cannot 
live the experience of their subjects, narrative interpretation is a method in which 
perceptions of experience are explored via ‘talk, text, interaction and interpretation’.268 
The purpose of doing such an exploration is to ‘see how respondents in interviews 
impose order on the flow of experience to make sense of events and actions in their 
lives’.269 Thus, this approach ‘examines the informant’s story and analyzes how it is put 
together, the linguistic and cultural resources it draws on, and how it persuades a 
listener of authenticity’.270  
Academics dealing with narrative have various and multiple opinions about the 
relationship of narrative to “truth”. This study is agnostic in how it views subjective 
narrative perceptions of “truth”. Therefore, the complexity of obtaining “truth” must be 
recognised in that narrative interpretation involves a double hermeneutic in that the 
researcher must interpret the data, which is the subject’s interpretation of their reality. 
Consequently, the researcher is fundamentally dealing with perceptions of reality and is 
perceptually distanced from the subject’s reality.271 We have thus returned to the 
argument that there are two levels of “truth” corresponding with the two levels of nature 
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– 1st order “truth” related to natural nature and the 2nd order of constructed “truth” 
related to intersubjective human nature. In 1989, the Personal Narratives Group wrote 
of narrative “truth” that – 
 
…when talking about their lives, people lie sometimes, forget a lot, exaggerate, 
become confused, and get things wrong. Yet they are revealing truths. These 
truths don’t reveal the past “as it actually was”, aspiring to a standard of 
objectivity. They give us instead the truths of experiences…Unlike the Truth of 
the scientific ideal, the truths of personal narratives are neither open to proof nor 
self-evident. We come to understand them only though interpretations, paying 
careful attention to the context that shape their creation and to the world views 
that inform them. Sometimes the truths we see in personal narratives jar us from 
our complacent security as interpreters “outside” the story and make us aware of 
our own place in the world plays a part in our interpretation and shapes the 
meanings we derive from them.
272
 
 
As Reissman indicates, narrative interpretation is linked to the everyday. In a later work, 
she briefly and generally defines narrative as an aspect of ‘everyday oral storytelling, [in 
which] a speaker connects events into a sequence that is consequential for later action 
and for meanings that the speaker wants listeners to take away from the story’.273 With 
this in mind, it is important to state that narrative interpretation is a social construction 
that is strongly linked to social interaction and intersubjectivity. Such communication is 
studied through the interpretation of text in thematic and storied form. It is a case-
centered approach that can comment broadly on intersubjective everyday life via a 
variety of subjective narratives. Reissman makes the important point that 
 
A good narrative analysis prompts the reader to think beyond the surface of a 
text, and there is a move toward a broader commentary.
274
 
 
The next chapter – Chapter 5 – will begin the empirical exploration by exploring 
relations to the non-Muslim community in terms of forms of wider societal and legal 
misrecognition.    
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Chapter 5       Relations to the Non-Muslim Community 
 
Through an array of narratives, this section will explore how the interviewees and 
discussants relate to the non-Muslim community that they interact with in Dublin, 
Ireland. Importantly, attention will be placed on themes and sub-themes that specifically 
deal with perceived forms of misrecognition.
275
 In terms of wider societal 
misrecognition, the focus will be on negative media stereotyping and various forms of 
everyday discrimination. In terms of legal misrecognition, the focus will be on how 
denizenship status puts direct and indirect limitations on the rights of residence and on 
social opportunities. The last section will deal with perception of identity, particularly 
with how “difference” tends to supersede “sameness”; how the participants relate to 
“Irishness” and how transnational identities are perceived by others.   
 
5.1 Media Misrepresentation 
 
Through a diverse collection of interview and focused discussion group narratives, this 
section will explore the pertinent issue of wider societal misrecognition in terms of 
media misrepresentation. This topic will be examined in terms of how such 
representation is negatively viewed as sensationalist stereotyping that it creates 
misunderstandings about Muslims and perpetuates discrimination, which negatively 
affects an individual’s positive relation-to-self and manifests a lack of trust between 
Muslim individuals and societal media. Lastly, narratives that normatively claim for 
more positive understanding, better representation and increased participation will be 
explored.   
 
5.1.1 Stereotyping, Misunderstanding and Discrimination 
 
A large volume of the narratives from the interviews and focus groups relates to 
stereotyping, which is perceived as creating a negative perception of Islam and its 
followers. For example, a working journalist Akhtar, takes the view that if Muslims 
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‘start practising Islam properly’276 then the ‘stereotypes about Muslims’ would ‘prove to 
be false’.277 This statement indicates how this interviewee views personal action as a 
means to transform societal media representations. He continues by stating that ‘there is 
a question of acceptability’ in relation to whether the Muslim youth in Ireland will be 
accepted for ‘the way they are or cast aside as foreigners, as [the] children of 
foreigners’.278 Nazir agrees that some people within Irish society have ‘a very negative 
picture of Muslim’.279 In his opinion, the media feeds such a perception by conveying a 
‘negative picture of Islam’.280 Saad also agrees that ‘sometimes we [the Muslim 
community] get bad publicity’.281  
The two female interviewees – Dahlia and Safeerah – also do not feel 
represented by the media in Ireland or Europe. For Safeerah, the Muslim name in 
Europe ‘means bad things’.282 Dahlia agrees and determines that this is because 
newspapers and other media ‘back the stereotype again’.283 Saad determines that the 
media’s job is to sensationalise information in order to sell media products and attract 
an audience. He makes reference to this by stating that ‘the media is doing their job’,284 
which is to ‘bring the stories that are sensational’.285 Unfortunately, the ‘good news is 
no news’286 and ‘only negative news can be sensational’.287 Sayyid talks about Irish 
television when he states that the ‘only time when the Muslims are featured there [on 
RTE] is when there is some sensationalisation going on, they want to paint him [the 
Muslim] bad or whatever’.288 This results in Muslim individuals making the decision 
avoid Irish media and instead ‘watch their own programs from their 
[home]countries’.289 Lastly, Firaq states in relation to media sensationalism: 
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They have to give you something that's kind of not boring in order for them to 
sell [their product] and for people [advertisers] to attract attention [to their 
products]. So media, being media, that's the way it’s gonna be and we're not 
going to change [the nature of] it…the interesting news always when, ye know, 
[the media] exaggerating something and unfortunately, in this era, which we are 
living in [now], is where [the media is] exaggerating things about Muslims.
290
 
 
The younger interviewees have a similar opinion to the elders about media and its 
negative affect on the small Muslim community in Dublin. They have a predominantly 
negative opinion towards media because it is perceived as the medium that facilitates 
stereotyping and has thus manifested a lack of trust. Speaking generally, Ayyub states 
that there are many Muslims, who do not trust the media as ‘they believe the media is 
saying hateful things’.291 Nurdeen states in relation to international news that ‘you just 
have to look at Sky and Murdoch. It's not really news’292 whilst Adam similarly states 
about Sky News that these media organisations ‘exaggerate everything’.293 A young 
female interviewee, Isra, comments on the link media constantly make between Islam 
and terrorism and how this affects Muslims in the West. She states the ‘the media 
publicises all these kind of problems’294 related to Islamic terrorism, however, this in 
itself ‘will also probably bring a problem’295 in that Muslims feel this is stereotyping 
and disrespectful. In other words, the media is presenting or possessing you ‘for 
something you haven't done’.296 
 Similar negative opinions emanate from discussions within the young male 
discussion group. Notably, the theme of media misrepresentation was prominent and 
many discussants felt that the media tarnished the name of Islam in Europe and across 
the globe. Masud latches on to the word tarnish and clarifies that he would ‘use that one 
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word’297 to describe how the media views Islam and Muslims generally. Aban enters the 
conversation to opine that the media have latched onto Islam because they are afraid of 
the rising Muslim population growth in Europe. He asks the moderator to ‘think about 
it’,298 especially the point that the media know ‘the religion [of Islam] is growing’.299 He 
refers to the example in England where ‘every week Islam is growing by three 
percent’.300 In a comment that indicates a transnational reflection, Aban criticises the 
media’s attention on terrorism and acts of violence against Western countries such as 
the US and UK, when similar acts are occurring to Muslims in countries like Burma, in 
which Muslims are ‘dying’.301 In this discussant’s opinion, the media ‘don't care about 
them at all’302 i.e., the suffering of Muslims in less-developed non-Western countries 
around the world. In Aban’s opinion, the media subjectively looks at news from only 
‘one side’303 when it normatively ‘should just look at both sides’.304  
 Masud then re-enters the conversation and emphasises the point that Muslims 
are treated in a particular way by Western media. To explain his point he uses ‘the 
example of what happened in America’305 by explaining that the actions of a mentally-
ill individual involved in a high-school shooting will not be perceived by the media as 
an act of terrorism as the ‘guy was sick’306 yet hypothetically, if that individual was 
Muslim or looks foreign, ‘the word “terrorist” is used’.307 For this discussant, this 
indicates that the word terrorist is ‘reserved just for us’308 and ‘that’s where the media 
comes in’.309 This perception about the media affects Masud’s feelings in that he 
describes how, when he sees or hears such news items it ‘really does annoy’310 him as 
he takes the view that ‘it's not the truth’.311  
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Another theme related to negative stereotyping is how such media create 
misunderstanding about Islam and Muslims generally. Within the interview narratives, 
Nazir has the view that misunderstanding is exacerbated by journalists who ‘don't know 
about Islam’312 and ‘don't sit down with Muslim people’,313 particularly the grassroots 
of the community. The two female interviewees – Dahlia and Safeerah – are concerned 
that such media misrepresentation has a negative impact on non-Muslims and their 
perceptions of Islam. As Dahlia states: 
 
They [the media] are always talking about the bad side, [the] burka. Prophet 
Muhammad married how many women? What else?  [voicing the media] "Many 
wives, many wives, you [Muslims] have". That’s always [the story], I never saw 
[anything different], where’s [the good stories]? Islam is a big, huge [religion], 
just only these two points and you [the non-Muslim] are left with all this [just 
two points].
314
 
 
For Akhtar, the large gap between negative media representation and positive everyday 
action must be bridged by actively participating in media and by speaking to and 
convincing others, who are ‘far removed from Islam and Muslims’,315 of the positive 
contribution Muslims make to Irish society in their everyday lives. Nabeel makes a 
concise statement that emphasises the pervasive role that the media has in disseminating 
knowledge about Islam to the wider public. This interviewee agrees that there is a lack 
of ethical recognition of Islam in Western society and that this has caused a lack of 
understanding about the religion.
316
 He goes on to say: ‘because our [Irish societies’] 
understanding of Islam, in general, is what the media talks about [in terms of] the 
problems’.317 The female interviewees narrate that the media does not understand Islam 
or Muslims. Dahlia opines that there is a ‘deep meaning of Islam’318 that advocates civic 
participation but the ‘media will never cover it, unfortunately’319 whilst Safeerah opines 
that the media have ‘wrong ideas’320 about Islam yet it is hard for Muslim individuals to 
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‘change it and say "this has nothing to do with Islam".321 Kaleem does not trust 
journalists. In his opinion, ‘most journalists, they have no idea of Islam’322 and are just 
interested in a ‘media sound bite’.323 He narrates a small story about the problems he 
faced when the Garda Special Branch interrogated him about opinions he expressed to a 
journalist: 
 
They [the special branch Gardaí] stopped me for two hours and questioned me 
about newspaper articles. This is very interesting thing that, after this [incident], 
I was speaking to my family about it and I was just saying the way, the whole 
media thing, they [the Gardaí] were holding up newspapers they brought, they 
didn't have anything like proof that I’d done anything or been anywhere, except 
for newspaper articles and it just hit home to me the fact that, “hold on here”, the 
first time that I've seen anyway, “they’re taking newspaper articles, what a 
journalist wrote whether it's true or not, to be true”.324 
 
For the young interviewees, the propagation of media stereotypes is connected to the 
continuing misunderstanding of Islam generally by wider Irish society. Ayyub strongly 
criticises the media for having ‘a superficial understanding of Islam’325 and proclaims 
that Islam and its followers have become a profit-making product for capitalist media 
organisations in the West.
326
 Aziz states that the ‘biggest problem is that people 
misunderstand Islam, especially with the media’.327 He continues by emphasising the 
important role and responsibility the media have as the main medium ‘where people get 
information’328 to ‘understand more about Islam’.329  
Within the narratives, a number of interviewees causally link negative media 
portrayals to the perpetuation of everyday discrimination. Certainly, the majority of 
interviewees perceive everyday discrimination to be significantly caused by societal 
media, which manifests misunderstandings and stereotypes about Islam; thereby, 
negatively affecting Muslim people in their everyday interactions. Indeed, a significant 
proportion of the interviewees mention the impact of stereotypes on everyday people. 
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Ayyub states that the media ‘categorises people’330 and that the vast majority of people 
in Irish society ‘see stereotypes that have been implanted in them’.331 Hakim states that 
the media is ‘planting racism in the minds of Irish citizens’332 whilst Sayyid states 
something similar by referring to Irish media as a ‘racist media’.333 In this interviewee’s 
opinion, the Irish television media is ‘too white’334 even though it is financed through a 
general license fee and is supposed to represent a pluralistic democratic society. In his 
opinion, Irish media is ‘ignoring completely the immigrant community as if they are 
non-existent’.335 Sayyid strongly states that: 
 
...if you look from RTE to RTE2 to TG4 to TV3, all the radios, do you hear any 
immigrants, do you see any immigrants? TV’s too white, it's too white, it's too 
white…we are all paying license, we are paying taxes, we are paying TV 
licences and there’s nothing, as if the immigrant community was non-existent 
and that does not all go well, not for the immigrant community, who's going to 
suffer [and] their own [wider] community is going to suffer.
336
 
 
The above is echoed by Daleela, who asks the question: ‘when was the last time you 
saw a Muslim on a television programme that wasn't a terrorist’.337 Isra, another young 
female interviewee, comments about the negative impact the media has on Muslims in 
the West in terms of their interactions with others in the wider social realm. She 
advocates strongly that ‘it was wrong to blame all Muslims’338 for the terrorist actions 
of a few and that media representations have a causal connection to everyday 
discrimination.  
 
...those people who attack you on the street, they've seen what they've seen on 
the news, they heard what they heard on the news and they tell you those things 
they heard and they judge you but they don't charge you as a person, they charge 
you with your [head]scarf and that's a huge problem.
339
 
 
Furat is deeply annoyed by the gap that exists between the media representation of 
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Muslims and the everyday life lived by the grassroots of the Muslim community. She is 
adamant that the media never shows Muslim individuals like her ‘walking down the 
street ever – a normal, dual-citizen, Irish brought-up Muslim girl that has a very open 
mind’.340 Instead, she perceives that the Irish media uses its persuasive power to show 
only the stereotypical image of the Muslim-as-terrorist. Such a stance annoys Furat: 
 
It annoys me a lot is that once they are doing a programme about that [Muslims], 
for some reason the producer has to include 9/11, ye know, the twin towers 
being knocked down, and so instantly they’re trying to prove to everybody, 
they’re trying to persuade [voice lowers], persuade them [the viewers] into 
thinking Muslims are this type, terrorists or what not and I haven't yet seen a 
programme were it kinda shows Muslims in a good kinda light.
341
 
 
 
5.1.2 Affect on Relation-to-Self 
 
Such negative media stereotyping, general misunderstanding of Islam and the everyday 
experience of being Muslim in Dublin has had vast repercussions in relation to the issue 
of trust between Muslims and the media. 1
st
 generation interviewees – Akhtar, Mazhab 
and Nabeel – agree that there is a lack of trust generally between members of the 
Muslim community and the media. Akhtar states that a lack of trust has developed after 
journalists have taken the words of Muslim individuals and ‘twist it, turn it, fry it, boil 
it’.342 For this interviewee, the lack of trust between the Muslim community and the 
media ‘is a big thing’.343 He narrates a small story related to the Jihad Jane case in 
Waterford to illustrate how important responsible media reporting is to the Muslim 
community and how irresponsible reporting affects the community in terms of its 
interaction with wider society:  
 
I told them [broadsheet journalists] straight forwardly – “look, if you 
sensationalise this [news story], the Muslim community is just going to distance 
itself from the media altogether, they're just going to go into a closed closet and 
they will go back in”. I felt that they [the journalists] understood this situation.344 
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Kaleem opines that the media ‘basically lie’,345 particularly the print media, which is 
perceived by this interviewee as ‘very dangerous, completely negative’.346 Although he 
has actively participated in an array of media productions, he continues to view media 
with distrust and as a hard-to-control communicative medium. Essentially, he doesn’t 
‘believe the media will ever really say what [it should]’347 and it won’t ‘ever put me on 
a show and announce exactly what I believe’.348 Nabeel defines the relationship 
between the Muslim community and the media as ‘not that healthy’.349 Negative 
experiences related to the media production process are perceived as not conducive to 
developing trust. For example, Nazir states his experience of speaking to a journalist 
about Afghanistan, his homecountry:
350
 
 
As a journalist, [she] doesn't know what is in Afghanistan, what is going [on] in 
Afghanistan, how ordinary people knows about that. So this is important. So 
journalists, most of them, are bringing negative picture of Islam and they don't 
know about Islam and they don't sit down with Muslim people.
351
 
 
Within the interviews, there are various narratives that explicate how media affects an 
individual’s relation-to-self. Most of these references point to how media stereotypes 
negatively affect an individual’s feelings and relation-to-self. Saad reflects on how 
media misrecognition makes individuals within the Muslim community ‘feel bad’.352 
This feeling is connected to the disconnection between how Muslims are living their 
everyday lives and how such lives are reflected upon by the media. For this interviewee, 
negative media stories connecting Muslims to terrorism ‘actually disturbs’353 people 
within the Muslim community. As he states in relation to living a good contributory life 
in Europe versus the negative global media image of the Muslim-as-terrorist:  
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We feel bad that we are living in this country and we are doing quite well, we 
have quite positive image [in Ireland] and then when something happens maybe 
in England or in America and we say "oh, thank God, this is not again another 
Muslim" because anything will, anything, bomb explosion or anything happens 
like in Sweden, this is what happened, we were all praying that hopefully it is 
nothing to do with Muslims.
354
 
 
Furat, a young female interviewee, elaborates further on media misrepresentation and 
how it has personally affected her own relation-to-self. She narrates a small story that 
conveys how the media can impact the everyday lives of Muslims in Ireland in terms of 
perception and misrecognition. In this narrative, Furat is embarrassed in front of her 
friends by a media programme that she feels misrepresents Muslims – and thereby 
herself – as terrorists. She is frustrated by the ability of media to denigrate her identity 
in front of her friends, thus, disrupting how she feels about herself and how she feels 
others perceive her “to be”. Her small story is as follows: 
 
It's really, really frustrating because then like I remember one day I was sitting 
down and they had this program with Muslims and with all my friends there [at 
her house], half being Irish, half being different ethnicities and they were talking 
[about] 9/11 and how bad it was and I was really embarrassed sitting there 
because, ye know, it kinda showed me like, ye know, I didn’t know where to 
look. My friends felt nervous themselves because they didn't know whether to 
look at me or not to look at me.
355
 
 
Of interest is the way in which many young Muslims negotiate their feelings and actions 
towards media. One interviewee is of particular interest in this regard. Azad states that 
he does not follow Irish media anymore. He states that he ‘barely even reads [print 
media] because, most of the time, [when] I open something it will be like “a Muslim 
something, a Muslim fundamentalist, a Muslim this”’.356 Further on in the interview, it 
becomes apparent that his agentic action to isolate himself from particular media is 
related to a perceived personal experience of media discrimination. He confides that: 
‘something happened to me once’. The situation being referred to has to do with the 
publication (in a well-known Irish tabloid) of online racist comments directed towards 
the interviewee. He states about this incident: 
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...it was years ago now, around four years ago but maybe that kind of bad 
experience just put me off from the media at all, to the extent that I never 
bothered following what the media [report], what's up in the media and stuff like 
that. So in a way like [I] kinda lost faith in it.
357
 
 
5.1.3 The Need for Understanding, Representation and Participation 
 
Although many narratives are negative in terms of criticising the media and its 
perceived affect on everyday life, other narratives are critical in terms of proclaiming a 
normative stance – a need or hope – that media should play a more positive civic role 
within Irish society by showing Muslims in their everyday contributory capacity that 
benefits society as a whole.  
For example, Nazir takes such a position and advocates that the media should 
play a more ‘positive role’358 in society. Dahlia states concisely that there is a ‘deep 
meaning of Islam’359 and the ‘media will never cover it, unfortunately’.360 For this 
interviewee, the deep meaning of Islam relates to the advocation of civic participation. 
This form of critique is also expressed by young female interviewees. Daleela asserts 
that the media, particularly Irish media, could do more to ‘portray Muslims a bit more 
positively’.361 In a similar reference to responsibility but with more inference to 
reciprocal action, Isra expresses the need for the Muslim community and European 
society (including Ireland) to mutually ‘show the good way that the Muslim community 
are doing [contributing], rather than just focusing on terrorism, terrorism, terrorism’.362  
 Interestingly, criticism is also reflected back towards the Muslim community 
itself in that the interviewees advocate for more media interaction and more pro-
activeness by Muslims within Irish media in order to rectify the perceived negative 
image of Islam and to create more positive representations that are closer to the lived 
experience of the Muslim grassroots. Hakim strongly advocates for the Muslim 
community to be ‘more proactive’363 within Irish media, which he views as a 
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‘subjective’364 medium of communication. Such statements that promote participation in 
Irish media also indicate the existence of the opposite – that there is a tendency in the 
Muslim community to be inactive towards Irish media and hence, to be isolated from 
the representation of their own lives. Ubaid discusses this issue. He states categorically 
that Muslims in Ireland need to try to participate within the local and national media 
because the ‘only way we can change that [media] is to be part of it’.365 This 
interviewee, who was born in Europe and lived his whole life in various European 
countries, is critical of the tendency of individuals within the Muslim community to 
consume ‘Arabic newspapers’366 and other media content from the homecountry. In his 
opinion, such actions are ‘isolating’367 and are ‘creating a bigger issue’368 in terms of 
integration and participation. He then goes on to strongly advocate for Muslims to 
contribute to their community by participating within and utilising various media. 
Importantly, Ubaid advocates for Muslims to civically act as democratic citizens within 
the communicative public sphere:  
 
What is your contribution as a community to the media, as an individual, to the 
media? Could you write an article? Did you, on a collective level, organise an 
event, conference where you invited the media and told them about your 
reservation?  Did anything like that happen? It hasn't [happened in the Muslim 
community]. So, since we [the Muslim community] are living in a democratic 
country and Islam is also a democratic religion. Islam is for democracy. So, you 
can react to that democratically. Why not write articles? Why not become 
involved?
369
 
 
As has become apparent through the above statements, many 1
st
 generation interviewees 
are critical of how their own generation relate to media within the Irish and European 
context. Mazhab states something extremely important in relation to how the 1
st
 
generation perceive the future role of the 2
nd
 generation, particularly in relation to public 
participation and media involvement. He views Muslim youth – who have grown up in 
the European sphere – as having the potential to enact better communication with the 
wider social sphere. Due to the younger generations’ language, education and cultural 
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competency i.e., social capital they have a stronger capacity to represent Muslim 
concerns and problematic issues to the wider society. In other words, the younger 
generation can ‘react with the media’370 in a more productive way. As Mazhab states 
about the potential of the 2
nd
 generation to create more mutual understanding:  
 
We [the Islamic community] are hoping that the new generation can involve 
more with the media, they can speak up and they are a lot of college 
graduated.
371
  
 
However, it must be noted that action related to social struggle takes many forms. It can 
involve action to isolate oneself or action to participate. Contra to Azad above, who 
took cognitive action to avoid Irish media, which he felt disrespected him as a citizen, 
Aamil actively decided to take part in an RTE documentary that focused on the Muslim 
community in Ireland in order to publicly defend his community, culture and Islamic 
religion. It is therefore a very good example of how individuals use their agency to 
struggle against forms of power and to regain positive recognition. Importantly, Aamil’s 
small story clearly outlines the causal mechanism of a struggle for recognition. In the 
story, he hears about the denigration of Muslim women by a right-wing Irish journalist. 
Such disrespect creates anger in Aamil, which leads to action in the form of deciding to 
actively participate in the television programme in order to struggle against denigration 
and regain a positive recognition and relation-to-self. Aamil’s small story is as follows: 
 
I'll tell you what happened. There was Stefan, the director of that show. He 
actually came into the X [workplace] with his crew. I do know what he was 
looking for. He said to me, this was the first time meeting [him], he said to me 
“there’s a guy [a journalist], Alex, he's against the Muslims”; so I go “in what 
way is he against the Muslims” because I'm not a, I'm not a faithful Muslim, you 
know what I mean, but I still, if somebody’s going to say “I'm against the Irish”, 
I'm gonna say “what way are you against the Irish, you tell me ”…He actually 
said a lot of different things but one of the things that really peed-me off, is it 
okay [to say peed-me off] yeah, he peed-me off because he actually said that the 
women that wear the niqab are like the characters in Pac-Man or like, the men 
are insulting the women by telling them to dress up like that or whatever but no, 
that's not reality, the reality is, if the woman is comfortable in it...You have to go 
with the generations growing, growing, growing, growing, this is 2011, you 
know, I'm not going to tell my wife “go out and where niqab”. My wife has her 
                                                 
370
 Mazhab (1
st
 Gen; M; Cit; SSI). 
371
 Ibid.  
 
 
89 
 
own will.
372
 
 
For male discussant Azaan, there is a need within Irish society for equal interaction but 
also an understanding and appreciation of difference and diversity in everyday life. In 
relation to pluralism within Irish media i.e., the issue of employing presenters and 
newscasters from different religious and ethnic backgrounds to reflect modern-day 
diversity within Irish society, he states that such symbolic gestures will not ‘really 
matter’.373 This narrative negates symbolic recognition in favour of more concrete 
recognition within everyday life, which will increase understanding between diverse 
people. Essentially, he is advocating that all people, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, 
must try to learn to understand other cultures and not stand in isolation to each other. On 
this point, he states the following: 
 
It's just the very basis of understanding different people, different ethnic 
minorities and understanding of peoples’ different cultures because we can't 
really be very narrow-minded or seclude yourself to your own culture because 
there's hundreds of different countries all over the world.
374
 
 
5.2 Discrimination 
 
The following section will examine the narrative perceptions of societal misrecognition 
in terms of structural and everyday discrimination. The interview and focus group 
narratives will aim to delve into this topic under the following sub-themes related firstly 
to a general identification of perceptions of institutional social exclusion and how the 
social pathology of discrimination manifests itself in everyday interaction as the 
prejudice of first impressions, particularly in relation to the female Muslim experience 
of wearing the hijab in the public sphere. Then the chapter will focus on how 
discrimination affects an individual’s relation-to-self, especially in terms of self-esteem. 
In the last section, two small stories about the cultural phenomena of art and sport will 
be utilised to identify the interactive common-ground that recognises ability and has the 
capacity to overcome pathologies of everyday discrimination.  
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5.2.1 Structural Exclusion and Everyday Discrimination 
 
Firstly, in terms of discrimination, the theme of structural exclusion from institutions 
and social norms did arise within the interviews and focused discussion groups. Despite 
Dahlia and Safeerah insisting that discrimination against Muslims in Ireland is ‘not 
systematic or it doesn’t happen every day’,375 quite a number of narratives relate to such 
forms of perceived systematic exclusion. 
In terms of sporting culture, Yaseen references the lack of Muslims within the 
field of professional sport in Ireland. He states that at present ‘you don't find a single 
one in athletics, a single one in rugby, nothing’.376 Four interviewees mention the 
difficulties Muslims have in relation to the Irish educational system, especially how 
young Muslims are find it difficult to gain access to Catholic schools that give priority 
placement to baptised Christian children, thereby, ensuring that Muslim children are 
further down on the list of potential students to gain entry into their local school.
377
 As 
interviewee Hakim states in relation to educational discrimination: 
 
In particular access to secondary schools. The Republic of Ireland still has a 
hierarchy policy that goes back to the 18
th
 Century. Muslim entry into schools is 
a secondary choice. Muslims are ninth on the list to be accepted.
378
 
 
It must be acknowledged that not all Muslim interviewees agree with the promotion of 
denominational schooling but see the school as a common area that should be separated 
from the influence of religious institutions. Firaq clarifies his position about how the 
problem is actually the continuation of the denominational educational system in 
Ireland. He is against the control of any school system by one religious tradition and 
calls for the separation of education from religious control in order to aid integration of 
all people into Irish society. He states in this regard: 
 
I think the education system will be sorted out eventually. I think, not because of 
the Muslim community, but because of the normal progress [of the separation of 
Church and State] that will happen here is that religion will be separated from 
schools and that will be, in my view, will offer a better school to everybody. Not 
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just Muslims – Protestants, Presbyterians, Jews – everybody. There's no [reason 
for it], it's not right, it's not moderate to have Catholic schools in Ireland running 
the educational system and ignoring everybody else, ye know, Protestants [and 
Muslims]…Many other countries, advanced countries have already, like in 
Canada since the 1980s, they've got rid of religion of school.
379
 
 
On top of Firaq’s critique of the education system and its denominational character, he 
also criticises policing within the Irish state, particularly the Gardaí and their uniform 
policy in relation to wearing of hijab: 
 
There’s very few Mu[slims in the Gardaí]...I don't know of any Muslims who 
have joined the Gardaí …first because with Gardaí women they would not 
[accept the hijab], a Muslim woman would need to wear [the] headscarf and the 
Gardaí here they say “sorry”, you know. They won't allow that [the hijab] in the 
Gardaí and as long as the Gards want to keep that attitude then they are not 
going to be a representative of those minority communities who are around 
[Ireland].
380
 
 
As well as criticising the Irish police force in terms of exclusionary behaviour towards 
the hijab, interviewees Firaq and Kaleem also strongly criticise special units of the 
Gardaí and the Army for their rough handed approach to Muslim suspects, who are 
detained and interrogated. Along with Kaleem, this interviewee claims that individuals 
have had their legal rights disrespected by security forces. For example, Kaleem, a 
convert to Islam, who adheres to a form of political Islam and has extreme geopolitical 
views about the place of Islam within the global political order, makes strong narrative 
statements indicating that he has experienced severe physical disrespect from the state 
security forces for vocalising his subjective opinions. From his perspective, the 
following interaction occurred with the security forces that caused him significant 
physical and psychological distress: 
 
The people who came to the door, the first time they were somebody else [not 
the Gardaí]. They were plain clothes [officers], they had machine guns. I think 
one or two had masks over their faces, they were something, they smelled of 
army, I think that's the reason why I got bounced from wall-to-wall and kicked 
up and down, even when they had handcuffs on, which is really bad, they broke 
my nose. I start[ed] reciting the Qur'an, which is really bad because, ye know, I 
was afraid what was going to happen, I'd always [thought about being] 
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kidnapped or something, you hear about stories, ye know, Shannon is only down 
the road [reference to rendition flights].
381
 
 
In terms of exclusion from social norms, there are narratives that emphasise the 
difficulties in being different to the dominant “Irish” identity standard that is firmly 
rooted within Irish societal culture. This is generally referred to by Daleela, who states 
that she has a strong Islamic religious identity, however, she adds the caveat that such a 
Muslim identity, which differs from the dominant standard of identity, ‘is not that 
compatible with [Irish] society’.382  
Such differences to cultural norms and the dominant identity standard have 
implications for the everyday experience of Muslim youth. This is indicated by 
discussant Maja’s small story about her children’s experience of discrimination at 
school. She focuses on the problems that her children encounter in school from other 
children due to their difference from the identity standard and social norms of the 
majority. She mentions children questioning her son as to why he is not allowed to eat 
ham. She recounts that discussions can turn nasty between her sons and other non-
Muslim children. Maja states that ‘sometimes if they’re [the other boys are] angry’,383 
they say to her son ‘go home. Don’t stay. Go home’.384 Such comments have forced her 
children to defend themselves by replying: ‘No! My dad, he’s a doctor here, he’s paying 
tax. We are working here. It’s not your right to say to me “go home”’.385 Hurriyah 
echoes Maja’s narrative by restating the words ‘go home to your country’.386 Elmira 
clarifies that these words do not suggest going home to your house in Dublin but return 
to your homecountry, the place where your parents originated from. She clarifies: 
‘Homeland! Your roots, your roots’.387 Dahlia, who is both an interviewee and a 
discussant, enters the conversation to support the reality that some children are ‘forcing 
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them [Muslim children] to this kind of initiation, this kind of argument’.388 Dahlia and 
the other discussants are not happy for their children to partake in such discussions. She 
also states that although rare in primary school such interaction becomes more common 
in secondary school – a time of adolescence, which represents the ‘very critical years’389 
of identity formation. 
Despite the above references to structural exclusion, the overall majority of 
narratives relate to everyday discrimination. Such negative experiences revolve around 
the discrimination of what makes Muslims’ different to the dominant Irish identity 
standard. Such differences relate to individual traits that differ from traditionally 
legitimised social norms, which are accepted as “normal” within Ireland’s cultural 
matrix. The misrecognition of surface-level traits – in contrast to normatively 
recognising the underlying abilities and achievements of individuals – has been referred 
to by numerous interviewees and discussants, particularly females, as the prejudice of 
first impressions. 
Such examples of everyday discrimination within the interviews include Mazhab 
stating clearly that ‘there is incidents’390 of discrimination, which have been exacerbated 
by the ‘recent economic situation’.391 Similarly, Iqbal states that ‘there’s many 
incidents’392 and the frequency has ‘gone up’.393 This interviewee declares that 
discrimination is definitely ‘on the rise’.394 Nabeel takes a realistic and practical stance, 
by stating that the expectation of discrimination is ‘something natural’395 for minority 
groups i.e., individuals belonging to a minority religious group will have a “natural” 
expectation that they will suffer discrimination because their “way of life” and spiritual 
recognition is different to majoritarian social norms and identity standard. Adeeb 
emphasises how societal injustice is referred back to religious intolerance and the need 
to struggle against such forms of discrimination. He comments on how perceptions of 
injustice filter down through the generations within the Muslim community: 
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The mentality of the Muslims – they relate that [social injustice] to the religious 
problem and they said “because you're Catholic and not Muslim, you're treating 
me like this, then you will see, then I'm delivering and passing this message to 
my kids – “my kids, those guys they treating us, they don't want us to be with 
them but we are here, we don't have any chance [opportunity].
396
 
 
In terms of references to on-street discrimination, Sayyid states that he personally 
knows about ‘incidents of racism’;397 whilst Iqbal states that Muslims on their way to 
the mosque were ‘pelted with stones and rocks’.398 Yaseen makes an interesting 
comment, which relates to how Rachid al-Ghannushi, a powerful Islamist leader, felt in 
recognitive terms as he walked anonymously through the streets of Dublin: 
 
While he was here [in Dublin], he comes on business, he said it, you know, "that 
everybody looked at him as a vendor, a fruit vendor" [laughing], because he 
doesn't fit our community here.
399
 
 
The younger 2
nd
 generation interviewees primarily discussed experiences of being 
discriminated against on-the-streets of Dublin. Generally, this misrecognition takes the 
form of verbal abuse, which aims to denigrate and insult; and therefore, it has the 
potential to create feelings of shame and to affect a person’s relation-to-self. For 
example, Adam, a convert of Irish ethnicity, states that ‘absolutely, you get a lot of “go 
back to your own country”’400 and Isra recounts her ‘first time wearing the scarf [hijab] 
and walking down the street, [and] people said “go back to where you come from”.401 
Furat, a Muslim of Libyan ethnicity, recollects how she was called a ‘Paki’ on the street. 
She clarifies: ‘I'm not a Paki, I'm Libyan’.402  
Although most of the discrimination is verbal, sometimes it does break out into 
acts of physical abuse that humiliate and damage a person’s sense-of-self. Nurdeen 
speaks of the time he was attacked ‘down the road from the mosque’ when ‘three 
teenagers popped [hit] me in the nose’.403 Furat described how her friend, who was 
walking down the street, had her hijab ripped off her head. She clarifies that the reason 
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for such action was to ‘humiliate her [friend] in front of everybody.’404 Azad, a young 
dark-skinned Muslim male of African descent, narrates how he experienced physical 
discrimination whilst walking around his local area. He states that ‘when walking the 
streets you have to be prepared, like [possibly] someone's going to throw a comment or 
something’.405 To avoid this ‘anti-social behaviour’, he will ‘try as much as possible to 
avoid walking down that side [of the street]’.406 Interestingly, he finds not only the acts 
of discrimination and of avoiding it difficult but also trying to assess the reasons behind 
such public abuse. Was he discriminated against because he is Muslim or because of his 
skin colour or is it just general anti-social behaviour that he happened to fall victim to? 
By questioning the act of discrimination itself, he is reflecting on its complexity and is 
reporting that it does psychologically affect the victim, who attempts to understand the 
reasoning behind such abuse:  
 
Sometimes you be like “okay he did that, the only way he did that is because I'm 
different or because of my skin colour or because of this, and this and this”. So, 
it's difficult to say, it could be anti-social behaviour or it could be racial because, 
I don't see it but I do experience [it], like I do experience it from time-to-time 
along those sides [areas of Dublin].
407
 
 
Similarly to Azad, Daleela also recounts her experience of trying to assess the probable 
cause for the discrimination she suffered. She states that she experienced a few incidents 
‘where you get called names or you clearly see that someone has a problem with you 
because of your religious and cultural background’.408 For this female interviewee, it 
does create paranoia. She states questioningly that ‘sometimes you never know if it's 
your own paranoia or not’.409 Another Muslim youth, Aziz is one of two interviewees, 
who mentions the issue of ‘name-calling’. He talks about the ‘joking about’410 or 
‘slagging’ that occurred in his secondary school411 whilst Nurdeen succinctly reflects on 
past childhood experiences by stating: ‘I grew up being called names’.412  
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Such abuse does not stop when one reaches adulthood as Nurdeen continues to 
state in relation to his public activities of conducting da’wa (calling people to Islam by 
public preaching) in Dublin city centre. This interviewee comments on a guy, who 
regularly comes by the da’wa table ‘every two or three weeks and gives out’.413 This 
guy publicly calls Muslims such things as ‘suicide bombers’.414 When asked about the 
frequency of discrimination at the da'wa table, Nurdeen states that ‘out of three days [of 
doing da'wa] you get it once or twice’.415 Adam discusses his acts of da’wa and 
experiences of discrimination, which constantly link Islam and being Muslim with 
terrorism and particular acts of violence. He states that ‘we've been made to feel 
guilty’416 and ‘there’s not one day I stand over there at the [da'wa table that] I don't hear 
“oh, September 11
th
…”’.417 He stresses that discrimination is to be expected when 
publicly preaching in Dublin city centre. As this convert to Islam states, ‘absolutely, like 
you get a lot of “go back to your own country”’.418 In terms of relations with the Gardaí, 
he states that overall relations are positive. However, he experienced one incident that 
made him realise the precariousness of his position as a young convert propagating a 
minority religion to a majority, who are either predominantly secular or Christian: 
 
There was one incident where, a female Garda and a guy came up and he was so 
“Muslims are terrorists, the Prophet Mohammad was a paedophile” and he made 
this cutting action with his [finger], across his neck and, [he said] “these 
Muslims will kill you!”. Now I was twenty feet away, I could hear this man 
shouting this, there was a Garda standing beside him and when I asked the 
Garda to remove him because he was inciting hatred…she said she “didn't hear a 
thing?”419 
 
In terms of opinion within the young male discussion group, Nejeed comments on how 
class interacts with the prejudice of first impressions. He relativises that societal 
recognition ‘depends on the person’420 and then uses a class analogy that associates 
positive forms of recognition with higher socio-economic areas and misrecognition with 
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disadvantaged areas of Dublin. He states – ‘for example’421 in a ‘rough area’422 people, 
who live in these areas ‘judge people from what they do’.423 In other words, for this 
discussant, areas associated with a low socio-economic social class do not view a 
person’s abilities positively and will discriminate against others even though – ‘you 
could be one of the smartest people, you could be great at soccer, you could have some 
amazing talent that they don't have’.424 In these areas of the city, people are judged by 
their visibly recognisable genetic and constructed surface-level traits, whether that be 
skin colour or clothing signifying a different ethno-cultural or religious identity. Nejeed 
narrates this aspect by stating that ‘they'll still like judge ye in a bad area, they'll still be 
judging you, “oh yeah, you're a Paki”’.425 At this point Yusuf, who lives in a council 
estate and views himself as different from the other discussants in that he belongs to a 
lower socio-economic district of Dublin, vocally states ‘no’426 in disagreement with the 
above comments by the other discussants. In his opinion, people who misrecognise 
others, based on visible surface-level traits instead of underlying abilities, are 
‘ignorant’.427 Nejeed agrees with Yusuf that ‘ignorance comes in[to]’428 why people 
discriminate but then he restates his point about class that, within “good” areas, people 
look beyond particular difference and ‘they don't really mind where you are from, what 
religion you are. They respect you more for your religion; they think that you are [a] 
model for your religion’.429 However, in this discussant’s opinion, in a “bad” area ‘it's 
all towards your religion, what you look like and everything’.430  
 Another male discussant, Azaan, enters the conversation and explains how 
discrimination is very much a present-day struggle for Muslims in Dublin. As an 
example, he talks about an anonymous letter received by all mosques and Muslim 
restaurants, the day before the discussion took place, which stated that ‘Irish people 
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want Muslims out’.431 The discussant clarifies that ‘obviously it was written by 
some[one] not representing Irish people, of course’.432 Yusuf states that he had ‘seen the 
letter’,433 which was being talked about in the mosque on the night of the discussion 
group. He states that the anonymous letter-writer is ‘a really stupid person’434 and 
provides evidence for this by stating that it had contained ‘basic vocabulary 
mistakes’.435 This statement creates laughter amongst the other discussants. For Yusuf, 
the perceived stupidity of the letter-writer ensures that he is ‘not the scariest 
scumbag’436 or somebody to be taken seriously. He states loudly to the other 
discussants: ‘I was looking at it [the letter] and started laughing’.437 Despite Yusuf’s 
claim that the letter is a joke, Azaan interjects into the conversation to explain the 
contents of the letter and how such threats relate back to the influence of the media:  
 
He [the letter-writer] was telling everyone, he was writing and he was saying 
that “everyone that is Irish, true Irish people” something like that “want all the 
Muslims out and they're going to attack Muslim people on the street and they’re 
going to get their kids to attack Muslim kids in schools and they're going to do 
this and that” and whatever, “until Muslims are out [of Ireland]” and they said 
that “if any Muslim people die in the process, we hope you burn in hell”. So 
obviously, well not I’m not 100% sure, but well like I'm pretty sure, that some of 
it would have to be done through media and stuff…so people, whether they are 
extreme or hate Muslims or not, they will have that fear like put into them 
because of the media.
438
  
 
The most insightful narratives about discrimination as the prejudice of first impressions 
emanate from female narratives, particularly in relation to wearing the hijab and being 
publicly identified by others as Muslim in the public sphere. Interviewees – Dahlia and 
Safeerah – insist that discrimination against Muslims in Ireland is ‘not systematic or it 
doesn’t happen every day’;439 however, ‘some kinda incidents’440 have happened that 
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are related ‘about hijab’441 or ‘about our sons at school’.442 Overall, when reflecting on 
her life and position within Irish society, Dahlia finds herself to be ‘lucky’443 to be a 
full-citizen and legally recognised in comparison to the isolation experienced by 
asylum-seekers in Ireland. However, she and Safeerah narrate an enlightening small 
story that illuminates how difficult it can be for Muslim women “to be” in the Irish 
public sphere, particularly when that “being” goes against social norms and the 
dominant cultural identity standard.  
For Dahlia, a positive relation-to-self, particularly self-confidence is intrinsic to 
wearing the hijab and being different to the “normal” identity standard. However, trying 
to be Muslim in the wider public sphere can be a difficult everyday intersubjective 
struggle that is also dependent on one’s relation-to-self. Dahlia narrates a small story 
about her Filipino friend, who did not have the confidence to wear the hijab in public 
and be seen as different to others in everyday life: 
 
Dahlia: Yes, you are confident, you understand [why Islam prescribes the hijab], 
you do it [you wear the hijab], I don’t care, they put me in many debates in 
shopping centre when I used to be, I say “I do my best to answer”, if it’s not 
[good enough to convince them] I don’t care, this will not affect me.  I think it 
depends on how you are confident and some, like I have a friend, she was a 
Filipino Christian and she converted to Islam, she wear the hijab immediately, 
she enjoyed [it] but she find herself like "I’m a stranger, [yet] everyone look at 
me". I said "You think this; they are not look at you [they are looking at the 
hijab, what you represent], if they look at you, and it’s ok". 
 
Safeerah: She wanted to feel, you know, [spiritually] affected. 
 
Dahlia: She said "I want to feel [that] I’m normal". 
 
Safeerah: The same as everybody else, yeah.  
 
Dahlia: I said "and what's normal?" 
 
Safeerah: Some of them does though, some of them does [stare]. 
 
Dahlia: But that not affect me, to be honest, I am proud of what I have [the hijab 
covering my head and the religion that prescribes it] and then at the end [of the 
story about the Filipino woman], she decided to take the hijab and she took it 
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[off], because why?  The [social] pressure.
444
 
 
Some 1
st
 generation males indicate their awareness of the issues that their female loved 
ones encounter in everyday interaction. For example, Firaq discusses the position of the 
hijab in Irish society. First of all, he states that ‘equality and discrimination is a big 
issue’445 and that ‘women are more affected by it [discrimination] than [Muslim] 
men’.446 He continues by narrating how his wife has experienced discrimination more 
often than himself. He reasons why this is the case by referring to the visibility of 
Muslim women in that their difference is ‘more obvious with their headscarf…and that 
makes [them] some kind of clear targets for discrimination’.447  
Such an experience is expressed by 2
nd
 generation interviewee Furat, who 
mentions her friend’s hijab being ‘ripped off her’.448 She also comments that the hijab 
carries with it the generalised perception and connotation that Muslim women lack 
agency and are forced to wear the headscarf by male patriarchal powers. As she states 
about this perception: ‘the first thing that people think when they see the headscarf is 
‘she [is] made wear it; I betcha that’s against her will; I betcha her father or her husband 
[made her wear it]’.449 Daleela states her opinion that the hijab and prejudice are linked 
and that by the simple act of wearing the hijab a Muslim woman is placing herself in the 
aim of discriminatory acts. She states that ‘you're the one who's wearing it [the hijab]; 
you're the one who's facing the prejudices’.450  Another female interviewee, Isra, states 
that in her own experience ‘you hear people saying “all Muslims are terrorists, you 
shouldn't be bombing everywhere, why are you killing [people]”’?451 This interviewee 
is adamant in her claim that Irish people ‘just do discriminate with the scarf [hijab] and 
they have [a] problem [with it]’.452 This has impacted on the everyday lives of many 
Muslim women. Isra describes her interactions with other Muslim women and how 
discrimination consumes their daily lives: ‘I have met with a lot of young [Muslim] 
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women, who are facing [discrimination] everyday, almost [all] their life – on the bus, on 
the street, in the shops, everywhere’.453 
 On the link between discrimination as the prejudice of first impressions and the 
sphere of work, once again the three young female interviewees above – Daleela, Furat 
and Isra – narrate their negative work experiences and connect it to wearing the hijab 
publicly. Two respondents – Daleela and Furat – discuss problems of wearing the hijab 
whilst simultaneously attempting to obtain employment whilst Isra gives an example of 
the actual difficulties she faced when wearing the hijab within a public work space. 
Daleela once again expresses her feelings of paranoia but this time in relation to 
obtaining work. She states that ‘you can never know why you didn't get the job, it could 
be you or it could be the first impression they are going to get of your [religious or 
ethnic] culture’.454 Furat states something similar by commenting that ‘another thing 
about the headscarf is that at work, sometimes you don't know whether you’re kinda 
getting declined for a job’455 because of the headscarf. To highlight the problems 
associated with the hijab and employment opportunities, Furat narrates a small story 
about a girlfriend, who always wore the headscarf but could not obtain a job interview. 
Within this story, the female friend ‘decided that it [the hijab] wasn't for her, [so] she 
took it off’.456 Due to this decision, ‘as soon as she started applying for this job, she was 
getting call-backs left, right and centre and they were trying to woo her’.457 
Consequently, Furat’s friend began ‘kind of thinking “was it really that [the hijab] was 
kind of stopping me from getting a job”’?458  
Also the following small story narrated by Isra is a good example of the 
recognitive-power dilemmas faced by young Muslims in Dublin who encounter, within 
the work place, challenges to their religious identity from others in positions of 
authority. The small story below shows that Muslim youth do struggle against forms of 
power that attempt to limit their freedom to express an Islamic identity in public. As 
shown in the narrative below, Isra successfully struggles for the recognition of her most 
salient identity and the freedom to express it by wearing the hijab in a public workspace. 
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Of note is that Isra is willing to sacrifice her monetary employment than give up the 
most salient part of her identity: 
 
I remember one day I was [working at Dublin] airport. I was wearing my [head] 
scarf and the woman [a security woman in the airport] told me to remove my 
scarf [hijab], I look at her and say “listen, you cannot tell me some things, I'm 
not going to remove my scarf”. Even though, if I really can remove it? I showed 
her and said “listen, this is my scarf; I'm not going to remove it”. If you want to 
sack me, you can sack me, but I'm not going to remove it…So, the woman did 
understand what I'm saying and where I'm coming from and then she let me go. 
If that day I didn't say “I'm not going to do it”, she will keep on doing [it to] any 
other Muslim woman, who was passing the airport but I said “no” and then she 
agreed and she say “okay” and she let me go. So, that's why I said one person 
cannot spoil a whole thing.
459
 
 
Within the 1
st
 generation female discussion group, Meera reasons that such societal 
misrecognition against the hijab is caused by a lack of knowledge and understanding of 
“difference”, particularly the Islamic kind. She states that, in her everyday life, she is 
constantly talking about Islam to other people and has come to realise that ‘some people 
don’t really know why I wear scarf [the hijab]’.460 In her opinion, there is a deep 
misunderstanding about Islam and Muslims in Irish society.
461
 Hurriyah enters the 
discussion with a narrative that explores how knowledge is related to the themes of 
recognition and respect. This narrative is worth reproducing in full as it symbolises the 
importance that is placed on the themes of recognition and respect:  
 
With knowledge, they [Muslims and Non-Muslims] can change recognition to 
us [Muslims] more. With my eyes, the recognition from the respect. If you 
respect yourself, people will respect you. If you yourself respect others, people 
will respect you – it’s reciprocal. Like you cannot be recognised until when you 
to yourself acknowledge other peoples differences, not criticising them, you 
understand me, because we are very easy to judge people, you know even within 
myself as Muslim, we judge each other “oh, she’s not wearing the hijab, she’s 
not doing this”. Leave that to Allah to judge. So within ourselves, I would say 
“we have to search inside ourselves” you understand…so, in so many ways as 
well, recognition comes within yourself, respecting the other people and ready to 
work with people, without discriminating them. Then, there will be unity.
462
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In the above statement, Hurriyah is emphasising the core importance and connection 
between knowledge, recognition and respect. In the first line, she emphasises that a 
greater degree of societal knowledge about Islam will have the affect of changing the 
recognition that Muslims receive from others. She then succinctly connects recognition 
to respect and positions it as important to the self and others in that it is a reciprocal 
exchange. As she states in relation to this point: ‘if you yourself respect others, people 
will respect you – it’s reciprocal’.463 For Hurriyah, respect and recognition is first 
performed by the need to respect and recognise oneself, and then a person can tolerate 
the differences of others instead of being judgemental. This discussant acknowledges 
human fallibility and the tendency to judge each other. She states that Muslims also 
judge other Muslims, especially in relation to the hijab. She advocates for humans to 
stop judging each other. In her opinion, people must use their spiritual recognition to 
leave judging to an abstract phenomenon such as God. Hurriyah stresses how 
recognition is a self-relation in that ‘recognition comes from within yourself’464 but that 
it also has an external aspect, which involves recognition of and co-operation with 
others ‘without discriminating them’.465 For this discussant, the acting out of this 
internal and external knowledge will create unity and solidarity within society.
466
  
 
5.2.2 Transitional Phenomena as Common-Ground  
 
With forms of discrimination identified, a pertinent question comes to the fore: where is 
the common-ground between Muslims and non-Muslims within Irish society? i.e., a 
place where discrimination as the prejudice of first impressions can be overcome and 
people can be recognised equally as human and also respected for their individual traits- 
abilities-achievements. Two small stories – by Fusaila and Masud within the youth 
discussion groups – provide a reflective insight that lead to answering the above 
question. Both of these small stories emphasise the importance of cultural transitional 
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phenomenon, to use a Winnicottian turn of phrase, as a reciprocal common-ground, 
which aids interaction between people.
467
 
 Isha is cognisant that when two different people meet there can initially be a 
‘prejudice of first impressions’.468 Although this is a negative aspect of the human 
condition, this discussant is also adamant that such discrimination can be overcome in 
that – through communication – people ‘start to get to know you’469 and within a small 
timeframe – ‘like just five minutes’470 – when they hear you speak English with an Irish 
accent ‘then they might actually see you as a person instead of as a Muslim’.471 Isha’s 
twin, Fusaila adds a small story that elaborates on how she feels recognised within an 
artistic social network yet she positions this in relation to the prejudice that manifests 
around first impressions and how this can be overcome. Her small story is as follows: 
 
It depends on what you associate yourself with as well because me, Isha and 
Rifa, we are artists, we do art. Like in our classes as well we’d be like the only 
[artistic] Muslims ‘cos Muslims don’t tend to do that thing. We [Muslims 
generally] go more into like doctors and law and all that but we’re more in the 
creative side. So, we associate ourselves with that kind of thing and when we 
like, when we go to like exhibitions and stuff like that people will, the first thing 
always they’ll see – “Muslim” – ‘cos we’re wearing our scarves but then they’ll 
like be “an artist”, I feel like we all understand each other, we’re all creative 
whatever so I feel like I’m really accepted in the art world because we all have a 
creative understanding.
472
 
 
Within the above narrative, Fusaila clarifies that she, her twin sister and Rifa are not the 
same as other young Muslims because they have a ‘creative side’473 i.e., they are artists. 
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The choice of such a profession is unusual for Muslims in that most young European 
Muslims, under parental influence, enter the medical, legal or financial professions. 
Fusaila speaks of her experience of going to art exhibitions and how she is immediately 
recognised for her particular race and Muslim traits i.e., wearing the hijab. However, in 
terms of abilities as an artist, she believes that she is understood and accepted by her 
artistic peers, who share the same professional skills and creative occupation. At the end 
of this statement, she confides that she generally suffers two prejudices to do with first 
impressions: ‘me personally, I get two prejudices when you first see me – I’m Muslim 
and I’m black and then later I’m Irish and I’m this and I’m that but yeah, that’s me’.474 
 The second small story relates to Masud’s experience of being recognised as an 
accomplished soccer player and how such recognition of his meritocratic abilities on-
the-pitch overcomes the prejudice of first impressions off-the-pitch. Masud states that 
he has received recognition for his abilities as a soccer player from various people. 
Although traits do come into it, he stresses that in relation to the game of soccer, ability 
is most important. On this point, he differentiates between the recognition of traits 
versus that of abilities:  
 
All over the place, people that you wouldn't know that I've never seen and they 
do recognise you [when you play soccer at a high level] and you are different 
because you stand out, like the different name, you look different, everything 
about you is different. So definitely ability is one thing for me. It's always stood 
out, it's always been there for me.
475
  
 
Masud distinguishes between recognition on-the-pitch for his abilities and the prejudice 
of first impressions received off-the-pitch in his everyday life as lived in Dublin. He 
states concisely that ‘no’,476 he never received discrimination ‘on the soccer pitch’477 
because in such transitional arenas ‘there is that respect’.478 He acknowledges his 
varying experiences on-the-pitch with those off-the-pitch i.e., on the street, where ‘out 
of nowhere someone could come up to you and be like “ah, you're this, you're that”. I've 
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had that a few times’.479 Overall, this discussant feels that the recognition he receives 
on-the-pitch is good for him personally but also generally beneficial for Islamic identity 
in that other people get the opportunity to see a Muslim in a positive contributory light. 
On this point, Masud states his feelings about being recognised for his abilities and 
relates this back to his identity traits as Muslim: 
 
...it feels good to be recognised for what you’re doing and then people know 
you're Muslim. Like my name is Masud…but they still know [I’m Muslim]. So 
it is something good. So they do know you're Muslim and there's respect and 
[the] coaches and all respect me for doing Ramadan and playing at the same 
time. So, it is good.
480
  
 
5.2.3 Affect on Relation-to-Self 
 
In terms of discrimination’s affect on an individual’s relation-to-self, a 1st generation 
female discussant, Hurriyah, determines that societal misrecognition has a negative all-
encompassing affect on maintaining a positive relation-to-self. She states about the 
affect of misrecognition on the self: ‘Yes it [discrimination] does [affect relation-to-self] 
– Mentally, physically, socially it would, it will do’.481 This discussant’s comments are 
articulated well and she has an advanced understanding of the dynamics of recognitive 
relations. Her remark about how societal misrecognition mentally, physically and 
socially influences a person’s relation-to-self invokes Maja to enter the discussion and 
narrate a small story of her personal experience of perceived misrecognition. This story 
relates to her attending to a fitness centre, located within a plush hotel in Dublin. Maja 
narrates her small story in Arabic whilst Dahlia translates it to English:  
 
It’s a small story happened to my friend Maja, like she didn’t say anything but 
just Maja she felt from the lady [receptionist] in general, what do you call it, 
five-star hotel [fitness centre] and she’s [the lady is] working in a reception and 
everyday and day she’s [Maja] go back, but she [Maja] “felt this lady doesn’t 
respect me. She looks at me in a very bad way”. This is make her at the end of 
the shift, “I don’t want to go” and she paid the full year [fee] and she said “I 
don’t [want to go back]” and I [Dahlia] said “why? She’s [the lady is] just a 
receptionist. Just go, speak with the manager, say something, why you 
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stopping?” She [Maja] say “I don’t want to go there, I’m not happy. Her eyes, 
her way she talking to me”, [thump on table] ye know that smallest thing”.482  
 
Maja’s small story is an example of how she perceived an everyday experience of 
disrespect from the receptionist. Such perceptions are highly influenced by her feelings 
in that she felt the receptionist did not respect her. This perception, backed by a 
cognitive-emotional reflection, is corroborated by how the receptionist looks and 
communicates to her. Through such communicative gestures, Maja perceives that the 
lady behind the reception desk does not respect her. The feeling that her visible surface-
level traits are not respected has an impact upon Maja. Although she has paid full fees 
for the year in order to use the fitness facilities within the hotel, she is certain that she 
will not return and be subject to disrespect. For this discussant, respect comes before 
monetary considerations. In further conversation with Dahlia, Maja explicates further 
reasons as to why she perceived herself to be disrespected. She states that when she 
tried to speak to the receptionist, she was not given any attention i.e., she was made 
invisible by the receptionist. Dahlia confirms the importance of being recognised by 
stating ‘I respect attention’.483 Maja felt that her enquiries were not being given 
sufficient attention: ‘she [the receptionist] said [towards] any question, she said abruptly 
“I don’t know, I don’t know”, like that’.484 In terms of the annual fees, Maja states: ‘I 
don’t like war [fighting about it] anymore, I don’t care [about losing money]’.485 Dahlia 
comments that she has lost money, but due to suffering disrespect, she has lost 
something more important and harder to replenish – her self-confidence. As Dahlia 
states: ‘I think she don’t care about that [losing money] but she lost her confidence 
because [of] that way’.486  
 The young female discussants view the link between misrecognition and self-
esteem as obvious, particularly in relation to the sphere of work. When probed as to 
whether recognition within one’s employment gives a person a sense of self-esteem, 
Sumayya and Isha both concur then Sumayya then commonsensically adds – ‘isn’t that 
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obvious’487 – that being recognised for your abilities in employment would give an 
increase in self-esteem. Isha interjects into the conversation to clarify to the other 
discussants that: ‘he [the moderator] means that if we were more recognised in society 
that we’d be more confident [in ourselves]’.488 
 In relation to Masud’s small story above about being recognised for his abilities 
on the soccer pitch, when probed as to whether such recognition positively affects his 
relation-to-self in terms of self-esteem, he responds by stating that it is good to receive 
recognition for his abilities, even though he is different to the other players on his team 
in terms of traits such as skin colour, ethnicity and religion. He confidently states that 
on the soccer pitch, he is given respect and his abilities are recognised. Thus, he 
differentiates between the respect and recognition he receives on-the-pitch for his 
abilities and the misrecognition he receives on-the-street, where his surface-level traits 
are discriminated against by others. He states the following narrative about being ‘in-
between’ in terms of identity and how the transitional phenomenon of soccer provides 
the meritocratic common-ground, where individuals, despite their difference to each 
other, can be recognised for their particular meritocratic –traits-abilities-achievements; 
and thereby, overcome the prejudice of first impressions that impedes everyday life off-
the-pitch:  
 
It's good. It's good, yeah it's good to feel recognised in a place like this [Ireland] 
where you’re different, especially at the [high] levels maybe I’ve played at and I 
feel like I am being recognised. When I first made it onto the team at a young 
age, and this is the talks managers and coaches were giving, this was like “you’s 
were the best twenty in this country that we've selected”, that is definitely 
something good, to be fair, because I was the only different one in that changing 
room. Like everyone else was pure Irish, like 100% Irish and I'm there. I've lived 
in Ireland my whole life but, you don't feel 100% Irish and you don't feel 100% 
Libyan because it's the same thing. You feel a bit excluded in a way but yet 
you're still living a 50/50 kind of thing. So it does feel good to be recognised for 
your ability and yeah, people do know me and that's something I like. It's good 
to know that wherever I go, because they know me you’re not going to get stick 
for it, so I've some sort of respect because of soccer. So people aren't going to 
come up to me and go “ah, you're a Paki, you're this” whereas, if you go to a 
rough area, people don’t know you, they give you stick straight away, just 
judging you, like you've done it, you walk by them and you're going to get stick 
for nothing whereas here you go on a pitch, the lads won't say anything to you. 
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They might be from rough areas, but then there's that respect because they've 
heard of you. It is something good that I've experienced anyways.
489
  
 
 
5.3 Limitations of Rights of Residence 
 
The following section will focus on aspects of legal misrecognition, particularly on  
denizenship
490
 as an uncertain civic status and how such categorisation impacts 
negatively upon the familial sphere.   
 
5.3.1 The Uncertainty of Denizenship Status 
 
From the 1
st
 generation interviews, Saad references the negative experience that 
denizens encounter within Irish society and he vocalises what he perceives to be an 
issue within the Muslim community in relation to the status uncertainty experienced by 
denizens, who may do something ‘right or wrong to obtain [a full legal] status’.491 For 
example, there is evidence that denizens have married Eastern European women in 
Ireland in order to gain European citizenship; and thereby, acquire a secure citizenship 
status.
492
 It illustrates the status uncertainty faced by various groups i.e., asylum seekers; 
refugees, illegal immigrants and denizens and how such experiences may lead to 
extreme actions to obtain a more secure and beneficial legal position within society. 
Saad narrates a small story, which cogently elaborates on how such forms of status 
uncertainty have a negative impact on individuals plus the society that enforces such 
forms of civic stratification:  
 
Somebody who is here only a short time, four years or five years and they don’t 
have any resident status or permanent resident status [denizenship] or some 
other status, they will be very uncertain and those are the people who will 
actually try to do something right or wrong to obtain that status so then you will 
see some negative stories [in the media] and then you will see that some people 
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come in [to the country] and they try to make a business of different things and 
all this so there is some negativity surrounding those things.
493
 
 
Another 1
st
 generation male interviewee – Ubaid – stresses that the reason why 
multiculturalism is failing is because immigrants to Europe have, up to the present day, 
not been accorded legal recognition from host states that view immigrants as 
‘temporary’ workers,494 who work for a period of time then return to their homecountry. 
In other words, nation states did not ‘recognise them as citizens’495 or even as ‘members 
of the society’496 leading to the formation of denizenship – a status that limits social and 
political rights within democracies. In Ubaid’s opinion, denizens are ‘not recognised as 
the same citizen as anybody else. They’re in-between’.497 They’re not asylum seekers, 
who depend on the state but also they are not full citizens, who are recognised by other 
citizens as being independent and capable of making political and moral decisions 
through the use of their own reason.
498
 Ubaid stresses the need for the younger 
generation of Muslims to be conferred with citizenship in order to prevent isolation and 
to promote a positive feeling of belonging to Ireland. On this point, he states that: 
 
...if these [citizenship] issues are addressed and Muslims are seen as [“who they 
are”] and they are appreciated as citizens of Ireland, from grassroots level up to 
the top, then I think there will be some little bit of confusion; but at least, the 
youth will not feel that they are isolated and not citizens of Ireland, [by 
addressing such issues] they [the youth] will still feel citizens of Ireland.
499
  
 
The youth also view denizenship as an uncertain legal status. Interviewee Nurdeen 
states concisely without much elaboration that ‘in terms of legal recognition, if you're 
an Irish citizen you can't be kicked out of the country’.500 Whilst a denizen, Aziz, gives 
a critical account of his denizenship experience, particularly in relation to the 
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application process that is information deficient and drawn out in terms of time; thus, 
adding a great deal of uncertainty to everyday life and to the possibility of fulfiling 
future hopes. His narrative is as follows: 
 
Aziz: In terms of legal recognition, I have been here for ten years and I still have 
not gotten citizenship. My flatmate [who is also Muslim] and his whole family 
have been here for eleven years, and they have the same problems as us [with 
gaining citizenship]. The thing is you can't follow up on the application, which is 
annoying.  
 
Interviewer: Why do you think you've had to wait this long to receive 
citizenship? 
 
Aziz: I've no idea; [I] can't follow up on it. I really have no idea.
501
 
 
5.3.2 Civic Stratification and Familial Disruptions 
 
A variety of narratives give an insight into how the uncertainty that is inherent in 
denizenship status has a detrimental impact upon recognitive familial relations. Such a 
connection is strongly emphasised through narrative small stories. For example, Furat, a 
2
nd
 generation female interviewee, narrates a story about a close female friend, who has 
been ‘living here [in Ireland] all her life’502 but who applied too late for full citizenship 
status i.e., her father applied after she turned eighteen years of age. However, by the 
time her application was submitted, the Irish civil service ‘were looking for different 
criteria’,503 in particular the need for adults to have worked a number of years within the 
state. Lacking work experience, Furat’s friend did not meet the requirements, therefore, 
she [the friend] had to leave Ireland and move to Libya, her father’s homecountry. 
Furat’s small story recounts how legal misrecognition has negatively changed her 
friend’s personal circumstances and relations to her immediate familial members: 
 
It [legal recognition] does, it definitely does affect her [the narrator’s friend] 
because she is studying now in Libya at the moment and because she is studying 
there, ahm, she can’t come [to Ireland] whenever she wants to visit her parents, 
like her brothers, sisters, mother, father, all have citizenship except her. So, she 
has to apply for the visa, if it's a visiting visa, a study visa, or whatever it is, she 
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has to go through that process just to see her mother, her father, or they [the 
parents] would have to go down there [to Libya], kind of thing, d’know. It's 
made it very difficult [for] her, made it very difficult for her.
504
 
 
The 2
nd
 generation male discussion group gives an insight into the varying experiences 
of friends, who are legally stratified and categorised into citizens and denizens. Yusuf 
states confidently:  ‘I was born here so it doesn't make a difference’.505 He clarifies that 
he and his ‘whole family has passports so it wasn't really an issue’.506 He then compares 
his positive experience of being a citizen to the negative experience of denizenship. As 
a citizen, Yusuf states that he didn’t have to wait long for a passport, and unlike 
denizens, have ‘his hopes up’507 in terms of obtaining a passport and being legally 
recognised by the Irish state. This discussant is critical and cynical about the power the 
state has over the conferral of citizenship and is glad that he didn’t have to ‘beg for the 
red [Irish] passport to come so that I can be free’.508 He comments that not only does he 
have one passport, he also has dual citizenship with his homecountry – Libya. Masud 
identifies with the statement about being a duel citizen and comments correspondingly 
that ‘that’s the same here for me’.509 Yusuf re-enters the conversation and commenting 
to Aban states: ‘but you’re different’.510  
 The recognition of a different status by Yusuf marks the point at which Aban 
enters the conversation to talk about his denizen experience. In his narrative, he 
elaborates on his parent’s experience of coming to Ireland and waiting a long-period of 
time – ten years – to obtain Irish citizenship. He comments on how, as a child, he was 
unaware of the difference between himself, as a passport-holding citizen and his 
parents, who had not obtained legal recognition and had to use visas when travelling. 
Thus, the family structure was stratified between those members conferred with 
citizenship and those with the lesser status of denizenship. Reflecting upon the impact 
of denizen status, Aban clarifies that applying for travel documents was stressful and 
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time-consuming. Notably, as Aban states, prayer gave his parents comfort and 
consolation through the stressful and uncertain period of denizenship:  
 
It took them a while to get it [citizenship], like ten years to get it but as I was 
growing up, I didn't know what difference it made. Like I had the Irish passport, 
they just had a few travel documents. Whenever we went away you were going 
away with something different…like a visa to where you’re going. It was 
stressful and took ages for everything to get done but for the past two years like, 
you know, they just thank God, ye know, my parents made the prayers and all. 
The whole family has it, at the moment now, so everything’s good.511 
 
5.4 Limiting Access to Opportunities 
 
Certainly whilst the status of denizenship does curtail political participation, particularly 
voting in national elections, the narrative data gives an insight into how a lesser legal 
civic status also puts limits on the attainment of basic opportunities that are commonly 
afforded to people, who have obtained the human right of full citizenship.  
 
5.4.1 Education and Freedom of Movement 
 
The interview and focused discussion group narratives identify the basic good of 
education as a major concern for denizens, who have not obtained full citizenship and 
recognition as having the capacity to make moral decisions that impact upon the 
political community. This is exemplified by 1
st
 generation interviewee Adeeb, who 
states the following small story that illustrates how an uncertain civic status affects the 
younger generation in terms of the financial capacity to gain entry to education and how 
such limitations impede the ability “to be” within society and progress towards new 
forms of “being”. Adeeb’s critical narrative is as follows: 
 
…he can’t get [a student] grant, he stop, he [the person-in-authority] can't allow 
him to be, "you should pay the full [student tuition] amount [for a third-country 
national]" and that affect him but mean exactly because he had been here for 
ages [many years] and he's not recognised even as [a] citizen, [he is recognised] 
as nothing, like his father and his father is all the time complaining about this 
country [Ireland], he hate roses. This is such a problem, big problems of conflict 
for the community.
512
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From a youth perspective, Aziz discusses his denizenship experience and strongly 
criticises how his lesser civic status brings hardship and stress upon his parent’s lives 
and finances in that his university enrolment fees are high due to the fact that he is 
recognised as a third-country national, despite having lived the majority of his life in 
Ireland. For Aziz, legal misrecognition has but a significant burden upon his parents, 
particularly since his brother is coming of age and also aims to obtain a university 
education. His narrative on this matter is as follows: 
 
Interviewer: Do you feel that you want to have Irish citizenship? 
 
Aziz: Yes, it makes things a lot easier. For example, when going through 
security at airports and when I travel, I have to sort out a visa, which is a hassle. 
I also have to pay ten thousand in university fees each year and my brother is 
coming through to university now and he will have to pay the same, which is a 
big burden on my parents.
513
 
 
The above narrative highlights the criticism directed towards legal misrecognition by a 
denizen, who feels burdened by not being recognised as having the same legal rights as 
the majority. This interviewee states that he has been in Ireland for ten years yet has not 
received full citizenship status. He knows of other families, who have the same problem 
and that there is an increase in Muslim denizens attending third-level educational 
institutions in Ireland. Interestingly, Aziz claims that legal misrecognition has 
negatively affected his familial sphere in that his parents have had to pay exorbitant 
college fees towards his education, which is a significant financial burden.
514
 This 
comment emphasises that spheres of recognitive interaction can influence each other in 
detrimental ways i.e., legal misrecognition not only affects the individual but also other 
social spheres such as the family.  
 Within the 1
st
 generation discussion group, Hurriyah also mentions how by 
virtue of their legal status, denizens are limited in the possibility of accessing education. 
On the topic of denizens paying large university fees due to being categorised as third-
country nationals, she comments that she does ‘know people’,515 who have experienced 
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such a situation. She states that these denizens ‘have to wait another couple of years 
before they can get them[selves] nationality then they can go back to school because of 
the red tape [bureaucracy]’.516 Through such a statement, she is making the point that 
some denizens co-ordinate their educational attainment with the conferral of citizenship. 
This suggests that such categorisation limits their capability to attend a university. 
Hurriyah views this status categorisation as ‘absolutely’ a limitation.517 Furthermore, it 
is an impediment that has a negative practical impact upon people. She explains that by 
suffering such a financial block to education, denizens ‘can get frustrated’.518 She 
adamantly stresses the point that these people ‘want to exercise their human right’519 to 
unfettered access to education. 
 A similar narrative about educational fees for denizens is discussed within the 
young male discussion group. The comments are made predominantly by Aswad, who 
makes the point that denizenship can impact on the ability of a person to attend third-
level education due to the fact that, although many denizens have lived many years in 
the state, their recognised status means that they must pay higher educational fees.
520
 
For this discussant, the main practical issue surrounding legal misrecognition is ‘college 
fees’.521 He comments on his own experience of having to pay a large fee when he first 
attended college and reflects that he only received citizenship three years later. Like 
Aban, Aswad thanks God that his financial burden was eased by obtaining ‘a 
scholarship before that [receiving citizenship] so it covered most of the cost’.522  
As well as limitations on educational access, impediments to freedom of 
movement were also mentioned by a selection of interviewees and discussants, who 
view legal misrecognition as practically impacting on their ability to move freely back 
to the homecountry or through Europe. Reflecting back on Aziz’s comments above, 
when asked about his feelings towards obtaining citizenship, he confirms that he would 
like full citizenship status for practical reasons such as cheaper access to university 
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education but also for going through security at airports and for ease of travel out of 
Ireland without the need to obtain a visa.
523
 
 The most interesting discussion of this issue comes from Abdul, who took part 
in the 1
st
 generation focused discussion group. His comments focus on his experience of 
life as a denizen and how his life in Europe changed for the better upon receiving Irish 
citizenship. To relate his experience, Abdul’s narrative is in the form of a small story 
about his experience of planning to drive through Europe back to his homecountry to 
see his family in the Russian caucus. In the past, as a denizen and secular person, he 
recounts that he had no problem travelling through France, however, upon becoming 
more visibly religious he perceives a distinct change in how he is treated when applying 
for a transit visa:  
 
A couple of years ago, I want to travel home by car and in order to do that, I 
have to go through France and I have to do like a transit visa for French 
embassy. But eh, I did it second time. First time, I didn’t have the beard. I looks 
normal. They give me visa in 2005. But last time, I had a beard, at this time and 
they refuse me. I think because of that, because I’m Muslim like, you know and 
I feel very bad because [my] parents were waiting for me. I want to go home and 
they refuse the visa without any reason. They don’t say any reason but I thought 
that the reason was because I am Muslim.
524
 
 
The above small story illustrates how Abdul perceives that his change from being a non-
practicing to a practicing Muslim had ramifications for his plan to drive through France 
back to his homeland. With his second trip, he has the normative expectation that his 
travel visa will enable him to drive through France. However this time, he is visibly 
identified as Muslim. Thus, he perceives that this difference is the reason for being 
refused a transit visa. He feels ‘very bad’525 that he has been blocked by the French 
authorities, and thereby, is unable to see his family. Rashid, a quiet discussant, whose 
contribution to the discussion is minimal, opens up and makes communication on this 
topic. He states that ‘they’ – the immigration services or police – ‘do that for jilbab 
[long coat worn by Muslims]’.526 Essentially, this comment emphasises that 
immigration services, in France and other countries, visibly identify or carry out 
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religious profiling on pious Muslims by their surface-level traits such as race, clothes or 
facial hair.  
Within the same discussion group, Idris reflects upon the free movement of 
citizens between various European states, which makes him think about the issues he 
faces when returning to his homecountry. He sadly states that when he returns to the 
Middle East, he has to ‘take a visa to go to Algeria, Morocco and Saudi [Arabia] –
everywhere’.527 
This above comment is also reflected in the young male discussion group by 
Siddiq, who makes an interesting point that positively affirms Ireland’s legal and 
democratic transparency whilst criticising his homecountry attitude to citizenship, 
particularly when the diaspora appear at border checkpoints and present European 
passports. In terms of differentiating legal transparency between Ireland and his 
homecountry, Siddiq states that:    
 
[In] the Irish system, they abide by the legal system that when you have an Irish 
passport, they recognise you as an Irish citizen, it's real transparent but you 
know, if we were to go back to our parent’s countries, and it has Ireland written 
on the passport, they would be quite suspicious that “are you really, you're not 
really Irish”, do you know what I mean? They would be suspicious of that and 
they would actually be the ones who have the problems. Ireland seems to be 
very transparent, very law-[abiding], respectful in the legal issues.
528
 
 
5.4.2 Affect on Relation-to-Self  
 
A variety of narratives give an insight into how legal misrecognition affects an 
individual’s relation-to-self, particularly in terms of self-respect. Labeeb, 1st generation 
male discussant, vocalises how he has applied for citizenship three times but failed in all 
attempts.
529
 He also mentions that he has been refused the right to work and that his 
marriage ended in divorce and leading to being separated from his children. Labeeb 
blames the – governmental, legal and bureaucratic – system for his misfortune and 
determines that prejudice against his Muslimness is the prime reason for a plethora of 
difficulties. In terms of feeling, Labeeb agrees that he felt angry in relation to such 
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treatment by the state. When asked if he felt he had lost self-respect by being legally 
disrespected, the discussant vocalises that he had lost self-respect in terms of how he 
was treated and how, as he perceives it, his religious difference as a Muslim impeded 
his ability to acquire legal recognition. On the topic of losing self-respect, he states 
 
Of course [I feel like I lost some self-respect], I [was] treat[ed], I [was] treat[ed] 
very, very badly. I [was] treat[ed badly but] I have no criminal record. I never 
been fighting or arguing with anyone here.
530
 
 
In relation to Abdul’s small story about being refused a travel visa to travel through 
France to see his family in the Russian caucus, he recounts how such misrecognition 
made him feel. He states that: ‘after [my visa application was rejected], I feel very like 
stressed because, you know, I want to go home and I can’t’.531 In contrast to his denizen 
experience, Abdul recounts his experience upon receiving Irish citizenship, which 
overall is much more positive. In terms of his travels as an Irish-European citizen, he 
states: 
 
…since I received Irish citizenship, like you know, I feel free like you know, I 
don’t have to go and ask somebody for visa or something like that, I free to go 
wherever I want…I think it’s a very good right for me, like you know. I feel 
very happy with that.
532
  
 
When asked if Abdul can link the above experience to a sense of self-respect and of an 
ability to struggle for one’s rights, he responds ‘yeah, maybe’.533 In terms of how legal 
recognition relates to self-respect, Idris adds to the conversation of by returning to his 
own experience of travelling the world with an Irish company. He describes being a 
citizen as a positive feeling he associates with pride in representing Ireland as an Irish 
citizen. Interestingly, this discussant makes a distinction between his sense of being 
simultaneously an Irish citizen and an Egyptian national:   
 
I felt that not only I’m recognised in this country [Ireland], but you know, I feel 
inside me that I am Irish and I feel proud of representing the country. I mean 
I’m still maintaining that they know I’m Egyptian origin because of the name 
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and as I said you can never change that, but you know, it is a good feeling to be 
able to have an adopted country and to be able to say “yeah, I have [citizenship], 
I’m an Irish citizen but I’m an Egyptian national.534 
 
For this discussant, feelings are connected to the process of obtaining a nation’s 
citizenship. Idris received an Irish passport in the early 1980s and he states about 
receiving such recognition that ‘it is great because it allowed me a lot of freedom’535 as 
compared to his experience in many Muslim-majority countries. For this discussant, in 
‘our [home]countries’,536 legal recognition ‘as a human’537 and ‘as an individual’538 is 
not forthcoming. He strongly criticises Muslim-majority countries for being ‘about the 
appearance of the religion’539 rather than implementing ‘what it says’.540 Practically, 
with the Egyptian passport ‘I go nowhere’,541 which he views as ‘a shame’.542 For a 
long time, the Egyptian passport did not represent civicness and human freedom and 
that is why, in Idris’ opinion, present-day Egypt experienced revolution against the 
Mubarak regime. On the other hand, when he received the Irish passport, he was 
‘delighted’543 because, as he says, ‘now, I’m human’544 and can travel freely with 
dignity. He also states that when he travels, even to his homecountry, ‘I go with the 
Irish passport’.545 When asked if receiving an Irish passport affected his sense of self 
and whether he would define it as self-respect, he responds with confidence – 
‘absolutely’.546 However, alongside such positive feeling is ‘sorrow at the same time for 
my own background’.547 
 In concurrence with Idris, within the 1
st
 generation female discussion group, 
Hurriyah opines that denizens, who have not been recognised as full citizens, have ‘just 
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been isolated in a way, physically, mentally and their affected, yes’.548 However, not all 
of the discussants agree that bureaucratic legal recognition on paper relates to increases 
in self-respect but view it more as a practical status utilised to facilitate and maintain 
transnational identities and “way of life”. Dahlia clarifies her position as follows: 
 
I never think I have my respect from the paper. That’s really, I find it silly if one 
of us think that about this red [Irish] passport. No, I’m very proud of my 
whatever – Egyptian, Sudanese [heritage] and we are very proud of that. Just 
only the documents make the life easier for travelling [multiple voices in 
agreement].
549
  
 
The above statement indicates that Dahlia and other discussants do not connect 
obtaining legal recognition on paper as related to gaining a degree of self-respect. In 
fact, Dahlia finds the premise that her ‘respect [comes] from the [legal] paper’550 to be 
‘silly’.551 She then talks of pride and connects it to her particular homecountry heritage. 
She is ‘very proud’552 of her homecountry origin and views Irish citizenship as ‘just 
only documents [that] make life easier for travelling’.553 Thus, Irish citizenship is 
viewed as a practicality. Hurriyah agrees with this statement by Dahlia and confirms 
that Irish citizenship’s practical application is in giving ‘you leeway when you are 
travelling’.554 In relation to the above comments, it is important to recognise that both 
women are stating that through the conferral of citizenship they obtain greater freedom 
of movement and a wider degree of autonomy in how they conduct their transnational 
identities. This point is confirmed by Dahlia when she states that when returning to her 
homecountry, she commonly enters with an Irish passport rather than with her 
homecountry documentation, which is commonly known to create difficulties: 
 
If I’m going to there [Egypt] with the red [Irish] passport I don’t need to have [a] 
visa. If I have my Egyptian passport, you will pay [money] and you have to [be] 
investigate[d] before passing. That’s international rules, it’s out of our hands, 
political rules.
555
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5.4.3 The Need for Civic Participation and Contribution 
 
The discussion group narratives highlight how gaining full legal recognition enables an 
individual to venture further into society to participate and contribute to the value 
horizon of their social and political community. For example, Labeeb supports Idris’ 
comment that Irish citizenship (with its corresponding rights and obligations) gives an 
individual ‘freedom and opportunity’,556 which is not readily available in African and 
Middle Eastern homecountries. This statement is all the more stark in that Labeeb does 
not have full citizenship himself but is a denizen, whose citizenship application has been 
turned down numerous times. 
 Labeeb goes on to state a positive view of universal civicness that transcends 
religious particularness and also gives an indication of how he lives his everyday life as 
a denizen. He states that he is unemployed and is ‘receiving help from the 
government’,557 most probably in the form of unemployment benefit. He seems 
correlates social welfare payments not to the state, who distribute such payments but to 
other citizens within Irish society, who pay and contribute via taxation. He vocalises his 
appreciation to Irish society for coming to his aid in terms of providing him with social 
welfare whilst being unemployment: ‘who paying this tax, who paying this money, 
[it’s] from the Irish society and the majority is Catholic or Christian.’558 He adds that he 
reciprocates the aid he receives by civically volunteering ‘to work for my community 
through St. Vincent de Paul’,559 a Catholic charitable organisation. Thus, this 
interviewee recognises the reciprocal nature of being a citizen that involves moral 
responsibility involving rights but also obligations. Although he is receiving social 
welfare payments, his civic identity is active in reciprocating back to his community; 
thereby, proving that he is not a burden but a contributing member of society. This is 
reflected in the following statement: 
 
I’m not working now; I volunteer to work for my community through St. 
Vincent de Paul but some people [within the Muslim community] might have 
problem with that [working for a Christian charity] but I’m going to volunteer to 
work for St. Vincent de Paul to prove to my [wider] community, to provide for 
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my [wider] community because I don’t want to sit back in the room where [I 
am] watching television, why the government giving me money? and there is 
some way that I can contribute.
560
 
 
Within this statement, he suggests that some members of the Muslim community may 
have an issue with his decision to volunteer for a Christian charity. Idris asks a question 
of Labeeb: ‘and do you think there is a problem in doing that?’561 Labeeb responds 
‘no’562 and then reflects that ‘some people might have problem with that’.563 However 
overall, he is happy to be civically active and participating within the wider community. 
When asked about making civic contributions to his community, he responds: 
 
I’m three years doing that [volunteering] now. So, I mean, the understanding 
between the religion and stuff like that [civic participation], I think some people 
[within the Muslim community] find it difficult. It might be based on their 
background from back home or whatever – religion – but we live together in our 
[home]country Christian and Muslim, peacefully, there’s no difference.564 
 
The most concise statement about the confidence to participate and contribute within 
wider society emanates from Abdul, who opens up about his feelings in terms of 
receiving Irish citizenship and how it transformed his levels of participation. As a 
denizen, he tried to be generally ‘good with people’;565 however, he admits that most of 
his socialising was contained within his Islamic community in that he mostly ‘deal with 
[the local] mosque’.566 However, upon receiving Irish citizenship, Abdul remarks that 
he ‘thinks more responsible like other people’.567 This is an indication that his self-
respect has increased and that his confidence to stand up for himself is also buttressed 
by legal recognition. By being fully recognised legally, he is able to view himself as a 
responsible citizen, who has rights but also obligations to others within the society that 
has reciprocally recognised him as a full member. Abdul makes the following narrative 
remark about this change in identity status: 
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If somebody say to me [when I was a denizen] “aah, you foreigner like”, I take it 
like, you know, but now [as a citizen] like, even if they say that, I don’t care 
about what they say like. I feel like I have some responsibility for this society 
like, you know. Even people if they don’t like me it’s up to them like. It’s their 
business like. Anyway, I feel like I have to do something to bring some good 
stuff to this society. It doesn’t matter like what people think about me, you 
know. I feel more responsible when [I] received the [citizenship].
568
 
 
The above stance is also confirmed by Sadiyya, who states that legal recognition, in her 
opinion, implies that ‘you can say what you want to do and go out and start 
relationship’.569 Likewise, a young female 2nd generation discussant, Saiba views full 
citizenship as obliging an individual to civically participate and contribute beyond their 
particular community for the benefit of the wider society.
570
 On this point, she retells a 
conversation she had with her mother that went as follows: ‘I want to do stuff for the 
Irish community [but] she’d be like “oh, but why?”’571 This statement implies that Saiba 
understands the participatory obligations of being a citizen and struggles to justify such 
action to other familial members, particularly those from the 1
st
 generation. Fusaila adds 
to Saiba’s conversation by jokingly voicing a hypothetical response from Saiba’s mum: 
‘you’re not Irish’!572  
Saiba keeps the conversation going by explaining what citizenship means to her. 
She states that she sees herself as a citizen and feels she has to ‘contribute to my 
community’.573 It must be questioned which community she is referring to? She clarifies 
this point by stating that as a citizen she feels the need to contribute to all communities 
i.e., to her Islamic community, to her ethnic community but also to the wider societal 
community. Thus, she states: ‘not only my Islamic community but also like the Irish 
community’.574 Interestingly, she confirms that her mother questions such actions if not 
specifically aiding either her Muslim or ethnic community. Saiba voices her mother: 
‘but why are you doing it?’575 Once again her mother’s question is not left unanswered. 
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Saiba responds: ‘I’m not only those things’.576 This statement indicates that she has an 
Islamic and ethno-cultural identity but also that she acknowledges other identities, one 
being an abstract civic identity. She is exemplified in the statement: ‘I’m also Irish, in a 
sense’.577 Such a narrative gives an indication of how she views “being Irish”. She 
acknowledges that she is “Irish” but with the caveat – ‘in a sense’.578 It could be argued 
here that this discussant is referring to herself as “Irish” in the sense of being an Irish 
citizen and differentiates such “Irishness” from its nationalist and/or ethno-cultural 
forms. 
 
5.5 Perceptions of Identity 
 
The above focus on societal and legal misrecognition inevitably redirects this study to 
the salient issue of identity. Within this section, narrative data will be utilised to give a 
vivid perceptual insight into how the recognition of particular difference supersedes the 
recognition of sameness i.e., visible “particular” difference takes precedence over being 
recognised as a “universal” citizen with equal rights and obligations to other human 
beings. Then the viewpoints of Muslim youth will be explored in relation to how they 
relate to an “Irish” identity, particularly in terms of “being different Irish”. Lastly, the 
narratives give an insight into how Muslin youth accept, maintain and utilise their 
multiple transnational identities but problematic issues persist in terms of how other 
people perceive Muslim youth identity and belonging in Ireland and the homecountry.   
 
5.5.1 The Supersession of Sameness by Difference 
 
The narratives give a valuable insight into how Sunni Muslim individuals in Dublin 
perceive “difference” to others, especially in terms of how the recognition of surface-
level traits negatively supersedes the “sameness” that legal recognition universally gives 
to all people equally.  
 For example, 2
nd
 generation female interviewee, Furat, makes an interesting 
statement related to the tension that exists between “sameness” and “difference” in 
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everyday interaction. Her statement refers to how universal “sameness”, which 
normatively defines citizenship, has been tied to nationalistic ethno-cultural attributes 
and comes into conflict with “difference”, which is inherent to an individual’s 
“particular” traits and abilities related and unique “way of life”. In other words, 
differences in religious adherence, race or ethno-cultural tradition that deviate from the 
majoritarian social norms and cultural identity present within society at any given time. 
She states the following in relation to how a person’s “particularness” is recognised 
before a “universal” civic status: 
 
Legal recognition…myself, personal opinion, is that you always have to think 
twice about what you are doing legally because you always feel like as if 
because I’m a foreigner how will they treat me ye know, for example, I was in a 
situation where somebody else was in the wrong but I'd feel like I wouldn't be 
able to bring [it] up because it's not going to be dealt with that way, that person’s 
the Irish person, I'm the Muslim, you know, the foreigner, which side will they 
take, so you'll always have that fear, the constant background fear of “is there a 
point or is there not a point [to speaking out]?
579
 
 
Within this narrative, the interviewee, who is an Irish citizen, states that in everyday 
interaction she has to ‘think twice’580 about her legal recognition. She feels that what 
makes her “different” to other citizens i.e., her foreignness determines how she will be 
treated by others in the first instance. She gives an example of a situation in which an 
ethnic Irish person is acting “wrongfully”, however, she feels that she cannot speak out 
about such action because she feels that her moral claim will not be dealt with 
appropriately because ‘that person’s the Irish person, I’m the Muslim’.581 It is this 
‘constant background fear’,582 which prevents her from speaking out against “wrongful” 
acts committed by others. This statement is interesting as it delineates how citizenship 
in the Irish nation-state has been attached to ethnic and/or national attributes and 
conceptions of identity. Even though, the interviewee is an Irish citizen with the same 
rights and obligations to other citizens, she has a fearful feeling that her ethnic and 
religious “difference” supersedes the civic “sameness” she obtained through legal 
recognition. In other words, her abstract “universalism” as a citizen, which is filtered of 
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particularisms, cannot compete with the recognition of surface-level “differences” that 
constitute the individual in terms of race, ethnicity and/or religion. Tension arise when 
such particular “differences” diverge from the dominant norm of what is perceived to 
constitute the identity standard of “Irishness”. 
 Within the 1
st
 generation female discussion group, Ghazalah tries to distinguish 
how abstract citizenship can be applied to everyday life. Her statement gives us a very 
good insight into the dynamics differentiating recognition as an abstract universal form 
and being recognised for one’s particular differences to others in everyday life. She 
states that legal recognition as ‘just-on-paper’583 is practically useful when one is ‘in 
civic places’584 interacting with state bureaucracies such as immigration services, 
passport offices, hospitals etc. In this discussant’s viewpoint, legal recognition is 
symbolised by ‘documents [or] papers’585 that generally are ‘working fine’.586 Thus, the 
state recognises rights and obligations based on the stratified civic status assigned to 
each individual by the state itself.  
 Ghazalah then moves the discussion from the legal sphere to the wider sphere of 
societal recognition. As she states: ‘now, go to the practical life, go to the reality, no 
difference. I’m still the Egyptian, or the Sudanese, it’s no different.’587 This statement 
brings to the conversation the point that abstract “universal” citizenship loses its 
strength within everyday interaction because within the wider societal sphere, 
“particularness” or different traits are visible whilst the abstract status of being a citizen 
is harder to detect and cannot be recognised by others in initial interaction. Her narrative 
makes a clear distinction between the benefits that “universal” legal recognition has 
within state institutions, but that such a status is invisibly weak to be practically 
recognised within wider everyday life. In terms of the supersession of legal “sameness” 
by the initial prejudice of surface-level “difference”, Hurriyah makes the following 
statement: 
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…and you always remain like that. America, UK, it’s like that. It will always be 
there. You always be a second-class citizen. You will never be a first-class 
citizen because of your colour.
588
  
 
Through this statement, Hurriyah as a dark-skinned woman, is confirming that injustice 
is inextricably linked to the interaction between being a full citizen (with “universal” 
rights and obligations in relation to others) versus being a person of “difference” 
through having a particular religious, racial or ethnic identity in contrast to social norms 
and the majoritarian identity standard. For this discussant, even though she is a citizen 
of Ireland – a human being – who has “universal” rights similar to others, she 
understands that some of her “particular” identities devalue her “being” in the eyes of 
others. In response, Dahlia narrates a small story about her own experience involving 
how her “sameness” and “difference” is recognised by others within an Irish airport. 
She states the following: 
 
In the airports, actually the red passport, the Irish passport, working perfectly but 
recently I saw something, I’m kind of like observ[ing] a little bit around me. I 
saw, even if I’m holding the Irish passport and I have Irish [citizenship] and you 
read [it when] you’re in front of me, someone told me, “no, no – this is the EU 
queue” [from background multiple voices “yeah yeah” and laughter]. [The 
person says] “look it[’s] that way” and I say “thank you and continue [my own 
way]”.589 
 
The above story is interesting as it gives an indication of the divergence between reality 
and perception within an act of interaction. The discussant queues in the EU line 
because she has been given legal recognition by a European state. She is a citizen and 
holds in her hand the ‘red passport’.590 However, other people in the passport control 
line view her as not being an Irish or European citizen but a foreigner – a Muslim – who 
has mistakenly joined the wrong queue and should move to the third-country national 
designated area, i.e., the denizen line. It can be said that the ‘someone’591 who 
conversed with Dahlia does not initially perceive her to be a citizen of Ireland or Europe 
but recognises her firstly in her particularity and difference – as a Muslim woman 
wearing the hijab – and negates the possibility that she could be a “universal” citizen.   
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 Within the 2
nd
 generation female discussion group, Saiba and the twins have 
received Irish citizenship. Saiba narrates her own experience of being a citizen in 
Ireland. She states that she has been a citizen since her family came to Ireland in 1997, 
as one of the first Somali immigrants. She then tells a small story about attending 
secondary school. Many people didn’t think she spoke English because she was ‘very 
quiet’.592 She distinctly remembers a teacher asking her if she had a red (Irish) passport 
to which Saiba replies affirmatively. She then questions how she is recognised within 
the societal sphere. Despite the fact that she has been an Irish citizen all her life and has 
the same universal rights and obligations as other citizens, she criticises everyday 
people who only see her particular “different” traits and treat her like a foreigner. She 
states concisely about this form of misrecognition: 
 
I’ve had one [a passport] all my life and people walking around me like “you’re 
a foreigner” and I’m like “but I’m a citizen, I live here all my life, I went to 
school here, c’mon [said in whisper]”. I just take it in my stride and move on but 
I mean people obviously, of course, automatically they’d be like “you’re a 
foreigner, like your [different]”.593 
 
Within Saiba’s discussion group, multiple discussants feel and vocalise that a 
“universal” abstract legal identity is superseded by a person’s more recognisable 
“particular” traits, whether to do with religion, skin colour or ethnicity. Isha and Rifa 
respond with an affirmative ‘yeah’594 whilst Fusaila declares ‘ah, totally’.595 Isha 
interjects with a balanced view by stating ‘up to a point, up to a point but not always’.596 
She continues by stating that ‘it won’t be forever’,597 indicating that the recognition of 
“particular” traits over an abstract legal identity will not last indefinitely. However, at 
this moment in time, the recognitive power lies with ‘first impressions most of the 
time’.598 In response to her sister’s optimistic assessment, Fusaila narrates a criticism 
against a nationalistic identity and people who hold ethnocentric views. She criticises 
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‘some people’599 who are ‘real patriotic’600 and who, even if they know you’re a legal 
citizen, will say ‘this is my country’.601 Rifa agrees. Fusaila imitates these ultra-
nationalist views by voicing such people: ‘you’re taking our jobs, you’re doing this, 
you’re doing that’.602 
 
5.5.2 Bring “Different Irish” 
 
With the above discussion relating to the supersession of “universal” legal identity by 
surface-level “particular” traits, the issue of identity comes to the fore. The following 
section will narratively highlight the important point that the research participants do 
not negate “being Irish” but alternatively view such an identity in a more civic sense 
compared to the dominant (ethno-cultural and/or nationalistic) socially-normalised 
perspective of “Irishness”.   
 For example, 1
st
 generation male discussant, Farid, stresses the complementarity 
Islam and civicness versus how a national identity interacts with Islam. He uses the 
example of war. He states that if Ireland was to go to war tomorrow, Muslims ‘don’t go 
[and] fight for Ireland’.603 In his opinion, only those who have an “Irish” identity would 
fight and die for their country. Thus, this discussant states that ‘only Irish people fight 
for Ireland. You know, so that is a national thing. That’s a national [identity]’.604 For 
this discussant, many Muslims ‘don’t believe something like [a] national [identity]’.605 
He also associates cultural behaviour such as drinking alcohol and paying interest (riba) 
as being closely linked to such an identity. Importantly, Farid stresses the lack of 
connection between being Muslim and a national whilst strongly connecting the 
complementary relationship between being Muslim and civic. The clearest sign of this 
opinion, or ‘feeling’ as Farid calls it, is the following statement:  
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You know, the interest [riba]. It’s against our religion. That’s why we don’t feel 
like we’re national, Irish national. Probably, we feel more civil. Like, vote civil 
rather than Irish.
606
  
 
The topic of “Irish” identity and how to conceive it pertains most strongly to the 2nd 
generation, who are actively asking such questions of themselves and attempting to 
resolve such identity dilemmas. Similarly to Saiba’s statement above that she is ‘also 
Irish’607 with the caveat ‘in a sense’.608 Female discussant Fusaila defiantly talks about 
her personal identity struggle and how it is integrally related to how she is perceived by 
others.  
 
I didn’t consider myself Irish for a long time ‘cos people didn’t accept it, so I 
didn’t accept it but like, if they don’t want me to be Irish, I’m not going to be 
Irish [general laughter]. So, it’s only like about, just last year, I realised that I 
grew up with these people, you know what I mean? I’m just as Irish as they 
are!
609
  
 
Isha comments specifically on the relationship between having an Islamic and Irish 
identity and how she came to understand her difference to other Irish people at an early 
age. She claims that Muslim identity ‘is installed in you from a really young age’.610 
Such identity configurations – ‘that you are Muslim’611 – are most likely socialised 
through parental initiatives, which is facilitated and supported by the wider Islamic 
community.
612
 She then states that when she was young, ‘I knew that I was kinda 
different to everyone else’.613 This difference becomes visible when she speaks of being 
“Irish” yet “different”. She states: ‘I was Irish but I knew that I was different’.614 The 
term – different Irish – is mentioned. Isha replies ‘yeah’615 in agreement with the term 
and then states that being “Irish” yet “different” means that you have to ‘have [a] thick 
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skin’616 because you face discrimination due to your “difference” to others and will 
inevitably meet ‘people that are prejudice towards you’.617 Although these negative 
aspects exist, Isha has a positive optimistic reflection in relation to this identity in that 
she ‘grew up that way’618 and has come to be confident in her “difference” to others. As 
she states about this: ‘I really appreciate that I can go out different. I feel confident to go 
out in anything’.619  
 Within the 2
nd
 generation male discussion group, Azaan states that in his 
personal life he has lived the ‘whole Irish life’620 because of the influence of his Mum 
who ‘is Irish’.621 His mother was born and raised an Irish Catholic but converted to the 
Islamic religion and married a Muslim man. This discussant lived many years with his 
grandparents, who’s house was a place where “normal Irish” behaviour was common in 
that his ‘uncles and aunts came and they drank [alcohol] and they smoked. So I kind of 
lived through the whole “this is Ireland, this is what Irish people do”’.622 Importantly, 
Azaan does not view “Irishness” as related to a “particular” way a person looks i.e., that 
they should be ‘Caucasian, freckles or ginger hair’.623 For this discussant, “Irishness” 
has more to do with ‘the way you act in the country’.624 He describes how he celebrated 
family occasions socially in a pub, which is a common norm practiced in Irish cultural 
life: 
 
...it was a 21
st
 and we went to the pub for it – sorry for that [said quietly to the 
other discussants] – and we went to the pub and we were all partying and music 
and it's just the Irish life, so we all did that and my grandparent’s 60
th
 and their 
anniversaries, we'd go out for parties and all that. So it’s the Irish [life], we lived 
as Irish people; my grandparents were Irish and lived their whole life like that. 
So you know, I think it's not really how you look but more how you've been 
living here.
625
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From the above statement, it can be stated that Azaan does perceive himself as Irish 
through how he acts rather than how he fits the visual stereotype or norm of what an 
“Irish” person should look like. The above comments spur Siddiq to enter the 
conversation to clarify his opinion that the ‘perception of “Irish people” is changing’.626 
He mentions the impact of foreigners in Ireland; who are changing the social dynamic 
of the country. For this discussant, “Irishness” is becoming like “being American” in 
that different people within a pluralistic society identify with the meritocratic nature and 
openness of a modern “way of life”. Therefore, being “different” to the majoritarian 
identity standard is losing its significance. For Siddiq, Ireland is going in a similar 
direction to America, where merits and abilities are societally esteemed and “particular” 
traits are not discriminated against but respected.   
 
5.5.3 Transnational Identities and the Problematic Perception of Others 
 
Within the 2
nd
 generation female discussion group, narrative evidence comes to light 
that explicates how the Muslim youth have multiple transnational identities, which 
connects them to Ireland and their parent’s homecountry. However, how one is 
recognised by others within each domain can be problematic. Saiba states that ‘once you 
go back home’627 to the parental homecountry, ‘you’re [seen as] the European, the 
Irish’.628 Here in Ireland, however, ‘you’re [seen as] the foreigner’.629 This situation 
makes Saiba question: ‘I’m like “where do I go?”’630 Fusaila enters the conversation 
and reflects on her feelings of belonging. She states that she feels accepted by 
Tanzanian and Irish people; however, at the same time, she has come to an 
understanding that she will ‘never be Irish because we’re not born and raised [here]’.631 
Saiba agrees with this statement. In relation to the dominant stereotype of “Irishness”, 
Rifa speaks up and states: ‘of what “Irish” is, exactly’.632 Fusaila stresses that her 
Islamic identity is the one identity in which she feels accepted by others. She states this 
by contrasting herself to Muslims, who identify with an ethno-cultural identity: 
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When you’re Muslim, “you’re Muslim”, that’s it, but some people who are 
culturised would be “oh, she’s Arab, she’s this” and all that but a person who 
learns Islam properly when you’re Muslim, you’re accepted fully that’s where I 
find my full identity.
633
 
 
In relation to being recognised as different in the homecountry, Rifa states that the 
common experience of young European Muslims is that they ‘don’t feel they’re from 
there [the homecountry] either’.634 Saiba clarifies that despite the feeling of being 
connected to the homecountry ‘you’re still different from them’.635 Fusaila goes deeper 
into the matter by referencing how her parents have accepted her twin sister Isha and 
herself as being different. She states that she and her twin ‘were always different’636 and 
their parents knew they ‘weren’t totally Muslim, we were Irish. So, we were never 
Tanzanian to them anyway’.637 Despite being different, she confides that Isha and 
herself were ‘accepted’638 by their parents ‘as different from the start’.639 In terms of the 
future, she points out that if her twin and herself ‘change now’640 to another form of 
“difference”, their parents would ‘accept us as we are’.641 
 A similar conversation about transnational belonging and the recognition of such 
multiple identities by others takes place within the 2
nd
 generation male discussion 
group. Against the theory that European Muslim youth are experiencing an identity 
crisis, the narratives suggest that the discussants have come to acknowledge, accept, and 
utilise their multiple identities to maintain connections to both transnational spheres; 
however, problems arise in relation to how such identity variations are perceived by 
others within each national context.  
 For example, Yusuf speaks candidly by stating that the problem resides with 
other people, who do not see him as he views himself – as a Muslim with a mixture of 
Irish and Libyan identifications. Yusuf states about being misrecognised by other people 
as either not Libyan and/or not Irish: 
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It's other people. No. For me it's quite clear. I speak Arabic fluently; I embrace 
both cultures, not fully but, to a certain extent. For me, I know my identity, for 
other people they don't and that’s how they treat you and that's where your 
experiences come from how people treat you and how people perceive you.
642
 
 
Aswad interjects by stating that all the young male discussants taking part in the 
discussion ‘share the same thing’,643 which is that they all have ‘double identities’.644 
This discussant confides that, here in Ireland, people know he is not Irish ‘because of 
the way I look’;645 whereas in Egypt, he is not seen as Egyptian due to his Arabic 
dialect. This is exemplified in the small story he narrates about a taxi ride he took whilst 
in Egypt:  
 
When I go to Egypt and get a taxi, the minute I speak, the first two words I 
speak are like, [the taxi-driver says] “you're from here, you’re not from here, 
where are you from? [from background: “yeah, where you from”?]’, you're from 
a different Arab country”, [Aswad replies] “No, I'm Egyptian”.646  
 
Both small stories above are similar in that they both illustrate how the discussants’ 
multiple identities are misrecognised in both Ireland and in their respective 
homecountries. In similarity to Yusuf, Aswad states that, for him personally, it is not a 
problem but that the problem emanates from other people’s perceptions of him. He 
strongly advocates that multiple identities can coexist and that this is not a problem for 
an individual, whose “being” is a mixture of identities. For the male discussants, the 
problem lies with other people, who do not understand that a person can be constituted 
by multiple identifications. Aswad remarks:  
 
But everyone here [in the discussion group] is unique, I think everyone here 
knows how he acts around [others] and it's their [other peoples’] problem [for] 
not understanding that I can act both ways, well not really act both ways 
[simultaneously], I'm actually the same person but they see it in [a] different 
way.
647
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Aban agrees with Aswad that a person can have multiple identities depending on the 
context. For this discussant, such a variety of identities can be an advantage and can be 
utilised for beneficial reasons. He uses the example of vocal accents [or dialects] and 
how they change depending on context. This discussant states the following about 
speaking a dialect of Arabic in the Middle East and with a Dublin accent when in 
Ireland: 
 
It's an advantage for us because like speaking Arabic, there's different types of 
Arabic. Like [in] Algeria they have different slang Arabic, it's the way we type 
[from background: “different accents”] so if I go to Algeria, I'll be able to 
understand a few words and speak back with a few words, that'd be normal. In 
Libya, same thing. Egypt, same thing. Sudan, same thing and then when I come 
here [Ireland], same thing. We just put on the [accent], I'm able to put on a 
Dublin accent everything so they'll recognise [it] but they'll know you’re 
different, you get me, just by your skin colour. For example, when I go to Libya, 
they’d be like “where are you from?;” [Aban’s response] “Originally, I live in 
Ireland”; “so you’re basically Irish, do you have a passport?;” [Aban’s response] 
“Yeah”; “you're telling me you’re basically Irish”; [Aban’s response] I'm like 
“no, my parents are Libyan. I'm born in Libya, I'm basically Libyan”; and they're 
like “no, what are you doing here, go back to Ireland”!648 
 
At the end of Aban’s small story, Yusuf angrily revoices the Libyan character, who 
questions his friend’s identity: 
 
Why did you even come here?, ye dope! [laughter], [go] back, go back to 
Europe [loud laughter], get out of here [Libya].
649
 
 
The next chapter – Chapter 6 – explores the comforting coping mechanism 
sociologically associated with spiritual recognition.  
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Chapter 6          Relations to Spiritual Recognition 
 
Classical sociology was highly influenced by the grand theories of Emile Durkheim and 
Max Weber. On one hand, Durkheim viewed religion positively as the site where 
collective consciousness raised its normative hopes and ideals – or in Durkheim’s 
terminology, its ‘obscure aspirations towards the good, the beautiful and the ideal’ – 
above and beyond the reality of everyday life.
650
 On the other hand, Weber, despite his 
orientalist view of Islam as a militaristic warrior religion,
651
 made a famous 
differentiation between the social strata of elite institutional ‘virtuosi’, who generate 
legitimation for themselves by controlling and conserving religious meaning versus the 
religion of the suffering and struggling ‘disprivileged’ strata, who need a salvatory 
religion as a form of justified compensatory esteem that facilitates access to resources, 
physical well-being and ‘psychic comfort’.652 Today, whilst the grand theories have 
slowly receded, contemporary sociology of religion, although highly influenced by 
classical studies, is primarily guided by the interpretation of empirical data, particularly 
in relation to everyday experiences of religiosity.  
Furseth and Repstad explain that contemporary sociologists of religion answer 
the question – why do people become religious? – by the utilisation of four theoretical 
frames.
653
 Firstly, in line with Weber’s idea of religion as a coping mechanism and 
facilitator of comfort from suffering and everyday struggle, deprivation theory 
determines that ‘religious commitment is a result of compensation’ from various forms 
of disadvantage in everyday life (whether that be economic, social, organismic, ethical, 
psychic and even existential);
654
 secondly, socialisation theory determines that  we think 
and act in certain ways due to our upbringing or socialisation into a contextual world. 
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This theory has particular relevance for intergenerational relationships and associated 
struggles;
655
 the third is rational-choice theory that determines that self-interested 
individuals make rational and calculated choices in relation to religious commitment 
and behaviour;
656
 and lastly is the theory of seeking, which determines that individuals 
are on a life quest and seek the goal of meaning and belonging.
657
   
In terms of this research, the absence of a discussion about spiritual recognition 
cannot be justified, particularly as this study focuses on individuals, who identify 
themselves as having a salient spiritual identity and feel that they belong to a religious 
community.
658
 With classical and contemporary sociology of religion briefly outlined 
above, it must be stated that narratives within this study are firmly connected to 
deprivation theory, and to a certain extent, with the theory of seeking. In relation to 
spiritual recognition, a variety of interviewees and discussants confirm the positivity of 
their religious observance as a form of compensatory esteem that provides protection 
from the pain of pathological intersubjective interaction within everyday life. In other 
words, whilst religion provides the individual with tangible benefits and resources, it 
also acts as a coping mechanism and a comfort from physical and psychical ill-health.  
The relationship between religion, disrespect and the reinvigoration of a positive 
relation-to-self has been studied by Melvin L. Rogers in relation to the African-
American experience of slavery.
659
 Rogers, who is critical of how predominantly 
secular critical theorists dismiss religion in solely negative terms as ideological, 
investigates how individuals rebound from disrespect to ‘generate the motivation 
necessary to prompt social conflict and transformation’.660 In his opinion, Honneth 
overly favours secularised ‘formal’ systems of recognition to develop ‘psychological 
and moral autonomy’661 and ‘obscures’ alternative systematic ways in which individuals 
create integrity and ‘affirm their normative self-understanding’.662 For Rogers, the over-
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reliance on legal recognition ensures that individuals are dependent on modes of 
recognition that cause suffering in the first instance; thereby, creating a paradox. An 
alternative view would be to give abstract forms of recognition more sway within the 
theory of recognition. For example, he views the ability of African-American slaves to 
hold social death ‘at bay’ as explained by the use of religion as an alternative form of 
recognition to the formal structures contextually situated in everyday life. To create a 
positive self-understanding, slaves ‘employed religious imagination’.663 By being 
creative with their spirituality, particularly the Story of Exodus, slaves could ‘address 
[the] existential threat of slavery’.664 This is a strong argument for the fact that spiritual 
recognition has a positively productive and constitutive impact upon an individual’s 
struggle for recognition and identity formation:  
 
The practical result of the locution [utilising the Story of Exodus] was to remove 
from view, among other things, the obstacle of racial discrimination that 
prevented the acknowledgement of one’s particularity and its place in the larger 
well-being of the community. More immediately, however, if the story of 
Exodus worked as historians and others have described, then the corresponding 
sense of peoplehood provided precisely the vision of worth that each individual 
searched for. It indicated their importance by virtue of the similar journey they 
shared. They were esteemed in light of their struggle and allegiance to God.
665
  
 
The following sections focus on the general themes of religious support, religious 
solidarity and the identification of a civic component that can be interpreted and 
extracted from Islam doctrine.   
 
6.1 Religious Support 
 
This section explores the narratives on spiritual recognition, particularly in relation to 
how such an abstract form of recognition has practical benefits by acting as a comfort 
and coping mechanism against the harsh reality of everyday life, in which 
intersubjective struggle is inherent. Furthermore, the narratives also briefly explore how 
spiritual recognition relates to feeling and self-confidence.   
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6.1.1 A Comfort and Coping Mechanism 
 
In line with deprivation theory within the sociology of religion, many of the empirical 
narratives suggest strongly that spiritual recognition supports the individual by acting as 
a valuable coping mechanism that provides comfort against a range of pathologies that 
permeate everyday interactive life with others.  The majority of such narratives emanate 
from the focused discussion groups. For example, Idris opines that Islam ‘soothes’ and 
is for all of ‘humanity’.666 It a universal human coping mechanism by the fact that 
prayer is an attempt to gain recognition despite ‘all the troubles that you have in the 
worldly day’.667 This point is expanded further by Dahlia, who expresses her viewpoint 
that reading the Qur’an collectively with other community members helps 
psychologically with everyday struggles and ills, such as living within a foreign land 
and homesickness. She states about the positivity and rewards of religious study:  
 
It’s to help our inside, to build our inside. In this country, especially we are 
living abroad; we are away from home, that’s a really tough position for us. We 
find here to sit and read Qur’an together that’s a kind of recognition between 
ourself and Allah.
668
 
  
Another 1
st
 generation female discussant – Ayan – strongly emphasises how her 
spiritual belief and recognition gives her strength and power to tackle everyday 
struggles – either within the family or wider interactive spheres – with confidence. She 
states that having ‘belief’669 in God and following the prescriptions of Islam is positive 
for the self in that it ‘[makes] us strong’.670 In other words, recognition to God 
beneficially aids the person in their struggles through everyday life. As Ayan states in 
this regard: ‘Our belief on that [Islam] that make me strong; I can fight; I can do 
anything’.671 This comment suggests that spiritual belief gives a person internal strength 
and the self-confidence to partake in life, despite the struggles that may arise. Dahlia 
translates Ayan’s comments in terms of the attainment of personal power by stating 
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‘yes, to give us power!’672 Therefore, recognition to God is connected to the attainment 
of personal power and autonomy. Ayan connects this in relation to the familial sphere, 
in which she mentioned that she is the power dynamic of the familial sphere. In this 
section, she emphasises that matriarchal power is created by God and she ‘can be the 
dynamo of the family’673 but that such a position ‘comes from our beliefs inside the 
heart from God’.674 Dahlia emphasises the practical health benefits that spiritual 
recognition has for tackling everyday struggles. She agrees with Ayan and adds 
‘exactly, you believe we fight depression. We fight feeling homesickness’.675 For this 
discussant, spiritual recognition is related to two essential aspects: ‘Power and secondly, 
prayer’.676 
 Echoing Dahlia’s comments about how spiritual recognition has positive health 
benefits, Sadiyya returns to how recognition to God through prayer can help with 
practical struggles in life. What is interesting about her comments is that she specifically 
mentions psychological struggles related to depressive conditions. She mentions the 
uplifting aspects of spiritual reflection by stating that ‘sometimes if you feel depressed 
just read, open [the] Qur’an and after that you really feel [better]’.677 Dahlia supports 
this comment by stating in response ‘open the Qur'an, that’s the hope!’678 Thus, through 
their comments – Sadiyya and Dahlia – are emphasising the psychological benefits that 
spiritual recognition gives to people struggling with the realities of everyday life. It can 
give hope and can also make ‘the depression less’.679 Once again Ayan returns to the 
theme that spiritual recognition is a battery – a rechargeable form of empowerment. She 
states that when you are ‘travelling to God’680 you specifically make this journey to feel 
internally empowered and ready to tackle the everyday trials of life. In line with 
socialisation theory, this is one of the major reasons to ensure that the younger 
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generation recognise God and obtain a way to be internally empowered.  On this point, 
Ayan states: 
 
[When] you travelling to God, you come for more power inside yourself that 
what give our beliefs in God. Give us the power to, in our life, to do with the 
children, everything. So, we can now convince our children when you have 
beliefs you can prepare them and let them, give them this way for them, this 
power.
681
  
 
The above statements are also reflected within the 2
nd
 generation discussion groups, 
Azaan states that he went through ‘a phase’682 at the beginning of his teens that was 
marked by isolation and depression. He ‘left the mosque’683 and as he states ‘kept to 
himself’.684 He describes this period as a time when he went ‘all hardcore’,685 which 
was reflected in the music he listened to – a form of rock music called emotional 
hardcore (EMO). He openly states that his psychological health was not good; and on 
reflection, he was ‘real depressed’.686 Whilst he emphasises that this time was 
‘tough’,687 Azaan also reflects on how the reforming of friendships to other young 
Muslims brought him back to conducting prayer, which he feels alleviated his 
depressive symptoms. Notably, he associates prayer as an act of recognition to God with 
a confessional function that has similar qualities to counselling and forms of talk 
therapy. To communicate his point, he aligns Islam and Christianity through the idea 
that prayer is an act of confession, which can relieve the psychological tension 
associated with ‘bottling up’688 everyday worries and concerns about particular actions. 
He acknowledges that people who keep worries and problems to themselves can be 
deeply disturbed in that their negative thoughts can ‘kinda break them’ and they might 
‘crack up eventually and just go crazy like, especially if it was something bad’.689 
Therefore, in his opinion, the confessional in Christianity provides a means for 
transacting everyday problems to another person without the fear of being judged, just 
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as in the play associated with psychoanalytic therapy. After the act of confession, the 
person will ‘feel somewhat relieved because you’d let it out and told someone’.690 He 
then compares this to his own religion, Islam, in which the act of prayer is viewed as a 
private form of confessional between the individual and God: 
 
When you’re bowing and stuff you can let everything out and ask for 
forgiveness and tell God everything you've done and whatever and you wouldn't 
have to have told the priest. No one in the world could know or has to know 
what you've done and you can still feel that release because you've told or 
you've asked for forgiveness and you've let it out like, you know and no one can 
hear you, no one has to hear you.
691
  
 
After Azaan’s comments about confessional prayer, Yusuf, another 2nd generation male 
discussant, clarifies that the act of prayer as confession is only used when you’re 
‘wronging yourself’692 and does not exempt an individual from wronging or 
misrecognising another person. As he states, in this situation ‘if you are wronging 
someone else, you have to go apologise to them, so you can't just go and kill someone 
and just be like “God forgive me”’.693 Yusuf continues the narrative into how it can be 
an aid to the negative aspects of worldly life. He states that for him spiritual recognition 
as recognition to God is a beneficial aid that enables a person to learn how to cope with 
the stresses and hardships of everyday life. Thus for this discussant, spiritual recognition 
is a coping mechanism. He mentions the relief and satisfaction he feels when 
conducting prayer: 
 
...if I'm going through stress throughout the day, if I’m like sick of studying, if 
I'm having troubles and I put my forehead to the ground, I feel such a sense of 
relief, you know. Such a sense of satisfaction like, I can make, I can, for me I'm 
there and I'm facing God, you know, and I can just say anything I want and that 
just makes me feel so good.
694
  
 
Masud identifies with Yusuf’s narrative. He also states that praying to God ‘feels 
good’695 and this feeling is especially heightened ‘when you are going through tough 
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times’.696 Aban enters the conversation acknowledging that as a believer, he is aware 
that secular people ‘don’t believe’697 because they ‘say “God is not there”’.698 He 
positions himself in opposition to such an opinion, which views life as solely created so 
that people can ‘have fun, to do whatever you want and then you just die and then 
you're gone?’699 He does not agree with this assessment of what life is about. However, 
he is open to differentiating between recognising God and the institutional of the 
religion. He acknowledges that ‘every religion has its own theory’.700 At this point, just 
like Azaan and Yusuf, Aban moves to the practical application of his religion as a 
coping mechanism for everyday life. He narrates a small story about the stress of 
undertaking examinations and how his mother advised him to say a prayer before the 
exam in order to calm his nerves and clear his mind. However, he states that sometimes 
he forgets to pray, which causes him to ‘feel like I'm struggling, struggling and 
everything. When I say it, it comes better, so that's how I know’.701 For this discussant, 
spiritual recognition is a mechanism to ease the struggles of everyday life.  
 Yusuf adds that the perceived existence of God not only eases everyday 
suffering and struggle but also his existence is aesthetically evident within the beautiful 
complexity of the world. As he states: ‘the skies, the mountains, you look around, you 
know there’s a creator’.702 Through such evidence, Yusuf believes that this work of 
creation should be recognised and acknowledged by those who benefit and are 
conscious of its existence. He states that he recognises God and his work ‘by going 
every single day, putting your forehead to the ground, you speak of him, you know that 
at the end of the day, death is not the end, you know there’s a hereafter and that is what 
you work towards’.703 For this discussant, recognition to God goes hand-in-hand with 
the evidence that there is an afterlife, which is free of suffering and struggle. The 
afterlife is paradise and it motivates people to behave a certain way in this worldly life. 
Reaching such paradise becomes a reason to ‘work hard’704 in all spheres of life. For 
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Yusuf, it [spiritual recognition as evidence of an afterlife] acts as ‘a kind of 
motivator’705 in that it ‘pushes you’706 towards the goal of obtaining entry into a sphere 
of existence that is devoid of hardship, suffering and struggle. At the same time, in his 
opinion, ‘any problems you have in life, any difficulties, it [spiritual recognition] just 
eases everything off, you know’.707 Once again, he returns to the point that recognition 
to an abstract phenomenon i.e., God acts as a coping mechanism against the difficulties 
inherent to a socially intersubjective form of existence.
708
 
 
6.1.2 Affect on Relation-to-Self 
 
The following section will present narratives that give an indication how spiritual 
recognition affects an individual’s relation-to-self, particularly in terms of feeling and 
self-confidence. A revert to Islam, Kaleem has much to say about spiritual recognition, 
which he refers to as a natural instinct or ‘referential instinct’ i.e., to revere a higher 
entity.
709
 For this interviewee, spiritual recognition aids success and happiness in life by 
providing comfort and purifying the heart of the individual. Thus for Kaleem, spiritual 
recognition to God provides a unique ‘inner cleanliness’ of the heart.710 
 Idris, within the 1
st
 generation discussion group, echoes Kaleem’s statement 
above, by internally positioning the affect of spiritual recognition as being located ‘in 
the heart’.711 Furthermore, he states that the ‘heart can’t see’712 but that the ‘heart can 
feel’.713 Importantly in Idris’ opinion, spiritual recognition is not devoid of reason. For 
this discussant, it is cognitively rational in that the heart is connected to mental 
processes. He uses a common saying to emphasise this point: ‘we say “the heart is the 
heart of the mind”’.714 Overall for this discussant, spiritual recognition is fundamentally 
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about feeling and belief and ‘that’s the recognition to God’.715 He highlights how prayer 
is a repetitive act of recognition to God that provides comfort and reflection away from 
‘all the troubles that you have in the worldly day’.716 He is thus equating spiritual 
recognition – through feeling and belief – as a form of human coping mechanism: 
 
Feeling and belief, feeling and belief and that’s the recognition [to God] and 
every time you watch and stand in front of God, you are standing in front of 
God, and you try with all the troubles that you have in the worldly day, you 
know, people can lose their sight of what they are doing but, you know, the 
repetition maybe one day will get you to recognise and to recognise and to be 
recognised.
717
 
 
When asked about what specific feelings emanate from recognising God, Idris clarifies 
that such recognition through various acts gives a feeling of ‘cleansing’, ‘cleaning’ and 
‘purity’.718 He stresses that such recognition is also beneficial for one’s self and well-
being in that it creates a system of life that makes you a better person-to-self and to 
others.  
 
You know, the benefit is also for you. I mean it’s like a system of life. It’s not 
just a belief; it’s a system of life. You follow this and you are a better person. 
Not because it organises your day – simple thing [like] prayer organises your 
day. You take a break at certain times. Everything you do is [is for your well-
being], and there is also a hadith – “everything people do, Muslims do, it’s for 
themselves”…for your own wellbeing except fasting. Fasting is for God because 
you do it, and you know that he is watching you too…It’s teaching you to stop 
having what is permitted [halal].
719
  
 
In terms of whether spiritual recognition relates to self-confidence, a 2
nd
 generation 
female discussant, Isha, affirmatively agrees by stating concisely: ‘yeah, it does do 
that’.720 In terms of community and self-confidence, Nejeed opines strongly in relation 
to community relations that ‘you’re not just a[n isolated] person here’.721 By this he 
means that people within their Muslim communities are not isolated from each other but 
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are members of a social community that are all connected and know each other. 
Therefore, as he states, ‘you're known by your name, you're known for “who you 
are”’.722 As to whether community support gives self-confidence to an individual, 
Nejeed responds ‘of course, yeah’.723 
 Saiba makes an extremely important statement that links using ones autonomous 
choice to practise a religion to self-confidence. She criticises any form of religiosity that 
is forced upon people. She directly criticises the patriarchal power dynamics within her 
community that force (a proportion of) Muslim women to wear body coverings against 
their will. For this discussant, these people are not autonomous individuals and such 
actions destroy self-confidence. On the point of connecting autonomous action to self-
confidence, she states the following:  
 
Once you not doing it because other people expect you to do it, or because it’s 
the norm and you accept it within yourself, I think you’ll find it much easier to 
answer questions of like oppression and do you feel oppressed? You just say 
“no” or other times where I think people that are, have to wear the hijab or have 
to practise certain ways, they’d be like “I’m not oppressed but like why”? and 
they wouldn’t have reasons because technically they are, they’re being forced to 
wear it and if you believe in it [Islam] yourself, I think you’ll feel a lot more 
confident in yourself.
724
 
 
6.2 Religious Solidarity 
 
This section explores religious solidarity in terms how a collective religious bond acts 
as a regulative function for perfecting and maintaining individual religious practice and 
how friendships amongst Muslim youth are grounded and bound together through the 
search for an authentic Islamic identity, which acts as a common-ground for an ethno-
culturally diverse community.   
 
6.2.1 The Regulative Function of the Religious Collective 
 
Whilst the narratives above stress Islamic spiritual recognition as an individual action 
and relation-to-self, it also creates a strong collective solidaristic bond that fulfils a 
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function in relation regulating an individual’s everyday practice. Idris comments on hajj 
and its relation to the Day of Judgement by emphasising his viewpoint about the 
collective solidarity and equality that is symbolised and embedded within Islamic 
theology and practice. For this discussant, the hajj pilgrimage represents the Day of 
Judgement in which all people become one and the same under the umbrella of Islam. 
He views such symbolism within Islam as a means of making “particular” people ‘the 
same’725 or “universal” to each other, similar to the secular concept of citizenship. Idris’ 
states the following about the hajj pilgrimage: 
 
The Day of Judgement is when you go to hajj and you are doing that walk and 
people are pushing and shoving and people, some people are annoyed when they 
see people [being aggressive] and they say “ignorant” and this and that but this 
is an example of the Day of Judgement where everybody is there. Where 
everybody is the same, where there’s no difference between a president and a 
sweeper so that kind of thing. You’re all the same. No matter who you are, or 
what your background, rich, poor whatever, and that is the way that when all up 
on the last day. That is, and this is a microcosm of that day. So everything in 
[Islam], within our religion has a symbolism.
726
 
 
The 1
st
 generation female discussion group gives an insight into how collective religious 
solidarity can also act as a beneficial regulatory mechanism over the struggle individual 
members have with the norms prescribed by the religion. For example, Meera openly 
clarifies that she believes ‘God [is] here’727 but that in terms of her everyday actions in 
relation to prescribed norms, she confides that: ‘I’m not following everything, you 
know, no, I try!’728 A fellow discussant, Sadiyya, consoles Meera by replying to this 
statement with a reason for her not following Islamic norms to the letter: ‘cause you are 
human, human being’.729 Meera agrees. Ayan follows by also emphasising the fallibility 
of the human condition: ‘because we are [human], we are who [make] mistakes’.730 
Dahlia provides narrative evidence of how a female communal study group provides a 
regulative mechanism to individually recognise God but in a synchronised manner that 
is perceived as the “correct” way. As she states about such collective solidarity and how 
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it regulates “correct” religious adherence and provides a coping mechanism against 
everyday struggle:  
 
I find our meeting here every Wednesday that’s a kind of very spiritual 
recognition between this team [the female study group] and God. We came here 
just sitting, reading Qur’an, that’s the main thing, to learn how we can live 
Qur’an [in] the correct way and learn some spiritual things. It’s to help our 
inside, to build our inside. In this country, especially we are living abroad; we 
are away from home, that’s a really tough position for us. We find here to sit and 
read Qur’an together that’s a kind of recognition between ourself and Allah.731 
  
Dahlia’s statement emphasises how the Muslim women’s study group meets regularly 
to promote and regulate their individual spiritual recognition in a collective manner. 
They come together one day per week as a supportive ‘team’732 and read the Qur’an in 
order to learn collectively how to spiritually act “correctly” in-line with Islamic sources. 
As Meera’s statements prove, the individual may find it difficult to live correctly as a 
Muslim within a non-Muslim country; therefore, collective support and communal 
interaction provides a support system that enables Muslim women to ‘build their 
inside’733 in spiritual terms. The group also provides a mechanism to provide support, 
care and a remedy to isolationism. As Dahlia states – it’s a ‘tough position for us’734 to 
be Muslim immigrants within a non-Muslim country. She views reading the Qur’an 
communally as ‘a kind of recognition between ourself and Allah’.735  
 
6.2.2 Friendship and the Youth’s Search for Common-Ground  
 
Within the 2
nd
 generation discussion groups, collective solidarity in terms of friendship 
comes to the fore and also how such an ethno-culturally diverse generation have found 
common-ground through an Islamic identity. For example, Yusuf jokingly defines his 
Muslim friends as ‘kinda the Muslim brotherhood [general laughter]’.736 Masud 
laughingly replies ‘yeah, it really is like [that]’737 and then returns to the conversation 
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by emphasising that friendship within the small Muslim community in Dublin is not 
determined by age. For this discussant, ‘the age difference [between Muslim friends] 
doesn't really matter’.738 He clarifies that he hangs around with Muslims of varying ages 
and then compares this as different to his friendships with Irish non-Muslims:  
 
I wouldn't be out on the streets with an Irish guy, who's four or five years older 
than me. I wouldn't be chillin’ or talkin’ to them or something whereas here it'd 
be grand. They're like brothers to me.
739
  
 
Aban differentiates between his Islamic and Irish friends. First of all, he clarifies that in 
his opinion Islamic identity is ‘powerful’740 in that it can bond people together. For this 
discussant, it is what differentiates his two friendship groups. In terms of his Irish 
friends, the relationship is formed around amusement in that ‘if you’re with your Irish 
friends, you're going to have to plan the day, plan a time to meet up somewhere and do 
something’741 and when you come to meet with your Irish friends, they're like “no, I'm 
not going to come out unless we are doing something interesting, something fun’’.742 
However, in Aban’s opinion, the friendships are different between Islamic friends in 
that – 
 
Just take a random weekend or maybe a Friday prayer at the mosque, you'll see 
them all here. Think about it…with your Muslim friends you don't have to 
[plan]. Where do you want to find them on a Friday morning? You come to the 
mosque and you find everyone and they're happy…so that's what I find 
different.
743
 
 
Stressing the importance of friendship to spiritual recognition, Azaan narrates a small 
story about how he reformed new friendships with other Muslims. For this discussant, 
making new friends led directly to a reactualisation of his spiritual recognition and 
Islamic identity. Furthermore, re-enacting his Islamic identity through friendship is 
associated with a lessening of his depression and the creation of more happiness and 
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contentment in his life. He states the following about how friendship helped shape his 
spiritual recognition: 
 
I had stopped praying and reading Qur’an and everything to do with Islam back 
then and then one day they [Muslim youth] came to my house and they started 
praying and I was like “oh yeah, I forgot you had to pray and stuff”, they kind of 
brought it back to me and then when I had come back to it, I wasn't as down and 
stuff. So, I was kind of more happy than I was before being back here, being 
praying, being Muslim and stuff like that so I suppose friendship and he [God] 
had brought me back, being friends with him kind of brought me back to Islam 
and stuff so I kind of have him to thank for it and stuff so. So I suppose in that 
way, like God sort of like brought me back in that way.
744
 
 
It is interesting that friendship is being perceived as a circular movement back to 
recognising God. Azaan explains that friendship is different in Islam than the common 
idea of secular friendship of ‘he's just a mate’.745 Friendship in Islam is ‘kind of past 
that’746 standard definition adopted by most people. He associates friendship in Islam as 
closer to the idea of brotherhood or sisterhood in that ‘you are always there for each 
other and stuff so whether someone [is] going through something, you can't just be like 
“ah, hate that” or like “it's bad”. Someone would definitely like be there and trying to 
help you as much as they can through it’.747 For this discussant, this kind of friendship 
is ‘one of the greatest things about Islam’748 in that it involves a ‘closeness you have 
with [other] people’.749  
 Hussein states an important point that young Muslims in Ireland, due to the 
democratic environment and freedom that this entails, have looked beyond their ethno-
cultural and/or national differences to become friends through a “universal” Islamic 
identity. This narrative is extremely important as it provides narrative evidence that 
today, in cosmopolitan Ireland, Muslim youth have found a common-ground based on 
the practise of a salient Islamic identity:  
 
I'll tell you something, the reality is if I met him [Masud] maybe in Libya, we 
wouldn't get to know each other as much, so I think that Ireland brought all the 
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Muslims together. The barrier of culture or different country has been gone, you 
know because we’re in Ireland, we have respect for each other. Like I said if I 
met him [Masud] in his country [we wouldn't get to know each other]; probably 
because they have that kind of thing [culture] but Ireland did bring all the 
Muslims together.
750
 
 
A similar view is held within the 2
nd
 generation female discussion group. Rifa clarifies 
that the small size of the Muslim community in Ireland means that Islamic identity is 
struggled for, maintained and even strengthened. Fusaila opines that Muslims in Ireland 
‘hang onto the real Islam’751 because it joins everyone together despite there being ‘so 
many of us, different cultu[res], different cultures [high tone]’.752 Saiba and Fusaila 
agree that Islamic identity has become the common ground that binds the diverse young 
generation together as Muslim. On this point, Saiba states ‘exactly’.753 Fusaila agrees 
‘definitely’754 and then explains why mixing with other cultures is positive for Islam 
and can help ground a person in how they practise their religiosity: 
 
I want to have like different cultures in my life ‘cos I feel like my friends keep 
me grounded. When I’m straying too much in my culture, they’re like “you 
know that’s not Islam”. If you hang around with different cultures, you realise 
that you need to find a common-ground somewhere and Islam is that common-
ground.
755
 
 
The above has implications for the future development of Islam in Ireland as Fusaila 
makes the statement that young adult Muslims are actively pursuing a strategy to 
educate younger generations growing up in the Dublin metropolis and in the rest of 
Ireland. Fusaila states that the present 2
nd
 generation are making concerted efforts ‘to 
educate the younger ones’756 in how to attain a common-ground towards each other by 
returning to an “authentic” form of Islam, which contains a valued and embedded civic 
component.  
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6.3 Islam’s Civic Component 
 
This section will explore the narratives that give an insight into how the research 
participants view the relationship between Islamic and civic identities. Particular 
attention will be paid to narratives that emphasise the civicality of Islam i.e., narratives 
indicating the existence of an Islamic-civic component of identity.
757
 Secondly, 
narratives will be used to explore how the life story of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), 
particularly in terms of his time spent in exile in Medina, constitutes a key example and 
influence upon the research participants in terms of how Islamic-civic practice can be 
implemented within a pluralistic environment.  
 
6.3.1 Interpreting Civicness from Islam 
 
Within the narratives, there is ample evidence that a civic identity that is interpreted 
from Islamic teaching and practice is being emphasised as valuable by the interviewees 
and discussants. In other words, there is evidence that an Islamic-civic identity is 
important within the everyday lives of the research participants and is held in higher 
regard than the salience of an ethno-cultural or an overly nationalistic identity. For 
example, within the 1
st
 generation male discussion group, Farid stresses the lack of 
connection between being Muslim and a national whilst strongly connecting the 
complementary relationship between being Muslim and civic. The clearest sign of this 
opinion, or ‘feeling’ as Farid calls it, is the following statement:  
 
We don’t feel like we’re national, Irish national. Probably, we feel more civil. 
Like, vote civil rather than [vote] Irish.
758
  
 
Idris is of the opinion that there is no conflict whatsoever between Islam, national or 
civic identities. For this discussant, Islam equals respect and he states the following in 
this regard: 
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There is no real conflict between being a Muslim first because Muslim, if you 
are a true Muslim then you will respect everything of the country that you are 
living in…in Islam, you have to follow the country you are living in. So, this is a 
small thing, you have to follow the law of the country. You have to pay your 
taxes and if you are called to the army, then you have to go to the army.
759
 
 
Labeeb’s comments continue to raise interesting reflections upon civic identity and its 
practical application. Overall, although this 1
st
 generation male discussant 
acknowledges that Muslims can vary in belief, he is certain that ‘Muslim is Muslim’760 
and that despite differences in interpretation ‘we all believe’.761 In his opinion, if a 
person states the shahada (profession of faith), ‘he’s a Muslim’.762 Labeeb then goes on 
to state a positive view of universal and mutual civicness that transcends religious 
particularness and gives an indication of how he lives his everyday life. He states that he 
is unemployed and is ‘receiving help from the government’,763 most probably in the 
form of monetary benefit. He seems to be correlating such social welfare payments not 
to the state, who distribute such payments but to other citizens within Irish society, who 
pay and contribute through taxation. He states his appreciation to Irish society for 
coming to his aid in terms of providing him with social welfare benefits: ‘who paying 
this tax, who paying this money, [it’s] from the Irish society and the majority is Catholic 
or Christian.’764 Labeeb does not stop there but adds an intersubjective dynamic. He 
states that he reciprocates the aid he receives by civically volunteering ‘to work for my 
community through St. Vincent de Paul’,765 a Catholic charitable organisation. Thus, 
this denizen recognises the reciprocal nature of civicness that involves moral 
responsibility. Although he is receiving social welfare payments, his civic identity is 
active in reciprocating back to his community; thereby, proving that he is not a burden 
but a contributing member of society. This is reflected in the following statement: 
 
I’m not working now; I volunteer to work for my community through St. 
Vincent de Paul but some people [within the Muslim community] might have 
problem with that [working for a Christian charity] but I’m going to volunteer to 
                                                 
759
 Idris.  
760
 Labeeb.  
761
 Ibid.  
762
 Ibid.  
763
 Ibid.  
764
 Ibid.  
765
 Ibid.  
 
 
155 
 
work for St. Vincent de Paul to prove to my [wider] community, to provide for 
my [wider] community because I don’t want to sit back in the room where [I 
am] watching television, why the government giving me money? and there is 
some way that I can contribute.
766
 
 
Within this statement, he suggests that some within the Muslim community may have 
an issue with his decision to volunteer for a Christian charity. Idris asks a question of 
Labeeb: ‘and do you think there is a problem in doing that?’767 Labeeb responds with 
‘no’768 but then adds additionally that ‘some people might have problem with that’.769 
Overall though, Labeeb is happy to be civically active and participating within his 
(wider) community. When asked about making a civic contribution, he states the 
following: 
 
I’m three years doing that [volunteering] now. So, I mean, the understanding 
between the religion and stuff like that [civic participation], I think some people 
[within the Muslim community] find it difficult. It might be based on their 
background from back home or whatever – religion – but we live together in our 
[home]country Christian and Muslim, peacefully, there’s no difference…770 
 
Hurriyah states in relation to integration processes in Ireland that ‘here [there] are some 
of us [Muslims] as well that are not ready to integrate and everybody has the right to do 
what they want’.771 It could be inferred that this discussant is stating that an awareness 
of Islamic-civicness is growing but that more needs to be done to expand on how 
Islamic identity can find the flexibility within its own teachings to relate to the 
European environment. However, such a process is both internal and external in that 
Hurriyah stresses that ‘we [Muslims] need to find the inner side of us and educate 
ourselves about certain things’.772 In terms of whether civicness is inside Islam or 
whether it is an entity in its own right that is distinctly separate from Islam, Hurriyah 
states the following narrative: 
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It’s separated in the sense that even though you are a citizen there are some laws 
that still bound you but you can’t override that law as a Muslim. Example, you 
are a Muslim first before your citizenship. I am a Muslim first that comes before 
my citizenship. Then my citizenship comes next [from background: “yeah”]. To 
follow the rules of that citizenship, not to betray the government and everything 
there is already in Islam. Islam said “follow the rules of the land”. The only time 
you may not follow the rules of the land is when you are under threat to practise 
your Islam[ic] religion. It’ll [Islam will] move elsewhere because Allah said “he 
has created all the walls here for you to live in different places”, so that’s the 
only time you can’t follow the rules of that law, but apart from that follow the 
rules of the law. So in as much as we can do all this. Together, we’ll see that we 
can live together side-by-side without any prejudice, but individually, we have a 
set mind that we are racist to each other, and then we use, [for] example, politics 
and religion to get into each other rather than finding the solution within 
ourselves.
773
  
 
Within the above narrative, Hurriyah claims that civicness is not inside Islam per say 
but is separate. However, the teachings of Islam insist that Muslims must obey the law 
of the land. For this discussant, this is vitally important. However, she also clarifies that 
in her subjective opinion, Islam comes before ‘any legal citizenship’.774 In other words, 
Islamic identity takes precedence over formal civic identity or citizenship yet Islam 
implements a degree of reciprocal respect for the laws of the land as long as those laws 
do not infringe upon the right to practise one’s Islamic faith. If Islam is mistreated 
within a bounded nation-state, Hurriyah claims that Muslims are permitted to move to 
another area, where the Islamic religion is given a degree of respect and freedom. This 
discussant would like people to collectively work towards social harmony; however, in 
her opinion, what prevents such ideals from forming is the racist mindset that forms part 
of the human condition, which manipulates political and religious ideology to sow 
disharmony amongst people. As a solution, she restates her conviction that individuals 
must reflect and conduct a process of self-examination in order to identify pathologies 
that led to disrespectful action and the misrecognition of others. 
Both female interviewees – Dahlia and Safeerah – are critical of Muslims who 
assimilate into Irish culture and neglect their Islamic identity. They refer to such people 
as Muslims-by-name but not-in-practice.
775
 For Dahlia, such neglect of an Islamic 
identity within Western democracies is unnecessary because, in her opinion, Islam 
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provides the answer to integration in that civicness is inside Islam; and therefore, it 
enables Muslims to continue to spiritually recognise God and to civically participate as 
citizens in the public sphere. As she states on this point: 
 
Some Muslim people don’t know this [being involved in the wider community, 
i.e., the civic component of Islam] is from [the] Sunna from the Prophet 
Muhammad [PBUH], this is the problem…they [some Muslims] didn’t know 
this [civicness] is inside Islam.
776
  
 
Both female interviewees elaborate on the difficulties they face in terms of being 
members of a Muslim women’s group, who act civically outside of their Muslim 
community by organising charitable events in their wider local area. On top of being 
critical about how Muslims in Ireland interact with the media and of other Muslims, 
who become assimilated into Irish culture and forsake their Islamic identities, they 
actively promote Muslims to become active through a civic interpretation of the Islamic 
sources. For these two interviewees, many Muslims do not know that Islam promotes 
civicness and participation. As Dahlia states: ‘they [individuals within the Muslim 
community] didn’t know this [civic element] is inside Islam’.777 Whilst the female civic 
group has had to struggle against stereotypes within the wider society, they have also 
gained little support from their own Muslim community. Dahlia views Muslims in 
Ireland as ‘isolated, they are just sitting in the corner’.778 However, the interviewees are 
trying to change perceptions and inform their community and the wider society that 
Muslims can civically participate and contribute positively to their local community and 
to Irish society. Safeerah sums up the struggle encountered within Irish society and 
within their own Muslim community by stating that: ‘we are fighting both’.779 This 
short statement is valuable. It suggests that their group is struggling against perceptions 
of the wider Irish society and against perceptions that remain within the Muslim 
community. For these women, their message is that Islam has a civic component that 
can be useful to Muslims living in Europe, who wish to integrate and participate 
civically as Muslims within European societies.  
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 Within the 2
nd
 generation female discussion group, Saiba differentiates between 
her recognition to God as a dependent child and how it progressed to be the foundation 
of her identity when she matured into an independent adult. Although Islam is her most 
salient identity, Saiba views civicness as emanating from her core religious identity. In 
this regard, she states that as a child she ‘didn’t think that she did’780 recognise God 
because her actions were coordinated and socialised by her parents. As she states about 
this constitutive power dynamic: ‘at that time, I was just doing it because my parents 
told me to’.781 As a rebellious child, Saiba would give the appearance of acting out her 
recognition to God, but in reality, she was not following parental religious instruction. 
She states about the act of fasting: ‘even when I was fasting, I’d like fast because they 
told me to and then I’d like run away and go into the bathroom and eat food’.782 Saiba 
goes on to give a long narrative that examines how as an adult she agentically 
researched into Islam and began to see an Islamic identity as the ‘foundation’783 of her 
identity. She narrates the following about this gradual self-realisation: 
 
I don’t think out loud but I think subconsciously I said, “I do accept God and I 
am like, accept religion” and like I mean, I did say like I mean [it] and then from 
then on like, everything I do even if I wasn’t seen by other people I’d still feel 
conscious about it and be like you know “God can see me” and I’d still count 
that as one of my sins to like repent for like you know…it’s really hard to get to 
that stage where you’re like totally conscious of everything, where everything I 
do I think emm I do like basically for the sake of Islam. I mean, I’d always have 
it as my, my foundation, even when I’m in studies and when I like, anything I 
do, I’d always have a foundation of Islam or and then even things I do for the 
civic, like my community, even if it’s not benefiting Muslims, I’d still feel like 
it’s benefiting people. Islam is humane so I’d always have an Islamic foundation 
to it so.
784
  
 
The above narrative indicates that Saiba, as a young adult, rationally chose to use her 
individual agency to research what Islam was about instead of passively receiving 
socialising instructions from her parents. This process of acceptance is described as an 
internal feeling in which she, within herself, acknowledged God’s existence. By 
accepting Allah, she describes how her actions took on a different meaning in that 
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“wrongful” actions against oneself or others can be seen by God, even if acted out 
privately. Thus, as an adult, Saiba believes that she is responsible for actions she 
performs in private as well as in public. However, she also stresses that ‘it’s really 
hard’785 to be continuously conscious of every action that one initiates and performs in 
everyday life. With this said, overall for Saiba, Islam is her most salient identity. It is 
her core identity, the foundation of herself. She correlates her foundational Islamic 
identity to her civic actions by stating that any civicness she performs can be related 
back to the teachings of Islam. For this discussant, Islam is a humane religion in which 
civic identity is embedded and civic action promoted.  
 
6.3.2 The Civic Example of the Prophet 
 
The narrative data indicates how civicness emanates from an Islamic ethos. Within the 
focused discussion groups, multiple discussants narrate how their civicness is highly 
influenced by hadith (or small stories) that elaborate on the religious and civic identity 
of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) within the multicultural and multireligious 
environment of Medina. For example, in terms of civicness, Hurriyah states adamantly 
that the Prophet ‘was civic’.786 Sadiyya states about the Prophet: ‘he’s good’.787 For 
Hurriyah, it is important that all Muslims ‘try to emulate his [the Prophet’s] 
behaviour’.788 In her opinion, this implies a constant ‘need to keep on training 
ourselves’,789 especially since people within the Muslim community are ‘still not 
copying him even though we’re following the Sunna, which is his practices’.790 Overall, 
she is sure that ‘civic[ness] is there’791 and is actualised in actions conducted by 
Muslims.  
 In terms of how the 2
nd
 generation male discussants relate to the Prophet 
Mohammad (PBUH) and the Islamic-civic life he lived in the diverse environment of 
Medina, Masud, is the first to respond to the moderator’s probe: ‘I understand what you 
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mean’.792 Hussein then interjects into the conversation to clarify how immigrant 
Muslims can identify with the Prophet, who was ‘from [the] city of Mecca [and] he 
went [migrated] to Medina’.793 This discussant speaks about the fact that Muslims in 
Ireland are from ‘Arab countries and African countries’794 and have ‘come to Ireland’795 
just as the Prophet had ventured from Mecca to exile in Medina. Through his narrative, 
Hussein seems to be making the claim that Islam has a strong civic element in that it 
encourages its followers to be social. In other words, ‘mixing with other people is part 
of Islam’.796 Furthermore, he also determines that Islam promotes the need to ‘respect 
other people – always’797 and to ‘integrate with them [and] make sure everything’s 
going smooth’.798 Overall, he stresses that Islamic identity advocates and promotes 
civicness such as participation, integration as well as having respect for the other. 
Following on from Hussein’s comments, Siddiq enters the discussion to make the claim 
that the relationship between Islam and civicness is intrinsically related to ‘tolerance’.799 
For this discussant, Islam and the Prophet’s example illustrates how to interact and 
integrate within a pluralistic environment. As he states: 
 
It’s tolerance and also God says in the Qur’an that “we’ve made you from 
different tongues that you may learn from one another” and this is also 
something that Islam promotes when you go into [a] different culture.
800
 
 
Aswad returns to the theme of Medina and pluralism by stating that he thinks ‘it's 
because of ignorance’801 that there is a tension and confusion between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. He concedes that many Muslims themselves are ‘ignorant’802 of the civic 
message of tolerance and respect that resides within Islam. His criticism specifically 
targets the culture of Muslim-majority countries that misrecognise people who differ 
from dominant social norms. He states that: 
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...right now, Muslims, a lot of them are ignorant. If you look at the Arab 
counties, look at Tunisia and Egypt. Tunisia has Christians living in it and also 
Jews. OK, they have a tension. [Voicing an authority] “They are Christians, 
they're Jews, they’re the bad guys, never go near them”.803 
 
At this point, Azaan re-emphasises the point that tolerance is a fundamental aspect of 
living in a pluralistic society in which ‘you’re going to walk into people from every 
religion and culture’.804 For this discussant, living a ‘day-to-day life’805 within a 
pluralistic democratic European state implies that you should be as ‘tolerant as you can 
be’806 as this approach is codetermined by the social context. Importantly, this 
discussant stresses how intersubjective social relations determine how people act 
towards one another and that people need to be tolerant and flexible in pluralistic 
contexts, which are shared by a variety of people of different cultures and beliefs. He 
succinctly states in relation to the necessity for toleration within a pluralistic society: 
 
If someone was to say something bad about you and you'd get offended by it or 
hurt by it, or whatever, why would you bother doing the same thing to someone 
else? I think even if you don't agree with it, it's valid and you may as well turn 
the cheek or accept it or stay away from the person rather than having to reel up 
all this confrontation because it is so unnecessary.
807
   
 
The last point about civic identity is made by Siddiq, who states a very important point 
that emphasises that the younger 2
nd
 generation, by growing up in Ireland and being 
knowledgeable of Irish culture, have a greater capacity to be civic and tolerant within a 
European environment than the immigrant 1
st
 generation.
808
 This discussant states that 
Muslim youth, due to their social and cultural knowledge, have the means to find a way 
to connect their Islamic identity to life as lived within an Irish democratic society. This 
knowledge becomes a form of capital that enables youth to be more tolerant of Christian 
and secular social acts and also to discover new ways of interacting as Muslims within 
and towards a non-Muslim environment. Siddiq’s enlightening narrative is as follows: 
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I think our experiences growing up here in Ireland also allow us be more civic 
and more tolerant as well than the [1
st
] generation that came here to live in 
Ireland, in my opinion anyway, because we are used to Irish culture, we are 
used to some of the things that you guys [the ethno-national Irish] think trivial 
with one another and that is also something that we pick up [from you] that our 
fathers and mothers probably won't be able to comprehend. For example, cursing 
around the house, or something like that. We'd be used to hearing people swear 
in class or whatever, but our parents they'd be shocked at that. That’s where 
growing up here has made us more tolerant [of different “ways of life”].809  
 
The next chapter – Chapter 7 – explores intergenerational recognitive relations in terms 
of how the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 generations’ perceive, critique and relate to each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
809
 Ibid. 
 
 
163 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
164 
 
Chapter 7              Intergenerational Relations 
 
This section will explore intergenerational relations from two perspectives. Firstly, 
narratives will be presented that show a 1
st
 generation parental perspective of Muslim 
youth, particularly in relation to the power to constitute the next generation and efforts 
to protect the youth from “negative” cultural influence.  
Secondly, narratives will be presented to show a 2
nd
 generation perspective of 
their elders, particularly in terms of critiquing rigid inflexibility, patriarchy and the 
pressure to be a “good Muslim”. This chapter provides an insight into socialisation 
theory, which determines the process through which youth are socialised or ‘grow into 
societal roles’ expected and sanctioned formally through the local community and 
informally within the love sphere of the family.
810
  
Whilst such socialisation processes can be positively productive by 
constitutively shaping and maintaining values, roles and social cohesion; when such 
norms – internally prescribed within a minority community – become overly penalising 
and run counter to wider social norms and context, then the legitimacy of such 
constitutive power may come under challenge through forms of resistance. As Furseth 
and Repstad have stated, such challenges can take the form of ‘rebellion, defiance, or 
spitefulness’811 against the legitimacy of authorities that propagate the recognition and 
performance of expected social norms.  
 
7.1 Parent/Elder Perspective  
 
This section will present narratives that give an insight into the 1
st
 generation 
perspective, particularly in relation to how the parent’s feel they have the positive power 
to constitute the next generation. However, such action is openly debated by the 
discussants themselves in relation to the 2
nd
 generations’ potential to agentically 
maintain such an Islamic identity into the future and the 1
st
 generations’ protective 
stance. This leads into narratives into how the parental protective stance aims to counter 
the negative homogenising influence of Irish culture on Muslim youth identity and 
practice.  
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7.1.1 Constituting the Next Generation 
 
Although many of the 1
st
 generation interviewees and discussants critique their own 
Muslim community – in terms of the existence of patriarchy within sections of the 
community; a lack of support and leadership; and the existence of ethno-cultural and 
nationalistic tensions amongst the older generation of immigrants – a prime issue of 
concern and debate is how to constitute the younger generation in terms of instilling and 
maintaining an Islamic identity that is constantly influenced by the pervasiveness of 
Irish culture and its associated dominant identity standard. Within the 1
st
 generation 
female discussion group, Ayan states that self-confidence and the confidence to be 
strong is disseminated from parents to children and that this is an element of the 
constitutive power wielded by parents within the home. In Ayan’s opinion, parents’ give 
children the foundation to go out into the world confident-in-themselves: 
 
[A] strong mother can build strong children and I think I build good foundations 
for my children and when my daughter have a problem and the teacher talk with 
me, I said to the teacher in front of the Vice-Principal eh “I’m not going to teach 
my daughter to be a weak person”. I say that. So, I think it’s really Muslim 
woman inside the house with the children, really she have respect, she have a 
power inside the house. She has real power. People outside the house may see 
you, us with the scarf. They think “we are inside the house, under the man”. No. 
[Multiple voices in agreement].
812
 
 
What is interesting about the above statement is that it directly tackles the stereotype or 
common public perception that Muslim women have no power or agency within the 
domestic sphere and are under the control and power of the patriarchal figure, who 
provides and distributes finances to familial members. Ayan disrupts this perception. 
Through her narrative, she opines that the Muslim woman, who works within the realm 
of the private sphere as wife and mother, has respect and power – the “real” power – to 
productively influence and construct people and events. This discussant rebukes the 
common perception that perceives the headscarf as a symbol of domination. She 
counters the perception that Muslim women are ‘inside the house, under the man’.813 
This comment is supported by numerous other discussants. In Ayan’s experience, her 
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domestic life is filled with respect and power to aid and construct the lives of the people 
she loves positively for the benefit of herself and the familial structure as a whole. For 
this discussant, it is imperative that the 1
st
 generation ensure that the younger generation 
recognise God and obtain a way to be internally empowered.  On this point, she states: 
 
[When] you travelling to God, you come for more power inside yourself that 
what give our beliefs in God. Give us the power to, in our life, to do with the 
children, everything. So, we can now convince our children when you have 
beliefs you can prepare them and let them, give them this way for them, this 
power.
814
  
 
Similarly to Ayan, Meera twice emphasises with confidence that ‘our man treat us in the 
house like a Queen!’815 Certainly, such a statement cannot be taken any other way but as 
confirmation that she feels recognised and respected by her spouse.  
 However, constituting the next generation is a contentious issue. This is 
exemplified by the debate Sadiyya and Dahlia have about whether the Muslim youth 
have the ability to find an identity balance between being Muslim and living in a 
European context. Dahlia is optimistic of youth agency whilst Sadiyya is pessimistically 
certain that ‘we [the 1st generation parents] should be with them [the youth]’816 but ‘if 
we left them alone, I don’t think that [the youth can create an identity balance]’.817 
Dahlia confronts Sadiyya by stating that the ability of the youth to create an identity 
balance can be traced back to ‘the parents’ confidence’.818 She thus links youth 
behaviour and ability as being ‘related to the parents’.819 Sadiyya agrees that the parents 
‘have to be, you know, behind them’.820 Dahlia seems to be giving more agency and 
responsibility to Muslim youth by suggesting that parental instruction is ‘faint’.821 On 
the other hand, Sadiyya is adamant that the older generation must be behind the youth 
actively directing them onto the right path. In other words, it is important for the older 
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generation to be there for the youth and ‘call them, to talk’.822 Dahlia agrees – ‘of 
course’823 – in relation to this statement about communication.  
 Overall, the discussion about the 1
st
 generation staying with the youth becomes 
more complicated when ideas about returning to the homecountry become relevant and 
realistic. Although Dahlia views Sadiyya as being too over-protective, she agrees with 
her that parents’ should provide support and communication to the younger generation. 
In relation to the remark that parents’ have to be with the youth, Dahlia replies to 
Sadiyya that she herself has ‘thought of that all the time’.824 She then continues by 
providing an example of how her advice to her son instilled in him a strong Islamic 
identity and an ability to work cooperatively with others. However, the following 
narrative still accentuates her opinion that Muslim youth have the agency to build and 
maintain their own identities within an Irish-European context: 
 
One of them [her teenage son], he’s doing jummah prayer in the school. Doing 
the jummah, imagine! And he ask the teacher for the room and the key and he 
divide between his friends – “the key with you, the prayer on me, the adhan [call 
to prayer] for you”. Teamwork! To build your[self] and I keep on saying “don’t 
work yourself, if you have your friends, Muslim friends, you have to work as a 
teamwork. Enhance each other, don’t work with your own only. You will 
collapse!
825
  
 
However, in response to this small story, Sadiyya replies again stressing the need to 
protect and guide the younger generation. She is very pessimistic about the future, 
especially in terms of the younger generation keeping hold of their Islamic identity 
within a European environment. She foresees a future in which young Muslims have 
grown older and do not have parents to advise them. She imagines this scenario in a 
negative manner:  
 
...imagine that after twenty years if you don’t have your fr[iends], any other 
Muslim friends or Sheikh or if he don’t go to mosque – if you [the parent] are 
not here [in life], I doubt that his [Muslim] community will continue.
826
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7.1.2 Protecting the Youth from “Negative” Cultural Influence 
 
In line with Sadiyya’s protective perspective, Idris, a 1st generation male discussant, 
opens up the conversation by indicating that parents’ have the constitutive power of 
‘being able to teach them [the youth]’827 to be critical of culture and how it relates to an 
Islamic identity. Farid agrees that such teaching is conducted in order to ‘protect 
them’.828 For these two discussants, such an issue is exacerbated by the differences that 
come to the fore when one lives in a Muslim-majority country versus when one 
immigrates to a European context. Farid clarifies that in the homecountry ‘we don’t 
think about Islam’829 because everybody is Muslim but when you come to live in 
Ireland – to Europe – ‘you try to teach’830 your children their Islamic identity by getting 
them to learn the Arabic language and Qur’an. As he states, the teaching of an Islamic 
identity to his children gives him a sense of happiness: ‘I feel happier that my son or my 
daughter learns Arabic before they learn English. That’s the [core] identity’.831 Farid 
then explains how he is concerned about the influence Irish culture has upon his 
children, particularly upon their Islamic identity, which he has taken active steps to 
convey and instill within his children. As a father, he feels that he must protect his 
children’s Islamic identity from homogenising cultural influences. As he states on this 
matter: 
 
I try to protect them because the only place we feel safe in Islam is the mosque. 
Outside the mosque, our children – they get lost. Especially when they go to 
school, they see the Irish people, they see the French people, the German people, 
all mix of culture of people, all of them have different culture, background, 
probably different religion.
832
 
 
When asked about how he feels when his children leave the mosque and are influenced 
by Irish society, Farid states: ‘you feel bad to be honest; of course, you feel bad’.833 The 
reason for such feeling is that he is keenly aware that his children ‘will get influenced 
                                                 
827
 Idris.  
828
 Farid.  
829
 Ibid.  
830
 Ibid.  
831
 Ibid.  
832
 Ibid.  
833
 Ibid.  
 
 
169 
 
by Irish society’,834 which may negate the work he and his wife undertook to promote 
an Islamic identity within the familial sphere. The discussant then emphasises the 
struggle he undertakes to ensure that his children are protected and that their Islamic 
identity remains intact and relevant. Such comments suggest that this discussant has 
become an overprotective father and that identity construction and maintenance is a 
primary concern: ‘you try to teach them [their identity], like twenty-four hours you have 
to watch them’.835 He is anxious that without practical influence his children will ‘get 
lost’836 when interacting within Irish society. When asked if he feels that his two young 
children are maintaining their Islamic identity, he answers ‘oh definitely, oh definitely. 
We’re trying hard to give them this [an Islamic identity]’.837 Through his comments, 
one gets the sense that he is struggling – as a parent – to protect and ensure his children 
gain and maintain an Islamic identity within a non-Muslim society that has a particular 
cultural milieu. Farid reflects on how an immigrant’s life is harder when familial 
support is absent:  
 
Like back in your [home]country, your background, the origin country, at least 
you have your family, you have your sisters, your cousins...but here [in Ireland], 
you don’t have [familial support]. You have you and your wife you know 
otherwise, your kids will get lost.
838
 
 
Such identity concerns for the younger generation are also vocalised within the 1
st
 
generation female discussion group, Dahlia states that she and other Muslim parents are 
cognisant and concerned about how non-Muslim children interact with their children 
within schooling institutions. She states that non-Muslim children are negatively 
influencing Muslim children to be like them i.e., ‘forcing them [Muslim children] to this 
kind of initiation, this kind of argument’.839 She also states that although rare in primary 
school such interactions become more common in secondary school – a time of 
adolescence, which represents the ‘very critical years’840 of identity formation. Thus, for 
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Dahlia and other 1
st
 generation female discussants ‘[the young] generation is a big 
issue’.841 
 An example of such concern emanates from Maja, who opens up about her 
children’s experience. Although she clarifies that she likes to be a ‘very close friend to 
the Irish people’,842 she has noticed a “negative” angle to Irish social relations, which 
constitutes a ‘problem’.843 She has noticed the powerful extent to which the imitation of 
Irish culture puts pressure on people of “difference”. For this discussant, social pressure 
to conform to the dominant culture and identity standard has become the ‘biggest 
struggle’844 internally within the familial structure and externally within the wider social 
sphere.
845
 On this point, she states: 
 
They [young non-Muslim] like them [the young Muslim], they are very good, 
but the problem, “if you want to stay with me as a friend, you have to imitate 
me. If I drink, you have to drink, if I’m going to the pub, if I’m going to have 
appointment with whoever, you have to, otherwise if you don’t, we have a 
problem with our relationship”.846  
 
Maja continues her narrative by focusing on the problems that her children encounter in 
school from other children due to their “difference” from the identity standard of the 
majority. She talks about children questioning her son as to why he is not allowed to eat 
ham. She recounts that discussions can turn nasty between non-Muslim children and her 
sons and mentions that ‘sometimes if they’re [the other boys are] angry’,847 they say to 
her son ‘go home. Don’t stay. Go home’.848 Such comments have forced Maja’s 
children to defend themselves by replying: ‘No! My dad, he’s a doctor here, he’s paying 
tax. We are working here. It’s not your right to say to me go home”.849 Hurriyah echoes 
Maja’s narrative by restating the words ‘go home to your country’.850 Elmira clarifies 
that these words do not suggest going home to your house in Dublin but to return to 
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your homecountry, the foreign location where your parents originated from. She states 
in relation to this clarification: ‘Homeland! Your roots, your roots’.851 
 Sadiyya has a more pessimistic thinking on the future of Muslim youth in 
Ireland. In her opinion, she feels that life for the youth is ‘not going to be easy’.852 For 
this discussant, the 1
st
 generation will always be okay because they are independent 
adults, who can ‘take care of ourself’;853 however, she feels that the 2nd generation will 
encounter ‘a very big problem’854 by having an Islamic identity and growing up in an 
Irish-European context. This discussant has the view that some Muslim youth will reject 
an Islamic identity because of its minority status that is consistently overshadowed by 
the dominant identity standard of what constitutes “Irishness” and belonging. Sadiyya 
supports her narrative by telling a small story about her daughter’s friend:  
 
For example, my daughter’s friend, she told her [Mum] “I don’t want to be 
Muslim, because we are Muslim, I don’t want to be Muslim anymore”. So, she’s 
six years old. It’s a problem; if she’s in Sudan she would never think about [not 
wanting to be Muslim].
855
 
 
Sadiyya follows the above narrative with another one that specifically gives a personal 
account of the troubles she has had with her own daughter, who is influenced by the 
dominant culture and undergoes stages of identity rejection. Importantly, this narrative 
gives an indication about how she feels as a Muslim mother, who is struggling to raise 
her child as Muslim yet can recognise how the dominant culture affects and impacts her 
offspring. Such a narrative certainly stresses the degree of protection that Muslim 
parents give to their children in order to aid them in acquiring an Islamic identity within 
a European context. There are indications that this protectiveness is strong by the fact 
that Sadiyya feels that her daughter might lose her identity if she (as overseeing mother) 
is not close by:   
  
So I think it’s not very easy, but they try to feel something. We talk about Allah 
with them all the time and she know [about God], but I know that if I’m not here 
it will not be that easy and maybe she will lose her identity, so this gonna be a 
very big problem, especially if we are not with them and we can’t be with them 
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all the time, so I don’t know, maybe sometimes I think that we have to go back 
[to the homecountry].
856
 
 
Although the dominant culture is problematic for the 1
st
 generation, they are also facing 
difficulties within the familial sphere itself in that their Islamic and ethno-cultural 
identities and practices – brought with them from the homecountry – are being 
challenged by their own offspring. Within the 1
st
 generation male discussion group, 
Idris speaks about his own familial experience. He confirms that religious practitioners 
– from the same religion – may have different ways of viewing the teachings of the 
religion and that ‘in every religion’,857 there are contradictions or ‘things that don’t sit 
well together’.858 The seemingly contradictory elements of the same religious ideology 
are why scholars are needed to explain and interpret religion. In Idris’ experience as a 
father, it has been his inability to explain such contradictions that has created ‘a little bit 
of conflict’859 with his children. He openly details his struggle to explain key concepts 
to his children and has often found himself ‘lost to explain something because I actually 
haven’t thought about it, in terms of identity or experience’.860 For Idris, coming from a 
Muslim-majority culture has meant that there was no need to critically analyse the 
cultural and religious practice that he ‘received this way and lived with all my life’.861 
However, in the European context, he has ‘to explain it and that’s a little bit difficult’.862 
Idris remarks that his children – as European Muslims – are looking for more cognitive 
and rational explanations to solve various contradictions within Islamic belief; however, 
this discussant has the viewpoint that some things cannot be explained by rational 
cognitive analysis as human spiritual belief lies ‘above the mind’.863 On this point, he 
makes the following statement: 
 
They [his children] have [asked for explanations], and when they ask me to 
explain it [Islam] and I don’t know why and I have to go and search and 
sometimes I can’t find an answer because it’s not easy to find certain things that 
are not plain in every religion…simple things like heaven and hell and the last 
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day and all this stuff and people that lived in this [European] society, they don’t 
[believe this], it’s more of the mind [cognitive/rational] thinking and mind 
cannot explain everything, because we have limitation [as humans]. So 
sometimes, that’s supernatural or above our mind, you know, you’re lost to 
explain.
864
 
 
Similarly within the 1
st
 generation female discussion group, Elmira affirms that ‘yes’865 
she is recognised by her family but that ‘sometimes they don’t’.866 She continues by 
confirming once again that ‘they [her immediate family] respect me’;867 however, she 
stresses that sometimes she feels misrecognised in her relations as a 1
st
 generation 
Muslim communicating with her younger 2
nd
 generation child, particularly when sternly 
advising him on aspects of Islam. Elmira states that 
 
Sometimes if I talk about my eldest son, it’s like he’s twenty-five years. 
Sometimes if I will, because I’ll be sometimes I’d be a little bit strict about the 
Islam and that what they say [to me]. Sometime they will [say to] me “Mum, 
sometimes you offend me, something like [that]”’.868 
 
Hurriyah responds stating ‘old, yeah’869 which confirms that Elmira feels that when 
speaking to her son about Islam she feels ‘old true, like you are sixty years old’.870 
Sadiyya rephrases this as a feeling of being ‘old-fashioned’.871 This accentuates the 
point that the youth feel that they represent the present and the future i.e., modernity and 
how Islam fits into such space. For Elmira, she feels that she is respected and 
recognised by her family, however, she also confirms that she feels misrecognised as 
representing an old-fashioned viewpoint and practise of Islam. She states that ‘this is the 
main problem. It’s like that’.872 Hurriyah interjects that Elmira’s son has a new 
‘elaboration’873 of Islamic identity. Elmira then speaks up suggesting that he not only 
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has a new elaboration of Islamic identity but also a new elaboration in relation to her 
‘opinion’874 and ‘mentality’.875 
 
Yeah, he will tell me something like this because if you will tell him not to do 
something or to do that – he will tell me “mom, you are really like sixty years. 
You are from that generation before!” This is what, you know, my experience in 
my family.
876
 
 
7.2 Children/Youth Perspective  
 
This section will explore the narratives that give an insight into the youth perspective, 
particularly how the 2
nd
 generations are critical of the elderly propensity to be rigid and 
inflexible in terms of identity and practice. Secondly, narratives will also be presented 
that show how the youth (particularly females) critique patriarchy, which continues to 
exist within familial and community spheres. Lastly, this section explores how youth 
negotiate social norms they are expected to conform to in order to be perceived by 
others as “good Muslims”.   
 
7.2.1 Critiquing Rigid Inflexibility  
 
Throughout the 2
nd
 generation interviews and discussion groups is a consistent critique 
of the 1
st
 generation in terms of being too rigid and inflexible.  
For example, Daleela, a young female interviewee, states about intergenerational 
relations that there ‘is a gap between the first generation and the second generation’.877 
She then specifically links this generational gap to inflexibility in values and beliefs by 
stating that ‘they [the 1st generation] have set values and beliefs and they don't 
understand that you're growing up in a society that you can't be as rigid as they are’.878 
She is advocating for ‘more communication between the generations and more 
flexibility’.879 It is important to note that such steadfastness can result in pressure on the 
2
nd
 generation to negotiate the values and beliefs of their family and the norms of the 
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society they live and interact within. As Daleela states, ‘there is a lot of pressure from 
inside the community’.880 This pressure can come in the form of pressure to follow a set 
life-plan. For Aziz, ‘coming from a Pakistani [origin] you're either an engineer or a 
doctor’,881 whilst Daleela views such pressure in terms of its ethno-cultural form and 
how it interacts with religious belief and identity. In this regard, she states the 
following: 
 
I'm speaking more about cultural pressure to kinda believe a certain way, to live 
a certain way…because their identity, they’re, I suppose, they are first 
generation Irish but they identify more with the [their] homecountries. You 
kinda need to be [flexible], like for me not going to pubs was a big deal and I 
was like, this is not part of [me], like I was, from an early age, “this is like 
wrong and I can't do it”. But you can, you can kinda, you need to be able to at 
least go to a pub, be able to sit and be open-minded and accept that this is the 
[Irish] cu[lture], [you] need to [be able to do that].
882
 
 
The narrative above gives a clear indication of the recognitive differences that exist 
between the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 generations in that Daleela is clearly stating that the elders, even 
though they are resident in Ireland, still are very much connected to their homecountry 
and socialised by its ethno-cultural and religious norms. Consequently, their values and 
opinions are fixed and inflexible.  
Contrastingly, the younger 2
nd
 generation, who were born and/or have lived 
most of their lives in an Irish-European context, do not have as strong a link to such 
values and norms. The youth have multiple identifications to transnational and national 
homecountries, therefore, they are more cognisant of the values and norms that emanate 
from both locations. As a result, they need a degree of flexibility to accommodate Irish 
culture into their lived experience as Muslim. Daleela uses the example of the Irish pub, 
as an example of Irish culture that needs to be viewed by Muslims in a flexible manner. 
She advocates for the actionable ability to go to a pub, to sit down and be open-minded 
about the practical social nature of Irish culture.  
Another interviewee, Azad, also makes succinct statements about the 
generational divide. He specifically mentions that his perceptions are different from his 
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parents and members of his extended family. These differences are not physical but are 
related to ‘when it comes to ideas’.883 This interviewee feels isolated from 1st generation 
perceptions and viewpoints i.e., how they view the world, the importance of their ethnic 
traditions and how to act out an Islamic religion. This isolation is exemplified in the 
phrase: ‘I just find myself, way, a bit out from m[y family], their own way of 
thinking’.884 Furthermore, he states in relation to how he feels that ‘I feel like I'm just 
living my own [way]’ and that ‘I find it very difficult to fit into their group’.885 Such a 
divide manifests itself in disagreements about action in that Azad disagrees with ‘what 
they [his family members] say or what they do’.886 This divergence may be related to 
how the 1
st
 generation view the relationship between their ethno-cultural traditions and 
how they act out an Islamic identity.  
Azad’s difficulties also envelop wider relations. He comments on a number of 
difficulties that he feels exist within his Muslim community. These relate to a lack of 
leadership, a lack of facilities, the Arabic-English language barrier, and the isolation felt 
by the younger generation. This interviewee claims to be speaking ‘sort of from the 
young perspective’887 which is ‘a bit different’888 from that of the older generation and 
from non-Muslim young people. One of the main issues for him is the lack of leadership 
or ‘somebody to look up to, like to follow’.889 In Azad’s opinion, this issue has created 
negative feelings of frustration in young Muslims. He remarks that ‘a lot of young 
people are frustrated’.890 As well as a lack of facilities, he makes some very important 
points related to the general feeling that the younger generation are excluded and 
isolated from their own Muslim community. He gives a linguistic example by stating 
that the Arabic language is used during the conduction of Friday prayers. For the most 
part, the majority of young Muslims do not speak Arabic, therefore, many of the youth 
cannot decipher what is being stated to them during Friday prayers. Azad is also highly 
critical of various ethno-cultural traditions, which are related to homecountry traditions, 
which have been brought to the West by Muslim immigrants. On this point, he states 
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that: 
 
...you'll find most of the time [at the mosque], the old people will be there, and 
not so much of the young people and part of it is maybe language barriers as 
well because the old folks they speak maybe Arabic of which the [young] guys 
here they don't and if they're to have, let’s say, lecturers or something like that 
from there, and all be towards, give towards Arabic kinda thing of which the 
young guys kinda feel left out. So you can't really do much of the things. So in a 
sense, the issues they face, we face most of the time, it’s [pause], it’s a lot of 
issues but the main one, is to be like, being left out like not being part of the 
whole, whole process because of the old guys, the old guys with their own 
mentality and then the young guys coming up kinda caught in the mix.
891
  
 
Within this narrative extract, Azad indicates the language difficulties that are faced by 
the younger generation within their own community in terms of practising religion. 
Most mosques still conduct prayer in Arabic, however, many young Muslims do not 
know how to speak it. The internal language barrier within the community accentuates 
the feeling of being left out, despite the wish to have a deep comprehension of religious 
doctrine. Overall, towards the end of this narrative, Azad identifies isolation as a major 
issue that the young generation face ‘most of the time’.892 In other words, the younger 
generation do not feel ‘part of the whole’ because the older Muslims are not willing to 
change or be flexible with their traditions and this leaves the younger generation ‘kinda 
caught in the mix’.893  
 Within the 2
nd
 generation female discussion group, Rifa emphasises the 
difference between the generations in terms of identity and interaction. She makes the 
following statement about how her family hold tightly to their ethno-cultural habits and 
do not want it to be tainted by or mixed with other traditions whilst Rifa views Islam as 
a “universal” common-ground that brings people together and enables the mixing of 
cultures and races: 
 
It’s hard. I find it hard like, anything I learn I try to bring it to my family and if 
it’s Islamic, they accept it but once it get to culture, they’re like “no way”. Like 
yesterday, I was having an argument with my Mum and so I was like “I don’t 
want to marry an Algerian or an Arab altogether”. So I was like “what do you 
think?” and she was like, “no way, I’m not accepting it”. I’m like “OK but Islam 
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doesn’t say anything about that. It doesn’t say anything about the colour, about 
the race, nothing, it’s [Islam is] just in more step [with modern times than 
ethno-cultural traditions].
894
 
 
Isha supports Rifa’s last sentence by stating that ‘it [Islam] actually encourages you to 
mix’.895 Rifa replies in a high tone ‘yes’896 and then puts forward her side of the 
argument, which is that ‘once the person is Muslim, then it’s okay [to marry them]’.897 
She negates her mother’s perspective, which aims to maintain culturally socialised 
norms and is overly concerned what others will think and say: ‘she [her mother] was 
like “yes, but if you go back home and they’ll be like [negatively] “there’s Rifa!”’.898 
Through Rifa’s narrative, the discussion moves onto the difference in how the 
discussants are recognised by their immediate family members as compared to their 
outer familial circle in Ireland and/or in the homecountry. In terms of having a “new” 
Islamic identity, Fusaila states that ‘you can deal with the [immediate] family’.899 Isha 
agrees and confirms that members of her immediate family will ‘accept it’.900 Rifa 
returns to the conversation with her mother and how her outer family will react after she 
has convinced her mother that such a mixed marriage (in terms of race and ethno-
cultural attributes) is Islamically acceptable. She states in regard to this form of familial 
politics: 
 
I’ll make random calls and I’ll try to change her mind and she’ll be like “OK, 
yes. Like OK, fine. OK, I agree” but then going to your grandmother [in the 
homecountry] and it’s different and she’s like, “you’ll have mixed kids”.901 
 
7.2.2 Critiquing Patriarchy 
 
Whilst 1
st
 generation female Muslims view the domestic sphere as the location where 
constitutive power reigns, they do acknowledge the existence of limited occurrences of 
patriarchy performed by individuals within the community. For example, Saadiqa 
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confirms the existence of patriarchal culture but adds the caveat that generally this form 
of misrecognition is an exception to the rule. She states: ‘some men they treat their 
wives in bad ways but this is his personality. It’s like an exception, [an] exception’.902 
Likewise Ayan challenges the public perception that Muslim women, who wear the 
hijab, are oppressed by male patriarchy within the domestic sphere:  
 
People outside the house may see you, us with the scarf. They think “we are 
inside the house, under the man”. No. [Multiple voices in agreement].903 
 
Contra to above, Isra, a young female interviewee, strongly criticises familial and 
community recognition particularly in terms of the treatment of females. She advocates 
for flexibility in terms of the remit of actions that young Muslim women can perform 
within the familial and community spheres. This interviewee recounts a narrative related 
to the disapproval of young Muslim women, who wish to partake in social and artistic 
activities such as various sporting activities and acting. She states in relation to this 
issue: 
 
We did an acting class within groups and there was some young Muslim girls 
who was taking part and then, you know, they were told that they cannot do it 
because of the religion and stuff like that…it's a problem, it's really [a] problem. 
A lot of young Muslim woman [say] they want to take part in football and stuff 
like that [sport] but they were rejected because of the community, because of 
their family and they were told “you cannot do this because of this way and this 
way”.904 
 
Within this narrative, Isra is expressing her view that women are being misrecognised 
within the familial and community structures. This misrecognition is not physical but a 
misrecognition of identity in that the agency of Muslim women to take part in sports or 
artistic forms of communication and action is being disrespected by familial and 
community structures, who prohibit Muslim women from performing such actions. The 
interviewee stresses that young Muslim women are forcefully advocating for the right to 
play sport and to partake in a variety of social activities. However, this is deemed 
forbidden (haram) by the patriarchal familial and community structures that dominate 
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the articulation and acting out of permissible (halal) actions and social norms. Isra 
describes it as a form of rejection.  
Furthermore, she also narrates a small story related to her own familial 
experience. This story is evidence of the recognitive-power dilemma she encounters in 
that she must find a space between the need to be recognised by her friends and family 
yet also negotiate her identity in relation to the expected social norms that inform and 
constitute both groups:  
 
...look what will happen is, for example, my family see me not wearing scarf and 
going around and wearing trousers it will cost me problem because I can lose the 
relation [between] myself and my family because of my dress and all that and 
again when I see in my friend[s], they all dress and they look nice. I like the 
fashion, the way they are. I will try to be like the way they are and then again, at 
the same time, I have to hide it. So, it's really a big problem between the family 
[and] the new generation [of young Muslims].
905
 
 
Isra adds to the above statements by continuing her criticism of her community by 
emphasising the plight of Muslim women in relation to communicative participation in 
the public sphere. She states that ‘there is a lot of young Muslim women, who ca[n’t be 
active]…because we believe if your [a] woman and your Muslim, you cannot talk in 
public’.906 This view that Muslim women are prohibited from speaking publicly creates 
a sense of fear in carrying out the act of being active and vocalising one’s opinion 
publicly. Thus, ‘those women they’re scare[d] if they say “okay, I'm going to stand up 
today for my religion and my society.”’907 Isra has no trust that this issue will be 
remedied by her Muslim community. Therefore, she advocates for the Irish government 
and a universal legal framework to step-in and defend Muslim womens’ rights to public 
expression. Of note is that such Muslim women do not want to lose the respect of God 
or of their loved ones – they do not want to be discriminated by their own kind – and yet 
they want to obtain external recognition from the wider social sphere.  
Isra continues by stressing that the feeling of fear plays a significant factor. She 
remarks that ‘they [Muslim women are] scared to do it [to speak out publicly]; they 
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don't really feel like standing [up and speaking]’.908 For this interviewee, what has 
limited her agency is her lack of legitimised authority as a woman to interpret the 
Qur’an i.e., power comes from the ability to interpret the religious sources; and 
therefore, as a Muslim woman, she is powerless to defend her position as she does not 
have the legitimacy from others to conduct such interpretative actions. Such a gendered 
legitimacy deficit and corresponding exclusion from interpreting Islamic jurisprudence 
prevents her from partaking in struggle. As she states in this regard: ‘the only problem 
that I cannot do is I cannot explain the holy Qur’an in and out. If I really know…the 
religion explanation, I would stand up and fight but I don't know’.909 She opines that 
Muslim women will only overcome this fear if they are either protected and supported 
by the universal application of law or by an advocate within the Muslim community 
itself, who is ‘strong and says “okay, I'm standing in the [Islamic] community and I will 
do something [about it]”’. However, Isra acknowledges that this strong Muslim woman, 
who advocates for female rights within the Muslim community, is not her – ‘it ain’t 
me’.910 She then specifically narrates her own experience about being misrecognised 
within her community by stating that she herself was told ‘not to speak out’911 in public 
about the issue of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). She was verbally disrespected for 
using her own agency to speak up about womens’ concerns in the community.  
 
They [the Muslim women] don't feel like speaking out, they're scared because 
they are woman and the religion didn’t allow it [speaking out publicly]. I mean 
like, the man...I was told not to speak out; I was told that I'm a [unknown word] 
because I'm speaking in public [about FGM]. So, those [Muslim] women they’re 
scared to be discriminated within the [Islamic] community.
912
 
 
Such criticisms were also stated within the 2
nd
 generation female discussion group by 
Saiba. She advocates that religious adherence and practice should be primarily an 
individual autonomous choice and not forced upon individuals against their will. For 
this discussant, religiosity as individual freedom is conducive to creating and 
maintaining self-confidence whilst patriarchal domination by enforcing social norms 
upon an individual’s will, destroys self-confidence and reduces the capacity to internally 
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accept one’s belief and religious practice. Saiba makes an important statement with 
regard to this point:  
 
...once you’re not doing it because other people expect you to do it, or because 
it’s the norm and you accept it within yourself, I think you’ll find it much easier 
to answer questions of like oppression and do you feel oppressed? You just say 
“no” or other times where I think people that are, have to wear the hijab or have 
to practise certain ways, they’d be like “I’m not oppressed but like why”? and 
they wouldn’t have reasons because technically they are, they’re being forced to 
wear it and if you believe in it [Islam] yourself, I think you’ll feel a lot more 
confident in yourself.
913
 
 
7.2.3 Pressure to be a “good Muslim” 
 
Narratives within the male and female 2
nd
 generation discussion groups provide an 
important insight into the social pressure that young Muslims encounter in relation to 
conforming to social norms and being perceived by others as practising Islam 
“correctly”, and thereby, being recognised as a “good Muslim”.  
For example, discussant Isha differentiates between the acceptance of her 
immediate family versus the non-acceptance she feels from her ‘outer family’914 i.e., the 
extended family resident in Ireland, throughout Europe and within the homecountry. 
Bisma tends to agree with this differentiation of the family sphere by stating: ‘different, 
exactly’.915 Isha expands on her previous statement by stating its recognitive importance 
in that ‘they’916 – the extended outer family – ‘they’re different’917 and ‘they see you 
differently’.918 Saiba agrees also with this differentiation and reflects that its cause is 
due to a lack of familiarity and a distorted perceptual picture. She remarks about how 
her outer family recognise her from a distance: 
 
Cos they don’t see you day-to-day, so they’d just be like, they know they have a 
picture of you, of what the norm is – like a little innocent Muslim girl there – 
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and then when you’re like, if you have an opinion [said firmly], they‘d be like 
“but she’s just a kid like”, ye know.919  
 
Fusaila picks up on Saiba’s comments about the outer family positioning their own 
children towards or against a particular behaviour. Laughingly, she states that the outer 
family members advise their own children ‘you be like there…and don’t be like that 
girl’.920 Fusaila confirms that she is ‘just talking about [familial relations] here [in 
Ireland] like’.921 Saiba also confirms this: ‘Even here [in Ireland] like’.922 Fusaila then 
concisely outlines what differentiates the inner immediate family from the more 
distanced outer family. She states firmly that ‘we are accepted by our immediate family 
but then your outer family, they will use you as an example to their kids’.923 
Interestingly, it is at this point in the conversation that Saiba identifies the behaviour or 
example the outer family may take as a positive or negative. She states that the 2
nd
 
generation youth are ‘filtering-out the negative culture’924 and, in her opinion, it is 
perceived by the extended family as ‘a bad example’.925 Fusaila then voices what the 
outer family say to their children about the discussants’ actions: ‘they’d be like “don’t 
be like them”’.926 Certainly, the conversation so far tends to position the outer family as 
viewing actions such as the filtering of “negative” culture as a bad example that they do 
not want their own children to follow. 
Similarly, the twins also elaborate on the issues they have encountered in terms 
of how they are recognised by their extended family in the homecountry. Both struggle 
to be recognised by their outer family due to their identity “difference”. For example, 
Isha states that her ‘[outer family] think we’re not Tanzanian enough. They see us as 
being Irish, [said firmly], so they’d be like “no”’.927 Rifa comments on the possible 
reason for such views being held by the outer family. She remarks: ‘that’s the culture 
though’.928 Fusaila adds that the outer family more often than not see the twins as ‘not 
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even Irish’929 but as ‘European like!’930 This statement infers that the discussant would 
rather be seen as Irish than as European.  
 In the male discussion group, Yusuf looks towards his own homecountry 
familial relations in Libya as an example. First of all, he states that when he goes ‘back 
to Libya’,931 he can see the differences between his father’s family, who are ‘not too 
strict’932 and his mother’s family, who are austere  in their adherence to an Islamic 
identity to the point where the father has nicknamed his wife’s family – ‘the Taliban’933 
– because they ‘pray 24/7’.934 Yusuf positions himself towards his mother’s family, who 
pray and go to the mosque regularly. He describes how members of this section of his 
family are ‘always’ shaping his identity by ‘giving you advice, you know, anything they 
see wrong, they just always correcting you’.935 This aids the development of his Islamic 
identity. However, his father’s side of the family are lax in the practise of their Islamic 
identity and are ‘kind of mesmerised’936 that Yusuf, on arriving from Europe, will go 
and pray in the local mosque when visiting. The differences between both sides of the 
family are narratively explained in the following passage: 
 
Whereas if I go to my dad’s [family] side, and em you know I go to pray in the 
mosque which is only five minutes away eh they wouldn't want to go to the 
mosque – “ah, it's such a trek and five minutes away”. They see it as granted; 
they take it for granted because it's so close. But for me, I think if Azzam [my 
brother] and I have to drive you know fifteen minutes down [the road], it’ll be 
like an hour walk and eh so I go to the mosque. So they're kind of like, they're 
kind of mesmerised. You know, they don't really [get it that], “this guy he's 
coming from Europe, he's coming from Ireland but he's going to pray in the 
mosque, really?” ye know but if I don't go to the mosque with my mum’s side 
[laughter] – ah, I get in deep trouble, yeah.937 
 
Returning to the female discussion group, Mahala narrates her experience of being 
misrecognised by others for not following the social norms expected of a young Sunni 
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Muslim woman in the community. This is closely related to her being a Turk, who does 
not wear hijab and who is light-skinned in contrast to her father. She begins by 
differentiating herself from the other hijabi-wearing discussants: ‘I’m different [from 
them]’.938 Such divergence may be most apparent in her opinions about community 
recognition. Mahala quite openly states her opinion of how she feels and how she is 
recognised by others. She states: ‘I don’t have a community per se’.939 The reasons for 
not feeling a sense of belonging relates to how she is recognised by other Muslims 
affiliated to one of the larger mosques in Dublin. She details how she gets ‘the reaction 
from peoples’ face[s]’940 when they come into contact with her father and herself 
together. Her father has ‘good ties’941 within the Muslim community and is respected. 
However, through facial gestures and communication, Mahala has come to know that 
she is not respected by certain sections of the Muslim community. She exclaims to the 
other discussants that ‘I know I’m not acc[epted], not I know but I’ve, some people 
actually told me [to my face], I know but I am not accepted because I am different’.942 
The difference she talks about is varied. She is a Muslim woman but follows a Sufi 
interpretation of Islam and does not wear hijab. Furthermore, she has a light skin tone 
compared to her father. For this discussant, the knowledge that she is not accepted for 
“who she is” by other Muslims ‘hurts’,943 especially since such disrespect can easily be 
compared to how those same people interact with her father. She states the following 
about this painful situation: 
 
…because I am different and just that kind of hurt when [they say to your] Dad 
“is this your daughter?” and I’m like “yeah” and you kinda see the 
disappointment in their face ‘cos, I mean, my Dad is dark as well, ‘cos in Turkey 
we have different looks, like he’s kinda brownish [in skin tone]. So, I can feel 
that they’re very surprised to, for him to have me as a daughter but yeah, I’m not 
accepted. I wouldn’t feel that I’m accepted and I wouldn’t feel comfortable in 
that [mosque] area as well.
944
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Rifa is critical of her Arab Muslim community in that after one “negative” action that 
disrupts expected social norms, you’re identified as ‘that bad person’.945 Fusaila 
acknowledges that alot of people within the Muslim community are critical of Arabs by 
‘saying they “don’t like Arabs”’ because they have too much control over social norms 
that determines “correct” Islamic practice.946 Rifa responds strongly to Fusaila by 
generalising that the Arab community is not accepting of change, particularly in how 
individuals have the capacity to transform themselves into something better. She states 
the following narrative in reply to Fusaila: 
 
…even if you change, no matter how much you change, you’re still that bad 
person from years ago. So, it’s kind of “ok, we’ll talk to you and everything” but 
in, at the back of my [his or her] head, you’re still that person no matter how 
much you change, which I really hate that about it [the Arab community].
947
 
 
After the above statement, Saiba makes the point that such dynamics in the community 
make it hard for people’s transformations to be accepted and ‘that’s why we leave our 
own communities like’.948 Moving to another geographical location or to group enables 
the finding of acceptance, freedom and a break with the past. Fusaila, who is emigrating 
from Ireland with her sister and Rifa, agrees by stating ‘yeah’.949 For Saiba, leaving 
ones community means one can ‘be like’950 oneself. She correlates moving to a new 
community with gaining freedom from the past and obtaining a ‘clean slate’951 that is 
free from the expectations and judgements of others. She states: ‘I wanna, I wanna be 
new, I wanna have a clean slate within this community over here [in the UK]’.952 Rifa 
replies in agreement – ‘exactly’.953  
The next chapter – Chapter 8 – explores how the 2nd generation have redirected 
their legitimising recognition to a plurality of online sources, thereby, challenging the 
Islam espoused by local authority figures. Through such a contestation, the youth create 
and negotiate the construction of a new flexible space that facilitated by a unique 
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process involving the filtering of “negative” ethno-cultural traditions and a search for a 
normative “authentic” form of Islam that is perceived as complimenting an Irish-
European democratic environment.   
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Chapter 8      The Youth’s Search for “Authentic” Islam 
 
Due to increased globalisation, growing individualism and spiritual consumerism, Volpi 
and Turner have determined that localised traditional Islamic authorities – such as 
parents, Imams and local scholars - are in crisis and being challenged by a 
‘multiplication of authorities’ within Islamic jurisprudence and the reactivation of 
ijtihad or critical reasoning, which enables a more precise and flexible contextual 
interpretation of the Islamic sources, particularly for Muslims in Europe.
954
 In 
sociological terms, Turner states that such spiritual consumerism is fed by online fatwa 
markets offering a plurality of Islamic rulings that are democratically delivered and 
individually accessed through new technologies, such as the internet.
955
  
 The bypassing traditional centers of authority and power coupled with the 
flexibility offered by online fatwa markets, young 2
nd
 generation Muslims in the West 
have been able to use their individual and collective agency to recognise and legitimise 
alternative sources of authority.
956
 Linking this back to the theme of resistance within 
socialisation theory, whilst parents certainly have significant constitutive power to 
shape their offspring’s actions and identity, Furseth and Repstad emphasise the 
commonly negated reality that ‘children also can socialize their parents’957 by 
negotiating and transmitting their ‘individual religiosity as a form of adaptation and 
learning’.958 Sunni Muslim youth in Dublin (and elsewhere in Europe) are searching for 
the normativity of Islam i.e., for an authentic interpretation and practise of Islam that 
challenges the ethno-cultural version traditionally and habitually followed and brought 
to Europe within the cultural baggage of the 1
st
 generation. Such challenges to 
traditional authority have been spurred on by feminist critiques of social norms. Such 
criticisms have centered on an attempt to – 
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discriminate between the central and unchanging aspects of religious teachings 
and what has been incorporated as a result of cultural impact. In other words, 
there is a search for an authentic form of religion, where the cultural aspects 
are sifted away. For a sociological perspective, one may say that the attempt is 
being made to reinterpret the religious tradition in a new cultural context.
959
 
 
This chapter aims to explore the above by presenting narratives that show how the 
young 2
nd
 generation is actively differentiating between what is perceived as Islam and 
what is perceived as cultural. Secondly, two everyday dilemmas – handshaking and 
travelling with a mahram – will be explored through the narrative exchange between 
two young female discussants. This debate illustrates how everyday issues are alleviated 
by gaining flexibility by searching for, rationally selecting, and utilising online Islamic 
rulings (fatwa) that emanate from alternative Islamic sources. Lastly, this chapter will 
explore how Sunni Muslim youth in Dublin are agentically filtering out perceived forms 
of “negative” Irish or homecountry culture in order to attain a “purer” more authentic 
interpretation and practise of Islam. It is perceived that such a process brings one closer 
to being a “good Muslim”.  
 
8.1 Differentiating Between Islam and Culture 
 
The 2
nd
 generation male and female discussion groups give a narrative insight into how 
Muslim youth, in contrast to the immigrant 1
st
 generation, view and differentiate the 
relationship between Islam and culture. For example, for Azaan, Islam provides the 
common-ground for Muslims of diverse ethnic and national backgrounds to associate 
with each other on the same level. This discussant stresses the potential of spiritual 
recognition to traverse “particularity” by directing attention to the “universal” message 
of an abstract transitional phenomena i.e., the word of God. To support this statement, 
he specifically refers to the example of the pilgrimage or hajj to Mecca, where large 
numbers of Muslims from different ethnic and racial backgrounds come together under 
the banner of Islam to worship God and the prophet Mohammad (PBUH).
960
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 Aswad joins the discussion to add some complexity to the above point by stating 
his opinion about how ethnic and national groups mix within the Muslim community. 
He gives a much more realistic picture as compared to Azaan’s ideal by differentiating 
between the experiences of the 2
nd
 generation as compared to that of the 1
st
 generation. 
Aswad opines that it is ‘an advantage being youth’961 because as he states ‘you have no 
problems’962 with particular ethnic and/or national differences. For this discussant, the 
youth look beyond particular differences when living in the European context, which is 
exemplified by ‘kids out playing with each other there’.963 Although positive about 2nd 
generation interaction, he is critical of the older generation, who have problems with 
ethnic and/or national differences that exist between them. As he states on this matter: 
‘but actually the older generation have this problem. It's a big thing in the old generation 
and you can see parents not talking [to each other]’.964 In contrast to Aswad, Aban 
explains that ethno-cultural similarities can also provide positive grounds on which a 
relationship can be built. He states the following about his everyday experience in 
Dublin city centre: 
 
Say like I'm in the middle of the city and I see a group of Arabic speaking 
people, they're speaking Arabic like, I’ll probably walk up. Like they see me, if 
I’m talking on the phone in Arabic, they'll all approach me and say “oh, you 
speak Arabic” and I'll be “yeah” and they'll ask what country you are from and 
introduce ourselves to each other, and we'll just talk for a little bit, you get me? 
Most of these Arabic lads I know like, I didn't even know them and all of a 
sudden I'm like [their friend].
965
 
 
In relation to the tension that exists between Islamic and ethno-cultural identities and 
how some of the younger generation are actively avoiding certain forms of ethno-
cultural practice, which are perceived as having a “negative” impact on Islamic identity, 
Azaan clarifies that ‘a lot of it [Islam and culture] intertwines at some stage’.966 For this 
discussant, Islamic identity is specifically related to living by ‘the rules of the Qur’an 
and the Sunna’967 whilst culture is ‘a completely different thing’.968 He then asserts that 
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‘every country’969 has its ‘own set of culture and living’970 and that the children of 
immigrants are ‘going to sort of have that culture, whether you like it or not’.971  
 In relation to being influenced by parental cultural baggage, Hussein states that 
‘you just kinda grow up with it’.972 Azaan agrees that immigrants usually do have 
cultural baggage because they are themselves socialised by the fact of once ‘living in an 
Arab country’.973 However, not all culture is seen by the discussants in a negative way. 
Yusuf opens up about his experience of ‘speaking Arabic like just from the second 
you’re born like’974 whilst Masud refers to the fact that culture ‘starts off at home’975 
through certain actions e.g., ‘eating your home food, you do this and you do that’.976 
Yusuf agrees with Masud and also views food as a positive item to be taken from the 
cultural bag brought from the homecountry: ‘yeah, home food exactly!’977 Masud 
reflects on how culture is passed from one generation to the next in the following 
narrative. He does not equate power and domination with the passing of cultural 
traditions from one generation to the next but as socialised habits formed through the 
contextual environment in which one lives: 
 
Our parents were raised in Libya or their homecountries and they obviously have 
that culture and it's only natural for us to develop that from them. It's not like 
they force feed that into us, it’s just [how] they were grown. They pass it on, it's 
something that continues.
978
 
 
In terms of the differentiation between Islam and culture within the 2
nd
 generation 
female discussion group, Fusaila exclaims that ‘it’s really hard to see the difference’979 
between an Islamic and an ethno-cultural identity. Saiba continues the discussion by 
giving her personal opinion, which is that she would ‘see Islam [as taking] precedence 
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over culture’.980 She also explains her familial situation that although her parents would 
also agree that Islamic identity takes precedence, in practical reality, ‘they don’t practise 
it’.981 As to whether their parents still have cultural traits, she agrees that her parents are 
‘really cultural’ [laughing],982 and then gives an interesting narrative that offers an 
insight into how ethno-cultural and Islamic identity are both used to enforce parental 
control within the familial sphere. This narrative gives a good differentiation of how the 
Muslim youth view the relationship to their parents’ power and how they view the 
relationship between culture and Islam. Saiba states the following: 
 
Islam is kind of like the culture so they wouldn’t really understand the pure like, 
the actual [“authentic”] Islam, so when they’ve lost all the [argumentative] 
resources in cultural reasons, they’d be like “oh, but Islamically as well” because 
my parents would know that I’d listen to anything they’d say because I wasn’t 
allowed to do it Islamically. Culturally, I’d just be like “that makes no sense, I 
don’t care” [laughs] but then they’d be like “Islamically” and then I’m like “you 
can’t just pick and choose” like when you want to use Islam or culture.983 
 
This narrative illustrates how parents’ use their constitutive power with reference to 
ethno-cultural traditions and then move onto a more Islamic ethos to support their 
argument. This confirms the notion that the 1
st
 generation link culture and Islam 
together. Saiba is keen to differentiate culturalised Islam, which has grown within the 
homecountry, from the “pure” and “authentic” form of Islam, which she practises. She 
clearly states that the 1
st
 generation ‘wouldn’t really understand the pure like, the actual 
Islam’.984 For this discussant, her parent’s cultural argument does not hold much weight 
but any form of Islamic argumentation is acknowledged by her as important. However, 
she criticises her parents for deploying cultural and/or Islamic arguments selectively: 
‘...then I’m like “you can’t just pick and choose” like when you want to use Islam or 
culture’.985 In relation to young Muslim adults conducting their own research about 
Islam in order to justify and legitimate their actions that they have been socialised into 
since childhood, Saiba explains that as a child, she never differentiated or ‘saw the 
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difference between the two’986 i.e., between Islam and culture. However, when growing 
up she states that she would see ‘different contradictions’987 between what ‘culture 
would do and then things Islam says’.988 She then gives an example of such 
contradictions with reference to the ‘big wedding’:989  
 
My parents would always be a fan of the big wedding, the big white wedding 
and everything and then researching it Islamically in Islam that’s a contradiction 
to Islam and it’s like you don’t know which one to believe in like.990 
 
The twins then enter the conversation to discuss their familial situation in relation to 
Islam and culture. Unlike Saiba, Isha’s parents are presented as Muslims, who 
differentiate between Islam and culture. She states that her father used his own agency 
and ‘tried his best not to get us into the [homecountry] culture’.991 Thus, the twins grew 
up not speaking their homecountry language – ‘our own language’992 – but an Irish 
dialect of English. She also recounts that the communication between herself and her 
parents was good in that ‘my Dad, he always ta[lked], sat us down and explained 
everything to us’.993 Isha’s twin, Fusaila, interjects by explaining that her father had a 
cultural Islam because ‘he learnt it in Africa so they learned the culture version of 
Islam’.994  
 At this point on her own initiative, Fusaila brings up the issue of filtering-out 
“negative” cultural traditions, which are perceived as inhibiting the “proper” practise of 
Islam. In terms of this filtration, she states directly that ‘I find that most of my friends 
do that [filter-out “negative” culture].’995 She continues her narrative by explaining how 
these actions involve a learning process in which young Muslims intersubjectively 
interact with each other and identify which ethno-cultural traditions compliment or go 
against the teachings of Islam. In this regard, she states the importance of social 
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interaction and how Islam has become the common-ground for Sunni Muslim youth in 
Dublin, who emanate from diverse ethno-cultural traditions: 
 
We mix, the cultures like, we don’t hang around with our own [homecountry] 
people so we really notice our cultures and Islam when we’re together [with 
other young Muslims] – “oh, we don’t do that, this is Islamic” so we notice that. 
So I find that Muslim is our overall identity and that’s where we find ourselves 
most accepted.
996
 
 
8.2 Debating Everyday Dilemmas  
 
As has been stated above, globalisation and the evolution of modern-day technology has 
enabled Muslim youth in Europe to challenge social norms and local authority figures 
(parents, Imams and traditional Islamic scholars). However, there are a number of 
everyday practical issues that remain unresolved, particularly in relation to how Muslim 
women interact within a liberal Irish-European context. The narrative exchange – 
between Saiba and Fusaila – within the 2nd generation female discussion group 
highlights two salient issues: handshaking and travelling with a mahram. Such narrative 
interaction illustrates that such everyday dilemmas are being actively debated by young 
Muslim females, particularly in relation to whether Islamic jurisprudence – it’s 
interpretation and associated practices – progress through time to match changing 
contexts (Saiba’s argument) or whether they remain immutable and fixed-in-time 
(Fusaila’s argument).  
 
8.2.1 Handshaking 
 
Sumayya starts the debate by opining that wearing the hijab and socialising with others 
is not a problem; however, she then identifies handshaking as a persistent problem in 
her everyday life.
997
 This cultural practice, which in the West denotes respect and 
friendship, creates problems for Muslim women, who are prescribed by their religion to 
avoid close physical contact with non-familial adult males. Sumayya feels that the act of 
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handshaking is a ‘big challenge’998 that she consistently encounters within her everyday 
life in Dublin. She outlines this struggle as follows: 
 
It’s really hard to be in Dublin to do this [handshaking]. Once I feel that I’m 
really good and [I say] “I don’t, sorry, I can’t shake hand” and do like this, 
respectful[ly]. Most of them they accept that but other[s] don’t. Like my doctor, 
he took my hand, shaking [my] hand. I couldn’t talk that time, I don’t want to 
talk too much but some they don’t accept that at all, yeah but I still am trying to 
do [that] just because I am Muslim.
999
 
 
Sumayya directly states that she doesn’t ‘care about culture’.1000 She describes a funny 
story of how Arabs will see her on the street and say to her ‘so you are modern 
Muslim’1001 because she does not cover all of her body even though she comes from 
Saudi Arabia. Rifa concurs ‘yeah, that’s what they call us’.1002 Saiba speaks up about 
the dilemma of handshaking. She states that such situations are awkward and commonly 
she finds herself in the position where she doesn’t ‘know what to say, you just 
freeze’.1003 Riba acknowledges the dilemma in that many Muslim women do ‘not want 
to be disrespectful’ to the person offering their hand but also that they don’t want to 
disrespect their Islamic social norms linked to recognising God. Saiba then mentions a 
very practical problem associated with handshaking and job interviews. She states the 
following small story that highlights how the social norms inherent within a job 
interview can create a recognition dilemma for young Muslim women:  
 
Even in job interviews, the shaking-the-hand is a really big thing in the 
interview. It can either make you or break you and then you get to [the end], and 
then somebody puts out [their hand], and it’s like they’re inviting you and you’re 
just “no”, and you don’t know what to say and you just like “how do I even 
explain this” because I know the hadith, the actual principle behind it but, trying 
to app[ly it], make it make sense to me because I believe it but trying [to] make 
sense of it [to] somebody else that doesn’t have the faith and then you just be 
like “so, I just can’t” and it’s so hard to explain and it’s just awful.1004 
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Isha adds to Saiba’s small story by clarifying that people, who offer their hand as a sign 
of respect get annoyed and even angry when ‘something gets taken away’.1005 She 
voices that many Muslim women will say ‘sorry, I can’t shake your hand’,1006 however, 
this apology it not understood and people still feel ‘what’s wrong with me. I just wanted 
to shake your hand [out of respect]’.1007 Saiba concurs and also agrees that handshaking 
is a symbol of when two people meet and show a sign of respect and friendliness 
towards each other. She humorously states that the only option in such dilemmatic 
situations is to ‘pray that you get a girl’.1008 Isha adds that 'it depends on the person’1009 
in that some people will be understanding but others may be ‘real aggressive and you’re 
kind of like “sorry”’.1010 The handshaking dilemma can create awkward moments as 
Saiba emphasises when she recounts her experience at a Womens’ Rights breakfast in 
Dublin: 
 
There was a lot of officials there and one man was right in front of me and this 
was when the press, where everybody was there, and he put his hand out to 
shake me, shake myself and Sara’s hand and Sara shook his hand and I didn’t, 
and then, it just made the whole area awkward, like everybody. The cameras 
stopped flashing and I just kind of walked away because I didn’t know what to 
say and then after I was “Sara, what happened?” and she was like “it was the 
pressure” and it was like too many people were looking at me.1011 
 
To avoid such situations again, Saiba explains that she searched Islamic jurisprudence 
to find ‘my way around it’.1012 She researched ‘different scholars of Islam’1013 through 
the online fatwa markets to see if there were Islamic rulings that permitted the shaking 
of male hands ‘for professional uses’.1014 However, such online searching did not 
provide avenues of flexibility. Sumayya interjects and states to Saiba that ‘there are 
Muslim girls, they shake hands’.1015 Saiba responds to Sumayya that such young 
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women have made a ‘personal choice’1016 to shake hands whereas all the traditional 
Islamic schools of jurisprudence prohibit it. Sumayya then makes a comment on how 
the interaction between Islam and culture can create confusion in social relationships. 
Although she herself does not care for cultural acts, her sister shakes hands with people. 
Saiba agrees that differing actions carried out by Muslim women confuse people and 
leads to social misunderstandings. 
 The discussion about the difficulties related to handshaking and Saiba’s point 
about searching online for an Islamic ruling to remedy such problems brings into focus 
an important debate between the young females about how Islamic jurisprudence – 
conducted by trained scholars – regulates everyday practical life and whether such 
rulings change overtime or whether they remain constant through time. Saiba opens up 
about how she has conducted online research into other schools of Islamic thought 
‘because everything that we practise is obviously being said by one of these 
[schools]’.1017 During her internet search, she compares and contrasts different rulings 
from various Islamic schools on the same subject to assess whether the ruling is 
‘authentic’.1018 This discussant is not interested in individual rulings, which are just 
‘somebody else’s opinion’ but in a plurality of verified, contextual and reasonable 
rulings.
1019
 The reason for her online research is to find flexibility between her Islamic 
identity and her practical everyday life as lived in the Irish-European context. This is 
exemplified by her narrative return to the problem of handshaking within the 
professional job interview. Her statement clarifies that sometimes to make life easier, a 
person might decide to act against Islamic prescriptions. Out of respect for discussants 
in the room, Saiba apologises for indicating that she has gone against Islamic principles 
out of everyday practical necessity: 
 
It’s really hard especially in professions when you’re going for an interview and 
you don’t know what to say, you don’t even know how to explain it to them and 
at times you kinda just be like “let this be my one sin” and just do it [shake 
hands with males].
1020
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In terms of the need for contextual rulings to live life as Muslim in Europe, Saiba states 
her belief that the rulings of past scholars and Islamic schools are relative to the time in 
which they were produced and that new rulings should fit the present context. 
Essentially, this discussant is stating that Islamic jurisprudence is not fixed but evolves 
through time and should be context-dependent. As she states:  
 
...like the four scholars [schools], they were in a specific time so obviously as 
time progresses there’ll be another couple of scholars depending on the 
generation and stuff and the century. So I think it’ll be different from like 
looking now and a thousand years from now.
1021
 
 
However, Saiba’s comments about a flexible and transformative form of Islam are 
strongly opposed by the twins – Fusaila and Isha – who both adamantly disagree. 
Fusaila views Islam as fixed and she doesn’t think ‘Islam in generations [to come] is 
going to change – ‘how many generations have we gone through now?’1022 For this 
discussant, Islam is perfect and not in need of change because it ‘was made for 
everything. It’s not like they left something out’.1023 Saiba attempts to defend her 
opinion by arguing that what is halal (permissible) and what is haram (forbidden) can 
change through time based on different contexts. Fusaila questions Saiba about the 
handshaking problem. Saiba responds that she did mention it but she also researched 
Islamic jurisprudence online and found it be ‘authentic’.1024 Fusaila states her opinion in 
relation to the handshaking dilemma: ‘I don’t think it’s going to change in the years [to 
come]. I don’t think it’s going to suddenly be accepted’.1025 Saiba clarifies that she is 
not stating that change will happen soon but that it will occur over a long period of time. 
Fusaila replies: ‘Even in a million [years], I don’t think so’.1026 
 In relation to the concept of ijtihad (critical reasoning) in Islamic jurisprudence, 
which is a concept in line with Saiba’s argument that Islam can change through time, 
Mahala enters the discussion by suggesting that ‘it [ijtihad] should be open again’.1027 
This statement refers to the gates of ijtihad and suggests that the gates of reasoned 
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interpretation remains closed. Mahala’s argues for opening the gates because ‘things 
have changed’.1028 Saiba reclarifies her position. She states that in her opinion ‘different 
things apply to different times’1029 and she is certainly not ‘changing the whole’1030 of 
Islam. Notably, Mahala and Saiba agree with each other that the ‘fundamentals’1031 of 
Islam ‘will always be the same’.1032 Fusaila once again defends her position by stating 
that ‘if something changes, it matters’,1033 which indicates that change is not something 
that should be entered into lightly.  
 
8.2.2 Travelling with a Mahram 
 
The second debate relates to travelling with a mahram; in other words, the ruling that 
single Muslim women, who are travelling long-distances, be chaperoned by a male 
family member to provide protection against danger. Saiba states that this issue is 
important as some families today still actively encourage the use of a mahram and 
negatively view ‘travelling without [a] mahram’.1034 Fusaila believes women should 
travel with a mahram. In Rifa’s opinion, ‘Islam does not say you have to take this 
[ruling]’.1035 Saiba clarifies the important paradox of the mahram debate in that ‘we all 
travel without mahrams; even though we all know we are not allowed to travel without 
a mahram’.1036 She explains this point further by stating: 
 
In Islam, you’re [a Muslim woman is] not allowed to travel alone. You’re not, 
you have to travel with your brother or your father…back in that time [of the 
Prophet], everybody obeyed it because travelling back then you’re travelling 
through a desert and it’s dangerous, where travelling now is like you go to the 
airport, you board one plane and then you get off there [at your destination] and 
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then your family can be waiting for you at that other airport so it’s not as 
dangerous as back then [in the past].
1037
  
 
Fusaila states that she still thinks it applies today. However, Saiba views the mahram 
issue as ‘a good example’1038 supporting her main argument that what is halal and 
haram changes through time. However, other discussants are still willing to challenge 
Saiba’s argument. Sumayya makes the comment that rulings must be logical. She states 
that if she finds a ruling that is ‘not logic’1039 then she will not follow it. This implies 
that the concept of mahram is illogical for the present day, therefore, she will not follow 
it. Rifa agrees. Sumayya is certain that rules have to correlate to practical reality but that 
with clear fixed rulings that are in the Qur’an and come directly from God ‘you do it 
and that’s it’1040 and this sometimes means that as an individual ‘your mind has to make 
it operate with what you have’.1041 Saiba takes Sumayya to be advocating that rulings 
have to ‘make common sense’;1042 however, her argument is that rulings from clerics 
must be logical, but, if a ruling comes directly God through the sources then it must be 
obeyed. In other words, no matter how impractical, the individual must try to make such 
a rulings work cognitively so that it can be translated into practical action. Fusaila 
restates her position that the concept of mahram ‘applies in this time’.1043 Rifa agrees. 
Saiba replies: ‘well that’s your opinion’.1044At this point, Sumayya reflects that Fusaila 
has a right to a subjective opinion; however, she must also ‘think about other 
persons’.1045  
 Continuing the debate, Fusaila claims that the concept of mahram comes ‘down 
to culture’1046 and, in her opinion, she believes all women ‘should be travelling with a 
mahram’.1047 Saiba disagrees. Fusaila explains that if you grew up in a culture that 
promotes such a practice then ‘that’s your only choice’.1048 Saiba correctly identifies 
                                                 
1037
 Ibid.  
1038
 Saiba.  
1039
 Sumayya.  
1040
 Ibid.  
1041
 Ibid.  
1042
 Saiba.  
1043
 Fusaila.  
1044
 Saiba.  
1045
 Sumayya.  
1046
 Fusaila.  
1047
 Ibid.  
1048
 Ibid.  
 
 
202 
 
that Fusaila seems to be promoting an ethno-cultural tradition to validate her argument 
and she questions Fusaila by stating: ‘but in Islam, we’re talking about what’s there in 
Islam, that whole mahram thing is not in Islam. It’s not, [it’s] our cultures’.1049 Fusaila 
reclarifies her position that ‘now’,1050 in the present, ‘we don’t do it’.1051 Bisma states 
her opinion that mahram is a present-day cultural practice and is not Islamic: ‘We do it 
but, Islamically it’s not allowed’.1052 She mentions another clash in relation to weddings 
in which Muslim women can – in ethno-cultural traditions – show their hair to non-
familial males yet Islam directly prohibits such action. She states: ‘For example, for us 
when we go to a wedding, though there is a man there, we still show our hair’.1053 Saiba 
agrees and acknowledges that such practices are similar in Sudan.
1054
 Fusaila argues that 
such actions are ‘personal’1055 decisions but this argument is rejected by Bisma, who 
highlights that Islam is against showing ‘hair around but to your husband’.1056 Saiba 
agrees and stresses that such actions are cultural to which Bisma replies: ‘culturally, we 
still do that’.1057 
 
8.3 Filtering “Negative” Culture and Searching for “Authentic” Islam 
 
The following section will present narratives that highlight the process by which 2
nd
 
generation Sunni Muslim youth in Dublin are filtering “negative” ethno-cultural 
traditions and searching for an “authentic” Islam. Such a process challenges and 
influences traditional authorities and is perceived as providing the solution as to how 
one can live an Islamic life within an Irish-European environment.  
Within the 2
nd
 generation male focused discussion group, Yusuf discusses the 
mix of cultures that the youth are exposed to from their familial and community 
environments and from the wider context. He gives his personal experience about how 
he negotiates his homecountry culture and the culture he is exposed to within his 
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everyday life in Ireland. Such a cultural negotiation is regulated through the remit of an 
Islamic identity. He clarifies that Muslim youth have a ‘cultural mixture’1058 between 
‘this [Irish culture] and whatever you had at home’.1059 His practical way of negotiating 
both cultures is to ‘just kind of take the best of everything’.1060 This is an important 
statement because by stating that he takes what he perceives to be “good” or “positive” 
within both cultures, it implies that there must be forms of ethnic-culture that are 
perceived as “negative” and this also implies that this discussant has some means by 
which to assess the character of actions associated with cultural practice. Yusuf further 
explains what he does with the perceived-to-be “negative” parts of Irish and 
homecountry culture. He confidently states: ‘I just neglect it. You just leave it’.1061 
Masud supports this comment by narrating his personal experience: ‘I avoid it [negative 
culture]’.1062 Yusuf concurs and uses Masud’s terminology to restate his point in 
relation to socialised alcohol consumption within Irish culture: ‘[you] avoid it exactly. 
Just like drinking [alcohol], you just avoid it’.1063  
The above comments about avoiding the Irish culture of drinking alcohol 
refocuses the discussion towards forms of ethno-cultural tradition that are identified and 
bypassed by young Muslims. In terms of Irish culture, Hussein clarifies that ‘[drinking 
is] not in our [Islamic] culture’1064 whilst Siddiq refers to the Arab cultural practice of 
smoking ‘shisha’1065 as an action also to be avoided. On hearing the two examples, 
Yusuf clarifies that ethno-cultural actions to be avoided relate to both ‘Irish culture or 
Arabic culture’.1066 In terms of the latter, he describes whether a family avoids or acts 
out the “negative” aspects of culture in relation to a high or low degree of religiosity. 
On this point, he states that: 
 
My parents didn’t really teach me anything that’s bad in my [Arab] culture 
because they are very religious, but ye know, with other parents because they 
neglect that [religion] as well. They [my parents] don't look to it [“negative” 
                                                 
1058
 Yusuf.  
1059
 Ibid.  
1060
 Ibid.  
1061
 Ibid. 
1062
 Masud.  
1063
 Yusuf.  
1064
 Hussein.  
1065
 Siddiq.  
1066
 Yusuf.  
 
 
204 
 
culture] because they think it's very ignorant but, with other people that their 
parents are not really religious they would have that [“negative” Arab culture] at 
home.
1067
  
 
Siddiq clarifies his position against the “negative” Arab cultural trait of smoking shisha. 
This discussant clarifies that, as a Muslim, he views shisha as haram (forbidden) for the 
reason that it ‘harms you’1068 by damaging the bodily health. He then narrates how the 
ideology of Islam views this “negative” act as associated with the ideology of culture: 
‘so when it comes to a cultural thing like smoking shisha, Islam would say “no” to that. 
So that's where you'd see this conflict between the two ideologies’.1069  
 Aswad swings the discussion over to identifying the “positive” aspects of Irish 
culture. In this discussant’s opinion, there is an element of culture that differentiates 
Ireland from Arab countries and that is the act of trust. For this discussant, Irish people 
‘have a really great trust’1070 in others that comes easily and is ‘something great in the 
culture’.1071 However, in the Arab world, ‘sometimes that trust is not there’.1072 Nejeed 
enters the conversation and swings the conversation back to a discussion of “positive” 
Arab culture in relation to the transitional phenomenon of sport, particularly soccer.  He 
points out that Algerians ‘love soccer’.1073 Yusuf, a Libyan, speaks loudly about this 
love in that ‘they [Algerians] would not shut up about soccer.’1074 Aban, differentiating 
himself as an Algerian, states in reply that ‘that's the difference, like Libyans they don't 
really think about what it [soccer] is’.1075 He mentions ‘the shock’1076 when his 
homecountry – Algeria – won a soccer match against Germany during the 1982 World 
Cup in Spain. Although he brought up the narrative about the Algerian obsessive love of 
soccer, he adds that such an intense passion for the game creates arguments and 
divisions between Algerians and other groups, which for Aban implies that soccer may 
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sometimes take supersede a “universal” Islamic identity that views all Muslims, despite 
ethnic and national affiliation, as the “same” in their recognition to God.   
 
They [other Arabs] they don't really go more to soccer than us [Algerians]. We 
like [soccer], like we think it's a part of us. We love playing soccer. So then 
when we talk about it we get into like arguments and then that starts, we start 
hating each other and start not talking to each other because of our soccer, some 
stupid things. We keep forget[ing] that we're Muslim and start going to what we 
were born and raised looking at.
1077
 
 
Similarly, the 2
nd
 generation female discussants narrate their experiences of actively 
filtering-out what they perceive to be “negative” culture in order to obtain a “purer” and 
more “authentic” form of Islam. For example, Saiba states that ‘there’s a lot of 
“negative” culture’.1078 She and multiple other discussants agree that young Muslims are 
purposively recognising that some ethno-cultural traditions are not Islamic, therefore, 
such actions should be avoided through in-action. Isha enters the discussion and links 
her Islamic identity to this act of filtering-out “negative” culture and how this 
differentiates herself from others. She states in this regard: ‘That’s why we, in our 
cultures; in our own separate cultures, we would be seen as different’.1079 Saiba agrees 
that such a relationship to ethno-cultural traditions does define and distinguish the new 
generation of Muslims. However, Isha clarifies that such an identity is not always 
favourably looked upon by other members of the community. In terms of how the youth 
are recognised, she claims that ethno-cultural Muslims ‘think we’re better than them’1080 
but in actuality, as Isha states, the Muslim youth are performing such actions in order to 
‘follow the real Islam’.1081 She continues by stating that such action by the youth ‘leads 
to many arguments with our parents, our uncles or aunties and all that because they 
don’t agree and they laugh at us’.1082 Fusaila adds a point that ‘you also get called 
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“extreme”’.1083 Saiba and Fusaila are in complete agreement. Saiba responds to Fusaila: 
‘Exactly, exactly. My parents think I’m like a fundamentalist’.1084 
  In terms of whether the above filtering creates a perceived better recognition to 
God, Saiba says ‘yeah definitely’;1085 Fusaila replies ‘yes’;1086 whilst Isha responds 
clarifying that the youth are trying to act in ‘the right way’1087 and attain the identity of 
a “good Muslim”.  In terms of whether such filtering actions and the movement toward 
a “purer” form of Islam creates a common-ground in which young Muslims of all 
ethnic-traditions can come together in a unified way, Saiba responds affirmatively: 
‘Everybody did definitely, I agree, get along’.1088 Isha states positively: ‘I definitely 
agree with that’.1089 She explains her agreement by comparing her experience of living 
in the UK and Ireland and states that unlike Dublin; in London, Muslims mix in relation 
to their ethno-cultural traits to the point where whole areas of the city are split up into 
cultural neighbourhoods that represent a mixture of ethnic and/or national affiliations. 
The discussants then talk about how London is ethnically differentiated, unlike Ireland. 
Saiba states that when in London ‘we wouldn’t hang with the other community’.1090 
Fusaila agrees that in London there are ‘whole areas full of my people’1091 – Tanzanians 
– and whole areas [to Arabs]’.1092 Isha gives an example of when she and her twin went 
to London with Rifa, who is Algerian. It ended up that ‘she’d go to the south, we’d go 
to the east [of London]’1093 because that’s how the city is divided. Saiba agrees with the 
above statements and, with Mahala, she adds that segregated districts lead to mosques 
catering to a specific ethnic group that follow a particular sect of Islam.  
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 Fusaila contrasts the London experience to Dublin and positively states that ‘in 
Ireland’,1094 she realised that people in the community ‘hang onto’1095 their Islamic 
identity because there is ‘so few of us’.1096 Rifa agrees that the small size of the Muslim 
community in Ireland means that Islamic identity is struggled for and maintained. 
Fusaila returns to her opinion that Muslims in Ireland ‘hang onto the real Islam’1097 
because it joins everyone together despite there being ‘so many of us, different 
cultu[res], different cultures [high tone]’.1098 Saiba agrees that Islam has become a 
common-ground for the heterogeneous youth to come together.
1099
 Fusaila agrees 
‘definitely’,1100 she then explains why mixing with other cultures is positive for Islam 
and can intersubjectively help ground a person in how they subjectively practise their 
religiosity: 
 
I want to have like different cultures in my life ‘cos I feel like my friends keep 
me grounded. When I’m straying too much in my culture, they’re like “you know 
that’s not Islam”. If you hang around with different cultures, you realise that 
you need to find a common-ground somewhere and Islam is that common-
ground.
1101
 
 
Returning to the filtering of ethnic-culture and whether all young Muslims are filtering-
out what is perceived to be “negative” ethnic culture or whether some young Muslims 
aim to keep and maintain such traditions, Saiba reflects on a group in school, who were 
‘very cultural’.1102 Both Rifa and Fusaila confirm that ‘they were cultural’.1103 Rifa then 
adds that this group were not only cultural but that they were also ‘fresh’1104 arrivals 
from their homecountry. Saiba agrees that this group hadn’t ‘been here [in Ireland] that 
long’.1105 Fusaila calmly states: ‘give them time’.1106 Saiba confirms that this group 
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‘held onto their culture’.1107 She then goes on to state one of the most important 
narratives during the discussion that gives an insight into how time and interaction 
constructs identity and how she herself filtered-out “negative” ethnic culture, rebelled 
against tribal culture and forged a new “purer” form of “authentic” Islamic identity: 
 
I’ve been here [in Ireland] longer than she [Bisma] has but we’re from the same 
place [in Somalia] but today, people would see her more as Somali than me 
because she practises more Somali traditions than I do but basically, it’s just 
because I’m here longer and I kind of like dropped a lot and I was raised like in 
Ireland and where she was like, she was new to it and maybe in about ten years 
she’d be different to the person that was just new to her like. We grew up all our 
lives and we were told like “tribe is like a big thing” and then researching it 
Islamically and it’s like one of the worse things to do ever and now we try to 
filter that out.
1108
  
 
On reflection, Saiba clarifies that such an identity transformation has been ‘so hard’1109  
because ‘in our families’1110 ethno-cultural identity is still given a prominent and 
important role. Isha agrees and adds that it is even harder ‘especially when you are the 
first generation to do that’.1111 This statement is claiming that the 2nd generation is the 
first generation to actively resist and filter-out “negative” culture in an attempt to 
construct a “pure” and “authentic” form of Islamic identity in Ireland. Saiba agrees with 
Isha’s statement and supports it by stating the following: 
 
Exactly, [we are] the first generation to kind of like rebel out from the whole 
traditions and cultures and they’d [the 1st generation] be like “but what’s wrong 
with you?” and their [the 1st generation are] like “I know Islam doesn’t teach it 
but still it’s culture”.1112 
 
Fusaila opines that the 2
nd
 generation are questioning and challenging the mix of ethno-
cultural and Islamic traditions espoused and practised by the older immigrant 
generation. She states that the young generation are asking the question – ‘why’?1113 
Rifa, provides the answer to Fusaila’s question: ‘yeah, it’s culture’.1114 In terms of 
                                                 
1107
 Saiba.  
1108
 Ibid.  
1109
 Ibid.  
1110
 Ibid.  
1111
 Isha.  
1112
 Saiba.  
1113
 Fusaila.  
1114
 Rifa.  
 
 
209 
 
whether the discussants feel Muslim youth are changing and socialising the opinions 
and practices of their parents and the older generation, Fusaila replies: ‘yeah, some 
do.’1115 She then makes an important statement about how the 2nd generation can 
productively influence and constitute their parents’ behaviour and identity:  
 
My Dad says that “me and Isha changed our whole family” because we used to 
practise like them and then it came a time when we started hanging out with all 
my friends, me and Isha [were] like “we’re all doing something different here”. 
So, then when me and Isha changed ourselves, it changed the whole family and 
then it kinda created a domino effect, kind of changing the community little-by-
little.
1116
  
 
Fusaila credits her sister and herself for changing familial action and identity. Through 
social interaction with ethnically diverse friends, they identified differences in how 
various friends (with different ethno-cultural traditions) practise Islam. This made the 
twins change how they practised their traditions and identities, which then influenced 
members of their family and, according to Fusaila, slowly changed and resocialised 
practices in her Muslim community. Isha confirms that such a transformation is a slow 
process.
1117
 
 The above narrative also resembles the opinion of young male interviewee 
Nurdeen, who comments upon how he and his siblings, as Western Muslims, have been 
able to influence and socialise his wife and immigrant mother, who have both retained 
traces of “negative” homecountry culture within their identity make-up and everyday 
practices. On this point Nurdeen states the following:   
 
My mum has changed quite a lot [of cultural baggage]. She came here [to 
Ireland] when she was quite young and she had some cultural baggage – she is 
slowly losing it. I would not want my son to grow up in Pakistan because there's 
a lot of cultural baggage there. My wife comes from Pakistan and she had a lot 
of cultural baggage. She has seen [how to find a “pure” authentic Islam] 
through me, my sisters and friends in the mosque. She is now losing some of the 
[cultural] baggage.
1118
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For Nurdeen, it is also important for the upcoming 2
nd
 generation, who are agentically 
locating a space for a revitalised Islamic identity within the Irish context, to pass such 
practical knowledge to future generations. In this regard, he is adamant that ‘the third 
generation will follow the second generation’.1119 Similarly to Nurdeen, Fusaila also 
emphasises that the more senior Muslim youth are ‘always trying to educate the 
younger’1120 Muslims in terms of being able to differentiate and filter-out “negative” 
culture; thus, enabling such youth to gain a closer proximity to a more “real”, “purer” 
and “authentic” Islamic practice and identity. Such identity positioning acts as a 
common-ground for a diverse range of Muslim youth living together within an Irish-
European context and it also enables a strong perception that one has attained a better 
form of recognition from God, from the familial and community spheres in terms of 
religious adherence and practice, and from the wider societal sphere in terms of 
promoting Islamic-civicness as positive participation and contribution. 
 The next chapter – Chapter 9 – is a discussion chapter that will use narrative 
examples to illustrate and synthesise how recognitive relations are embedded and acted 
out within a complex range of power relations. In this regard, three dynamics of power 
and their associated positive and negative actions will be examined i.e., power over the 
actions of others in terms of domineering and constitutive power as well as bottom-up 
resistive power that works from within forms of top-down power and is inextricably 
connected to how the research participants recognise varying authorities or counter-
authorities, who give legitimacy to competing social norms and identities.  
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Chapter 9                           Discussion 
This chapter will discuss, in a concise manner, the main points that have emanated from 
the research, which utilised Axel Honneth’s typological framework of recognition to 
explore the everyday experiences of Sunni Muslim individuals in Dublin. The prime 
aim of this chapter is to synthesise the preceding chapters to demonstrate the complexity 
of recognition relations, which intertwine with various forms of power. The discussion 
will be conducted in three sections. The first section will show how the information 
within this thesis challenges socially-weightless communitarian and security paradigms, 
which determine how we generalise Muslim populations in Europe.  
Secondly, the complex intertwinement between recognition and power will be 
explored, particularly with an eye on the varied and complex relations of power that 
envelop recognition. Within this section, social theoretical work – from Petit; 
Schuppert; Foucault; McBride; Ramadan; Pędziwiatr; and Honneth – will be 
synthesised with contextualised narratives.  
The last section summarises and concisely evaluates the overarching insight of 
the research, which is that young Sunni Muslim individuals in Dublin are in the midst of 
resolving a variety of recognitive-power dilemmas within their everyday lives.    
 
9.1 Challenging Communitarian and Security Paradigms 
 
By reflecting upon the preceding chapters, it can be determined that the Sunni Muslim 
individual experience of recognitive relations in Dublin is highly complex. The 
utilisation of a Honnethian typological framework of recognition alongside narratives of 
everyday experience provides a vivid insight into such lived complexity and by doing 
so, challenges academia’s communitarian and security paradigms that influence how 
Muslims are generalised within the European context. The following sections discuss 
such challenges and how narratives of everyday experience; multidimensionally framed 
within distinct spheres of recognition, provide a more complex and nuanced 
understanding of minority experience within the Irish context.     
In terms of challenging the communitarian paradigm, the narratives evidence 
recounted does not substantiate the standard multicultural recognitive view, espoused by 
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Taylor,
1121
 that minority groups simply seek to have their “particular” culture and 
beliefs endorsed by the majority. Contra to this viewpoint, the research participants i.e., 
interviewees and discussants provide a complex narrative account of how individuals 
belonging to the Sunni Muslim community in Dublin are actively striving to be 
recognised within different spheres of everyday life as both the “same” and as 
“different” to others in Irish society.  
The importance of being recognised as the “same” as others is reflected in 
narratives that criticise the civic stratification of citizenship and advocate for the need to 
be seen and treated equally in similarity to other citizens that are recognised as morally 
responsible human beings, who can participate fully by utilising “universal” rights and 
obligations that have been reciprocally conferred. Such narratives, which advocate for 
equality, participation and contribution within and towards wider society, rail against 
the communitarian premise that minority groups are concerned primarily with the 
recognition of their “particular” culture and belief system that stands out as “different” 
to dominant societal norms. Such a view diminishes the role played by legal recognition 
and civic identity. Being legally the “same” as others in terms of being treated equally 
and conferred with the “same” rights and obligations to others is an extremely important 
form of recognition narratively advocated for by the research participants. Its everyday 
importance is identified in criticisms of how perceived “difference” supersedes equal 
recognition or “sameness” to others in the legal and wider societal spheres. This is 
exemplified in pathological interactions in terms of legal exclusion as civic stratification 
and societal discrimination as the prejudice of first impressions.   
The weightlessness of the multicultural communitarian position is most apparent 
in discussions about what types of “difference” deserve ethical recognition from others 
in wider societal relations. Communitarians view minority culture, belief and identity as 
the “difference” that requires recognition from a society’s majority. On the one hand, 
whilst the research participants want their cultures and beliefs to be respected within 
Irish society, such “ways of life” are internally contested within minority communities 
themselves. On the other hand, the empirical narratives convey the complexity of 
recognising “difference”, which is more commonly related to how individuals and 
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groups differentiate between surface-level traits as well as underlying individual 
meritocratic abilities and associated achievements. In line with Honneth’s typology and 
in contrast to the communitarian position, such narratives support that Muslim 
individuals and groups expect their “particular” culture, beliefs and identity i.e., “way of 
life” to be respected by others, however, overall, more emphasis is placed on objectively 
recognised individual abilities and associated achievements, which may be indirectly 
influenced by particular “ways of life”, but far more importantly, align with the 
continuing rise of a meritocratic society in which individuals (and groups) are 
recognised and esteemed for their contribution to the value horizon of society. Of note 
is that such meritocratic recognition is promoted within cultural transitional phenomena. 
This point is exemplified though the small stories narrated by Masud and the twins, who 
both detail how their underlying individual abilities and associated achievements are 
socially recognised in the sporting and art worlds while their surface-level “particular” 
racial and religious traits are discriminated against due to being “different” to the 
dominant identity standard that culturally resides within Irish society.
1122
 The above is a 
serious challenge to the communitarian position in that, as the empirical narratives 
illustrate, it is the recognition of individual abilities and associated contributory 
achievements that individuals normatively strive for in relation to the ethical and 
objective recognition of their “difference” to others within the wider societal sphere of 
interaction.     
In terms of the second paradigmatic challenge, the multidimensional frame and 
everyday narrativity of this study provides a unique emancipatory perspective that runs 
counter to the dominant security paradigm residing within the European literature that is 
too narrowly concerned with viewing Muslims in Europe through the lens of political 
extremism. Whilst the securitisation perspective tackles important and sensitive issues 
such as Islamic fundamentalism and youth radicalisation, it provides little reflection on 
the everyday experiences of Muslim individuals. In fact, such fundamentalist views are 
held and propagated by only a small minority of Muslims and have little application to 
the everyday lives of the majority of Muslim citizens living peacefully and productively 
within the European democratic environment. In the influential and interconnected 
fields of academia and media, political extremism is a “sexy” topic that provides a 
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lucrative form of distanced investigative work that has significant potential for 
exploitation. As the narratives illustrate, there is a perception that such “expert” fields 
create media stereotyping and academic over-generalisations, which have a propensity 
to link the Islamic religion and its followers to terrorism. Like the Irish in the UK 
throughout the 20
th
 century, Muslim people throughout Europe have now become 
suspect communities.  
This study counteracts the security paradigm by deploying an emancipatory and 
participatory counter-perspective to give a more nuanced understanding of the everyday 
experiences of Sunni Muslim individuals in Dublin. It is a more rounded holistic 
approach, inspired by a Honnethian multidimensional typology and utilising everyday 
narrative, which gives the subjects under study a voice to describe the complexity of 
their recognitive relationships and to critique forms of misrecognition that are 
continuously fueled by securitisation concerns. The aim of providing a more nuanced 
view of everyday Sunni Muslim life in Dublin constitutes a significant challenge to the 
security paradigm that generalises and reifies Islam as terroristic and views Muslims as 
suspect. It can be argued that such a holistic sociological approach, particularly the 
multidimensional view of positive and negative recognition and power relations, also 
permits security “experts” to gain an alternative comprehension of the complex 
dynamics that influence the spread of Islamic fundamentalist ideologies and the growth 
of radicalisation amongst Muslim youth within various European nation-states. By 
obtaining a more refined understanding of experience within multiple recognition 
spheres and the dilemmas that manifest within such arenas, a valuable insight is gained 
into how identity is influenced, constructed and maintained by a religious minority in 
their everyday lives and intersubjective relationships within the Irish context.    
 
9.2 Recognition and Power 
 
As Honneth’s theory and the empirical narratives illustrate, recognition is a subjectively 
innate “natural” need and an intersubjectively constructed dynamic of social interaction, 
which is a fundamental and necessary aspect of the human condition.
1123
 It is generally 
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verified within the empirical narratives that positive recognition and negative 
misrecognition do affect an individual’s relation-to-self and overall sense of self-worth. 
Of note however is that recognition does not occur in isolation but is continuously acted 
out within and enveloped by complex dynamics of power i.e., there is no outside to 
relations of power. The following aim to explore the relationship between recognition 
and power by examining how everyday experiences within recognitive spheres are 
affected by three formations of power. In terms of top-down relations, power over 
others is the most prevalent and is composed of two diverging components – 
domineering and constitutive power – whilst the third formation is a form of bottom-up 
power enacted by individual and collective agency, which manifests within and resists 
forms of top-down arbitrary interference. Such a bottom-up agentic form of power is 
referred to within this study as resistive power.  
 
9.2.1 Domineering Power 
 
As stated above, recognitive relations across social spheres are always enveloped by the 
dynamics of power and the narratives within this research project give a valuable insight 
into how recognition and power relate to each other. This section will examine 
domineering power, acted out through pathological behaviour, within three spheres of 
recognitive interaction i.e., within the wider societal sphere in terms of discrimination; 
within the family and community love sphere in terms of patriarchy; and lastly, within 
the legal sphere in terms of exclusion through the stratification of citizenship. 
 
Public Discrimination 
 
It has been identified that domineering power exists to a large extent within the wider 
societal sphere in the form of public discrimination. Using Petit’s definition, it is 
possible to state that it is common knowledge that such discrimination is domineering 
because it arbitrarily interferes with a person’s capacity “to be” within the wider social 
sphere, thereby restricting an individual’s freedom and choices within that sphere of 
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interaction.
1124
 Such domination by private actors in the public sphere connects to 
Schuppert’s understanding of domineering power as dominium.1125  
Furthermore, discrimination as domineering power fails the eyeball test i.e., to 
be able to look another in the eye without reason for fear or deference by the fact that it 
is an attempt to publicly shame individuals, who are “different” from prevailing social 
norms.
1126
 The empirical narratives reference how everyday discrimination in the form 
of public discrimination is a common experience and how surface-level traits are 
shamed because they are “different” to the dominant identity standard that has become 
the culturally socialised norm within Irish society. The fact that an individual may be a 
citizen – and thus be the “same” as others in society – is negated by being superseded of 
what makes people “different” to each other. Such public discrimination can be acted 
out as physical attacks or non-physical verbal and gestural denigration. Furat’s small 
story about her friend having her hijab ripped off her head in public is a good case-in-
point about public shaming.
1127
  
Importantly, the narratives indicate that it is Muslim females, who bear the brunt 
of such domineering power and are positioned on the front lines when it comes to acts 
of discrimination, whether related to Islamophobia, race or ethno-cultural prejudice. 
Certainly, Muslim womens’ surface level traits, particularly wearing the hijab and racial 
features, make them clear targets for public discrimination in the form of prejudice of 
first impressions, which negatively affects an individual’s confidence “to be” oneself 
within society. Various small stories illustrate this situation such as Dahlia and 
Safeerah’s story about a Filipino friend, who took off her hijab because she lacked the 
confidence to be visibly differentiated from others
1128
 plus Maja’s small story about 
perceiving disrespect from the hotel receptionist.
1129
 Azaan and Hurriyah also indicate 
how such experiences of everyday domination negatively affect an individual’s relation-
to-self and sense of worth, with the likelihood of leading to self-isolation and 
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depression.
1130
 Of note is narrative evidence from the Muslim women’s civic group that 
women are struggling against domination by proving to others they – as female Muslim 
citizens – can civically participate and contribute to their wider community and society. 
Whilst such women would like respect for their “particular” surface-level traits, they 
advocate strongly that what should be normatively judged by wider society ought to be 
their “particular” meritocratic abilities and associated achievements that productively 
contribute to society.
1131
   
An interesting aspect of this form of societal domination is that the narratives 
from the research participants continuously connect everyday public discrimination as 
being fueled by media misrecognition. In other words, media in general is perceived as 
having a negative impact upon the Muslim population in Ireland by subjecting them to 
forms of misrecognition in terms of sensationalist stereotyping, categorisation and 
reification people, which thereby creates misunderstandings about Muslims and Islam. 
Predominantly, Islamophobia and racism are perceived to exist in Irish society because 
the media has influenced and pressurised everyday people to have a negative attitude 
towards Muslims. An example of this is Furat’s small story of being shamed in her own 
house whilst watching television with her friends. The narratives suggest that an 
unhealthy relationship, devoid of trust, exists between the Sunni Muslim community in 
Dublin and Irish and international mass media outlets. Masud has the view that he lives 
within a suspect community, whose lived experience is tarnished by sensationalist 
media.
1132
 Of note is that Muslim youth are quite vocal about this stale relationship and 
are actively questioning the media’s representation of their lived reality. Representation 
is also a problematic aspect of the relationship in that there is, in the Irish context at 
least, a definite non-representation of people of “difference” within mainstream Irish 
media formats such as television and radio. Although in recent times, Ireland has 
become a plural heterogeneous society with all residents contributing taxes towards the 
production costs of state television and radio, many “different” groups lack visible 
representation, which predominantly promotes the socialised dominant identity standard 
of “Irishness”.  
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Patriarchy 
 
It has also been identified that pathological domineering power exists – to a minimum 
extent – within the private love sphere in the form of patriarchy. Using Petit’s definition 
of domination,
1133
 it is possible to state that it is common knowledge that patriarchy 
arbitrarily utilises a mixture of Islamic prescriptions and ethno-cultural traditions to 
interfere with the female capacity to participate and contribute to everyday life, thereby, 
restricting a woman’s individual freedom and range of choices with multiple social 
spheres. Such “invisible” abuse (physical and non-physical) fails Petit’s eyeball test 
because it is carried out by male familial and community actors in the private sphere 
and is creates shame by detrimentally affecting a person’s positive relation-to-self and 
sense of worth; thereby, reducing self-confidence and exasperating psychological 
difficulties and social death.
1134
 1
st
 generation female narratives confirm that such 
patriarchal domination exists within the community; but maintain that it is not 
systematic but minimally and arbitrarily conducted in rare and exceptional 
circumstances.
1135
 However, young female participants are more vocal about how such 
domination over-regulates social action within the familial and community spheres and 
is primarily acted out through pathological interaction such as FGM, forced marriages 
and “honour” killings.   
Such forms of negative domineering power, conducted and legitimised by males 
against women within the love sphere, inextricably relates to the interaction between 
Islamic identity and traditional ethno-cultural social norms. There is evidence that many 
uneducated 1
st
 generation Muslims, who come from low socio-economic backgrounds, 
retain a diluted Islamic identity that is heavily socialised by homecountry ethno-cultural 
traditions and practices. Such cultural baggage has the capacity to contain domineering 
forms of patriarchal traditional culture that commonly escapes critical assessment. 
Domineering power in the form of patriarchal pathologies are clearly equated, 
throughout the narratives, with ethno-cultural traditions; and noticeably, distanced from 
a “pure” form of normative Islamic identity that promotes closer attention to the 
prescriptions of the Islamic sources. Whilst the passing of such a homecountry identity 
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to future European generations may seem, in parental minds, as a vital form of 
constitutive power, it can conversely be perceived by educated Muslim youth in Europe 
as a form of domineering power that limits flexibility and constrains Islam from being 
applied to contextually in a productive manner by maintaining recognitive relationships 
to multidimensional spheres of interaction. Such a narrative is voiced by Saiba, who 
advocates that confidence in religious belief resides in its autonomous and rational 
practice free from domination.
1136
 Such concern is prominently reflected in the young 
female narratives. This is exemplified in Isra’s small story that recounts how she must 
hide her identity to resolve a dilemma between how she recognises her socialised 
familial norms and the interaction she conducts with her friends in the wider public 
sphere.
1137
 This interviewee also points to how young Muslim women feel excluded 
socially from participating in sport and acting classes due to the “particular” way in 
which leading family members interpret the relationship between Islam and culture.
1138
 
 Importantly, the 2
nd
 generation female narratives give a vivid insight into how 
domination is maintained via a power/knowledge linkage i.e., how patriarchy is 
maintained by the male control of Islamic jurisprudential knowledge. Such an 
intermeshing of power and knowledge excludes female agency and limits womens’ 
capacity to resist being negatively affected by a socialised mixture of Islamic and ethno-
cultural norms legitimised by males for the sake of control and privilege. The above is 
exemplified, from a young female perspective by Isra, who is critical of the patriarchal 
domineering power that controls and determines a “particular” interpretation of Islam; 
and thereby, prevents young Muslim women from participating and contributing to a 
range of social activities i.e., cultural transitional phenomena like acting and sporting 
activities and in vocalising their opinion in the public sphere against “negative” ethno-
cultural actions such as FGM. Isra stresses that she has a strong Islamic identity but that 
her struggle is essentially over the legitimate interpretation of Islam, which is controlled 
overwhelmingly by males within the familial and community spheres. Her point is that 
knowledge is power and she has come in contact with many young Muslim women, who 
are scared of the patriarchal domination over them, which is exacerbated by the lack of 
female input into the interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence. In others words, Muslim 
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women lack control over the interpretation of Islamic knowledge, which would enable 
the formation of resistive power to counter act forms of domineering patriarchal culture 
and to develop mechanisms to productively struggle against demeaning male 
pathologies and constitute themselves as productively autonomous Muslim citizens 
living within the Irish-European sphere.
1139
 
Furthermore, a number of young female discussants criticise the Muslim 
community for its overly critical, judgemental and regulatory view of female behaviour, 
which restricts transformational change and growth. There is plethora of narrative 
evidence that gender issues form an important and continuing concern for young female 
participants, particularly in relation to patriarchal power and the social pressure to 
conform to socialised norms. For example, Mahala narrates that she feels she is not 
accepted by elements within the Sunni Muslim community. She vocalises her painful 
experiences of verbal and gestural abuse due to her “different” Islamic practices and 
also for not wearing hijab.
1140
 Interviewee Daleela and young female discussants speak 
of the social pressure they have experienced within their Muslim community, where 
young Muslim women lack the flexibility “to be” within the Irish-European sphere due 
to the pressure to conform to a “particular” interpretation of Islam as well as the over-
regulation of everyday behaviours.
1141
  
 
Exclusionary Civic Stratification 
 
The third form of domineering power identified relates to the creation of unequal civic 
stratification and exclusion within the legal sphere of interaction. In other words, it is 
the state that regulates citizenship status on behalf of all citizens and, in this regard, the 
state wields domineering power over the governability of others in relation to their 
“universal” legal status. This power is negative as it has led to the stratification of 
people into different civic status groups e.g., denizens are in a less secure position than 
recognised full citizens, who have full rights and obligations within society. Using 
Petit’s definition of domination, it is possible to state that it is common knowledge that 
exclusion through the stratification of citizenship is anti-democratic in that it runs 
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counter to the all-affected principle of fairness and equal treatment.
1142
 Although 
citizenship is a necessary institution that has power over others in terms of being 
productively constitutive, the application procedures for obtaining citizenship have 
become arbitrary – especially in terms of the lengthy time-scales to process received 
applications, the informational deficit experienced by applicants, and that applications 
are solely judged at the discretion of the presiding Minister of Justice and Equality. 
Such arbitrary procedures interfere with an individual’s capacity to live a stable 
democratic life marked by full participation within and contribution to the public 
sphere. Certainly, civic stratification creates undemocratic social and political exclusion 
and limits the range of choices an individual should democratically be in a position to 
make as a legally recognised human being. The domination of civic status by 
institutions and agents of the state connects to Schuppert’s understanding of 
domineering power as imperium.
1143
 Such non-physical stratification and exclusion fails 
Petit’s eyeball test because such actions are commonly known to shame people by 
excluding them from full democratic participation. Such an uncertain status like 
denizenship detrimentally affects a person’s positive relation-to-self and sense of worth, 
thereby, reducing self-respect to see oneself as a morally responsible person capable of 
participating fully (civically, socially and politically) within the democratic public 
sphere.
1144
  
The above is supported by participant narratives, indicating that legal 
recognition has an unequal dimension in that the nation-state has used its domineering 
power over others to stratify individuals living in Ireland into a variety of civic status 
types. Such stratification can be viewed in terms of how the research participants narrate 
their experiences of long-term residency or denizenship in Ireland. The empirical 
evidence substantiates that the uncertain denizen experience differs significantly from 
the more secure citizen experience. Whilst the status of full citizenship is equated with 
mostly positive internal feelings and external reciprocity leading to confidence in 
participation and new opportunities, denizenship is viewed negatively as an insecure 
temporary residential status with limited social and political rights and obligations to 
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others and, most disturbingly, as a status that can be rescinded through the arbitrary 
discretion of the Minister-in-charge.  
Saad and Hurriyah provide narratives indicating the negativity of an uncertain 
civic status, which isolates one’s public voice and is given less credence than the 
recognition of full citizenship.
1145
 Hurriyah links such negative experiences to a sense of 
frustration in not being recognised as a human with accompanying rights and 
obligations.
1146
 Of note is that this research had difficulties convincing denizens to 
participate in the project because of the fear that any negative public statements made 
against their status position may jeopardise pending applications for full citizenship. As 
Aziz’s narrative indicates, applying for citizenship can be a long drawn-out process 
taking ten or more years, leaving individuals and family units under an insecure status 
for extremely long periods of time.
1147
 With this in mind, it is possible to determine that 
legal misrecognition does have the power to disrupt familial recognition.  
A very good example of this is Furat’s small story about how, due to a technical 
irregularity on her citizenship application, a close friend was forced to move to her 
father’s homecountry and leave the certainty of her homelife in Ireland.1148 
Furthermore, in practical terms, denizenship status also financially impedes the 
opportunity to educate oneself as university fees are high for third-country nationals. 
Adeeb’s small story illustrates how an uncertain legal status restricts sub-citizens from 
the human right to attain an education.
1149
 Freedom of travel is also restricted.  Notably 
in recent times, the Irish government has recognised the plight of such individuals and 
families by bringing in amendments to speed up the citizenship application process and 
to reduce university fees for denizens, who have lived the majority of their years in 
Ireland. Overall, the narratives vividly illustrate how denizens have less freedom and 
opportunity “to be” in Irish society due to their limited rights and obligations to others – 
a responsibility unfairly and unequally carried by fully recognised citizens. 
Paradoxically, such civic stratification has been created by the domineering power of a 
“democratic” nation-state that views “universal” legal citizenship as applicable to select 
individuals and disregards the democratic all-affected principle, which expresses the 
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normative viewpoint that all humans a bounded state – who fulfil the minimum level of 
transparent criteria – should be recognised equally as having reciprocal rights and 
obligations to other individuals.  
Interestingly, just as denizenship status came under sustained narrative criticism, 
the status of full citizenship itself was also heavily reprimanded by Muslim individuals, 
who have managed to obtain such a status. Despite the positive comments about 
reciprocal legal recognition, the narratives suggest that such a status is commonly 
viewed as to abstract, therefore, inherently weak when applied to the practicalities of 
interaction in everyday life. In other words, although it is important to be recognised 
“universally” as a human being with the same rights and obligations to others, such a 
status remains imperceptible when interacting with everyday people in society. For 
minority groups, this is acutely problematic in that full legal recognition is deemed to 
have more value as a procedural formality to be utilised when communicating within 
state services than as an everyday practical status in which people can be acknowledged 
for their “universal” human value.  
A variety of narratives, particularly from female participants, emphasise how 
“particular” traits take precedence over the “universal” value of being a human citizen 
in everyday interaction with others. Such narratives highlight the dialectical tension that 
exists between abstract “universal” legal recognition and the societal recognition of 
traits-abilities-achievements. Without doubt, the nation-state’s power over the 
institution of citizenship has warped its fundamental essence by connecting it to 
“particular” ethno-cultural and nationalistic conceptions of identity. By submerging 
human “universalism” beneath more visible “particular” traits, a dominant identity 
standard is forged that defines and legitimises the socialised norms of what constitutes 
“Irishness”. The result of this is that instead of an individual being recognised as an 
equal citizen “universally” to others in practical everyday life, minority groups suffer 
prejudice as second-class citizens because their “particular” traits differ from the 
dominant “Irish” identity standard. This is exemplified in the narratives around the 
prejudice of first impressions, which exemplifies how Muslims, particularly females, 
consistently feel that their “particular” traits are judged negatively before any 
acknowledgement and acceptance of their status as full citizens. In power terms, it can 
be stated that legal recognition is too abstract to wield effective use within everyday 
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realms of interaction that is continuously eclipsed by the recognition of what makes 
people “particular” to each other. To put this complex notion another way, one can say 
that a dominant identity – formed by immersing universal “sameness” under a range of 
“particular” traits – has oppressive tyranny over minorities, who despite being conferred 
as citizens differ from the “particular” traits deemed to form the essential components of 
“Irishness”. Narrative evidence substantiates this viewpoint. A clear example is Furat’s 
small story about her workplace, particularly the experience of having a ‘constant 
background fear’ that her “particular” foreignness is a deprivation in relation to 
interacting with co-workers, who hold dominant traits deemed to be closer to the 
identity standard of what legitimately constitutes “being Irish”.1150 Even though she is 
an Irish citizen, in such occupational situations, Furat feels that she does not have the 
power to openly criticise the “wrongful” actions of others because ‘that person is the 
Irish person, I'm the Muslim, you know, the foreigner’.1151 
 
9.2.2 Constitutive Power 
 
Whilst power over others can be domineering, as Foucault famously realised and 
expounded,
1152
 such power can also be constitutive i.e., it can shape, maintain and be 
productive for action and identity. This section will use narrative evidence to concisely 
explore two forms of constitutive power relating firstly to the state’s regulative power 
over citizenship; and secondly, in relation to intergenerational productive power 
wielded within the family and community spheres that is closely associated with 
spiritual recognition.  
 
Shaping the “good citizen”  
 
As stated above, whilst the state’s regulatory control over citizenship can be 
domineering, its overall power in this arena is predominantly constitutive by being 
productive of identity in that state bureaucratic administration moves and transforms 
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sub-citizens into fully recognised citizens with equal rights and obligations to others. In 
other words, the state has the constitutive and productive capacity to transfer and shape 
people from one civic status to another - from asylum seeker to denizen then to a “good 
citizen”. Such transformations are facilitated overtime by the regulation of action and 
identity whilst the eligibility to move from one status to another is commonly verified 
by citizenship tests and ceremonies, which determine whether an individual has reached 
the official standard of the “good citizen”. Of note is that uncivil actions by sub-citizens, 
even small missteps such as accumulating driver penalty points, can detrimentally affect 
whether one is recognised by the state as a morally responsible person. On a more 
positive note, such status movement shapes and moulds an individual’s identity and is 
constitutive in that it confers stronger recognition and enables socialised people to 
practise stronger forms of individualised and/or collective productive action within 
society.  
A good example of this within the narratives emanates from Abdul, who as a 
denizen, confined his social interaction to the bounded space of his local Muslim 
community and associated mosque in Dublin. However, on being conferred by the state 
with full citizen rights and obligations to others, he felt more confident to interact within 
the wider social sphere.
1153
 This example is pivotal to understanding how the regulation 
and conferral of citizenship status by the state can be both negatively domineering yet 
also positively constitutive and productive of action and identity.  
 
Shaping the “good Muslim”  
 
Another form of constitutive power identified by the narratives relates to 
intergenerational interaction within the familial sphere, particularly in relation to 
promoting spiritual recognition and shaping the “good Muslim”. This form of power is 
closely linked to the socialisation literature within the sociology of religion, which 
examines how people are raised with the expectation of continuing various actions and 
identities that have become legitimised within the familial and communal spheres. 
Although such norms can be domineering, they can also be a positive aspect of identity 
formation. For example, within the 1
st
 generation female discussion group, the 
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discussants view their role within the family as positively productive in that they feel 
that they have the constitutive power to construct the private familial environment and 
also to manage how the next generation interpret and practise Islam within the Irish-
European environment. Of note are narratives of older female research participants, who 
in their dual roles as wives and mothers continuously stress that they wield productive 
and constitutive power within the familial structure. This power comes in the form of 
communicative action to construct and maintain the identities of other familial members 
and is perceived to be the “real” constitutive power to construct and regulate how 
familial members relate to their multiple identities. For example, Ayan views herself as 
the ‘dynamo of the family’.1154 In another example, discussant Dahlia narrates how she 
gives advice to her children and can see how the youth are working together to carve out 
an Islamic identity, which is specific to the Irish context. She describes her power as 
positively influencing her son to unlock a new European Islamic identity.
1155
 
 It terms of who wields constitutive power, it is commonly thought that parental 
influence holds sway over the actions and identities of upcoming generations. In other 
words, the 1
st
 generation – as parental authorities – hold sway over the reins of 
socialising power that can be domineering and/or productively constitutive. However, 
there is ample narrative evidence that as dependency ebbs and the youth evolve, through 
time into independent beings, they develop the capacity to intersubjectively influence 
the identities of their elders and parental figures, particularly in relation to the 
development of a new interpretation and practise of Islam within the Irish and broader 
European context. In other words, both generations – in certain contexts – influence 
each other in terms of identity construction and behavioural expectations. From a youth 
perspective, the twins – Isha and Fusaila – see their agentic constitutive power as having 
a very strong influence on their parents and even on the broader Muslim community. 
They perceive that they have been able to change how their parents interpret and act out 
an Islamic identity in an Irish environment.
1156
 Similarly, Nurdeen also relates how he 
and his siblings have influenced their mother and his wife to filter-out homecountry 
cultural baggage and return to a “purer” form of Islam.1157 Such narratives convey the 
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crucial point that although the 1
st
 generation generally retains the reins of socialising 
power – in contexts of greater independence – it is confirmed that both generations 
mutually influence each other in terms of identity construction and maintenance.  
 Noticeably, much of the constitutive power exchanged between the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 
generations relates to spiritual recognition and how to shape the other and oneself into 
the “good Muslim”. Although such a transcendental form of recognition can be an 
institutionally domineering form of power over individuals, within this research study, 
the research participants overwhelmingly view their individual expression of spirituality 
as positively constitutive in that it acts as a coping mechanism to deal with the 
complexity and hurt of everyday intersubjective interaction. From a secular viewpoint, 
the narrative evidence suggests that such esoteric recognition – referred to as a 
‘referential instinct’ – can be associated with the Winnicottian concept of transitional 
phenomena.
1158
 It constitutes a potential space that is creative and playful in that it has 
an illusionary aspect that enables people to suspend their belief.  
Furthermore, such an abstract sphere can also be seen in a Blochian sense as an 
act of recognition, which enables individuals to transcend the uncertainty and darkness 
of the lived moment inherent within intersubjective relations and look towards the hope 
of a utopian “Not-Yet”.1159 Such an intermediate arena creates a bridge between an 
individual’s inner and outer existence and links a range of binaries such as inner/outer, 
internal/external and subject/object.  
Vitally, individual and collective recognition to God must be separated from 
recognition to man-made religious institutions. Over the centuries, a variety of secular 
academics have viewed religion as an ideological concept that capacitates religious 
institutions to dominate and sustain power over a populace by controlling theological 
interpretation. Contra to the above and in line with the sociology of religion literature, 
the narratives within this study confirm that spirituality – in its individualised form – 
has a beneficial constitutive affect on a person’s relation-to-self and acts as a comfort 
against the misrecognition suffered through the darkness of everyday life. Just as a child 
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receives comfort from a variety of transitional objects such as a blanket or teddy bear, 
adults also receive comfort within the expanse of various cultural obsessional practices 
– or little madnesses – such as religion, art, sport and science.1160 The participant 
narratives illustrate cogently that such an intermediate potential space enables 
individuals to have positive feelings and emotions such as comfort, happiness, relief, 
and satisfaction. In other words, it is the antithesis of everyday life in that it is a sphere 
devoid of struggle, hurt and hardship.  
The connection between spiritual recognition to God and Winnicottian 
transitional phenomena is supported by a plethora of narratives that refer to how 
recognition to an abstract object can bring relief from everyday struggles and pressures 
in which humans misrecognise and judge each other. In other words, internalised 
struggles related to the complex external arena of everyday life can be reflected upon 
and released by individuals when recognising an abstract spiritual entity. Similar 
mediations occur also through meditative practices such as mindfulness and counselling 
like psychoanalytic talk therapy. In terms of narrative examples, Yusuf refers to how 
recognition to God through prayer can act as a human coping mechanism in which 
physical and psychological tension can be released towards a deity, who is perceived as 
the all-powerful creator of everything and the ultimate controller of judgement.
1161
 
Although everyday problems can be ‘let go’ through the recognitive act of prayer, the 
narrative evidence also indicates that individuals obtain strength and power from their 
spiritual acts of recognition that can then be redirected back into aiding one’s interaction 
to everyday spheres of life – whether that be in the love, legal or wider societal arenas. 
Such a form of empowerment can be equated to recharging a battery. Not only does 
spiritual recognition give a purpose-in-life but it can act as an empowering mechanism 
against forms of misrecognition within everyday life. For example, Ayan states that her 
individual recognition to God makes her ‘strong’ so that she feels that she can ‘fight’ 
and ‘do anything’.1162 Interestingly, she views her matriarchal power as created by and 
sourced from God. In similarity to each other, Dahlia, Sadiyya and Azaan, all view their 
spiritual recognition to God as tempering various negative psychological feelings and 
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emotions such as depression and homesickness.
1163
 In this regard, their acts of 
recognition give them a positive mental attitude, which can then be utilised to cope with 
complex spheres of interaction in which forms of misrecognition persist to varying 
degrees. Generally stated, when upset by oneself or others within a particular sphere of 
interaction, adherents can enter the solitude of the spiritual reflect upon their lives, 
recharge their spirit and then confidently return to the complexity of intersubjective 
everyday interaction.  
 
9.2.3 Resistive Power  
 
As stated above, power over others can take a domineering or a constitutive form and 
deeply influences an individual’s actions and identity, which need recognition but 
remain firmly positioned within varying and competing power relations. This section 
explores how agentic resistance manifests itself, particularly in relation to the 
recognition of authority. Such individual and collective bottom-up power is called 
resistive power.
1164
 This form of power is linked to 2
nd
 generation integration processes 
in which, to avoid total assimilation (involving the loss of one’s prime identity) and 
isolation (which involves the over-protection on one’s prime identity), young Sunni 
Muslim individuals have developed an alternative way “to be” within Irish society, 
commonly referred to as integration without dilution. Such a balanced integration 
strategy maintains an Islamic identity as well as positive recognitive relations to a 
variety of social spheres. However, it also implies that distinct social norms that 
emanate from the private and public arenas must be resisted by returning to the 
“correct” teachings of the Islamic sources, and at the same time, filtrate “negative” 
                                                 
1163
 See fns., 675, 679 and 691.  
1164
 Critical theorist and feminist Amy Allen has also outlined a Foucauldian understanding of 
power as power-over others in terms of being domineering and/or constitutive plus bottom-up 
individual power-to and collective power-with others to agentically resist from within relations 
of power. See Allen, A. 1999. The Power of Feminist Theory: Domination, Resistance, 
Solidarity. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. It must also be noted that Honneth has actively 
engaged with Allen’s views of on the complexity of power relations. See Honneth, A., Allen, 
A., and Cooke, M. 2010. A Conversation between Axel Honneth, Amy Allen and Maeve 
Cooke, Frankfurt-am-Main, 12 April 2010. Journal of Power. 3(2), pp. 153-170.  
 
 
 
 
231 
 
forms of Irish and homecountry ethno-cultural norms that go against the normative 
tenets of Islam. 
 
Resisting familial and community norms 
 
For the 2
nd
 generation youth to find a space as Muslims within the Irish-European 
sphere, they must strategically resist particular social norms that emanate from the 
private sphere of the family and the Muslim community. The empirical narratives verify 
that the young research participants view their Islamic identity as the most salient 
identity, however, complications arise by the fact that there are many divergent forms of 
Islam that are practised by a plethora of ethno-national groups within the boundary of 
the Irish state. Such diversity creates complexity but it also, through intersubjective 
interaction, enables educated Muslim youth to identify everyday practices that are a mix 
of ethno-cultural and Islamic culture.  
Furthermore, unlike the 1
st
 generation, who in the past held tightly to forms of 
“ethno-cultural” Islam leading to tense power struggles within the community, the youth 
view such variations as an impediment to internal and external cohesion. They wish to 
find an Islam that will provide a common-ground in which all Muslim youth, 
irrespective of ethnic or national background, can actively participate. In reaction to the 
1
st
 generations’ “traditional” Islam, the 2nd generation have begun to search for the 
normative ideal of Islam i.e., to practise Islam as it ought to be practised with specific 
reference to the Islamic sources – the Qur’an and the Sunna. This “universalised” Islam 
is constantly referred to within the narratives as the “pure” or “real” form of Islam – that 
is filtered of all “negative” ethno-cultural and nationalistic components. In this regard, 
the youth narratives illustrate the “negative” affect of culture and the growing trend 
amongst young Muslims to filter-out what is perceived to be in opposition to normative 
Islam in order to reach a (perceived to be) “purer” form of Islamic identity that 
facilitates and enables recognition to and from multiple spheres of interaction.  
Such an identity movement is an alternative way of integrating into wider arenas 
of Irish society whilst still maintaining and strengthening one’s connections to faith and 
religious community. In other words, it enables integration without total assimilation or 
isolation.  This strategy is referred to by the research participants as ‘integration without 
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dilution’. Such a return to a “purer” form of Islam enables Muslim youth to integrate 
into Irish society as Muslim citizens, who are struggling to be recognised as contributors 
to the value-horizon of society yet also maintain and strengthen the Islamic bond 
between familial and community members. Such a process involves identifying familial 
and community social norms, which go against what is perceived to be the normative 
tenets of Islam and which create impediments to interacting with the wider legal and 
social spheres. This study has identified that 2
nd
 generation Sunni Muslim individuals 
are promoting such an identity movement and are actively passing this new identity to 
upcoming Muslim youth. Of note is that this intragenerational influence is particularly 
related to the deconstruction of socialised identities alongside the formation and 
maintenance of what is deemed to be a revitalised Islamic identity that places greater 
emphasis on the Islamic sources and on the deep civic and democratic examples within 
Islamic teachings, particularly in relation to the Sunna, which is comprised of numerous 
stories (hadith) of how the Prophet Mohammad (PHUH) lived his life within the 
multicultural and multireligious context of Medina.     
 The processes outlined above are deeply fastened to the need for recognition, 
which resides under the umbrella of complex power relations. It is argued that such an 
identity movement is a form of resistive power against pathological social norms within 
the family and Muslim community, which impede holistic social interaction. Such 
social pathologies include the practise of FGM, marital abuse, forced marriages, 
“honour” killings, or the compulsory wearing of a specifically coloured headscarf or 
garment. Corresponding to McBride’s work,1165 such agentic resistance against 
domineering and constitutive top-down power – detrimentally governed by everyday 
pathological social norms – can be connected to the recognitive struggle over authority 
that legitimises what is deemed to be “normal” conduct for everyday people. This is 
very much visible through the narratives of female research participants, who vocalise 
how they are slowly yet actively resist powers over them within the private love sphere 
and within their Muslim communities. More specifically, there is evidence that Muslim 
youth, particularly well-educated Muslim women, are beginning to redirect their 
recognition away from local authority figures (family members, local Imams and 
scholars) and are actively using a “new” interpretation of Islam to counteract male 
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patriarchal domination and parental constitutive power. This involves redirecting one’s 
recognition to authorities and publics that utilise a counter-interpretation of the Islamic 
sources that advocate against forms of domineering and constitutive power, which 
impedes holistic social interaction to various spheres of life. However, the male 
interpretative control over Islamic jurisprudence makes such struggles a slow and 
difficult process for women, especially for those who are less-educated and remain 
socially isolated.  
 The narrative evidence shows how such transformations, facilitated by the rise 
of online fatwa markets, are being actively discussed and debated by Muslim youth. As 
exemplified by the 2
nd
 generation female discussion group, such youth are debating 
between themselves whether Islamic jurisprudence and interpretation remains statically 
fixed-in-time or whether it progresses-through-time in a manner that is cognisant of 
context.
1166
 It is at this point that Tariq Ramadan’s work in relation to the reformation of 
Islamic jurisprudence comes to the fore, particularly in relation to the concept of ijtihad 
(critical reasoning), which enables trained (male) scholars to produce fatawa (Islamic 
rulings) that are more cognisant of context, thereby, facilitating a greater degree of 
flexibility in how Islam is interpreted and acted out in a post-traditional modern 
society.
1167
 Essentially, the slow reinstatement of this contested concept enables young 
Muslims to feel that their Islam is not a controlled ideology that has domineering power 
over them, but instead is positively constitutive, in terms of being respectful of 
individual and collective autonomy, which empowers the youth to enter fatwa markets 
and use their free rational choice to select verified rulings that suit their specific lives as 
contextually lived. Thus, the digital age of the internet has ushered in a new era in 
which young Muslims are less dependent on family figures and local religious 
authorities (imams and scholars) to direct them onto the “right” path to practicing Islam. 
Today, Islamic websites collate indexes of rulings from all over the world on specific 
topics, which can then be adopted by Muslim youth depending on whether such rulings 
suit their contextualised recognitive needs. To a certain extent, young Muslims in 
Europe are searching the surface and deep levels of the internet for fatawa that will 
provide flexibility. However, such research can end in disappointment as Saiba’s search 
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illustrates when she tried to resolve the issue of handshaking.
1168
 Of note is that 
although such reforms are slow-in-coming, they show how change, however 
incremental, to the interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence facilitates how Muslim 
individuals act out their Islamic identities within the European context. Be that as it 
may, as Tariq Ramadan has critically acknowledged about Islamic jurisprudence today, 
the majority of Muslim scholars, based predominantly in the Muslim world, cannot 
adequately facilitate the lives of an ever-expanding population of European Muslim 
youth because they lack comprehensive knowledge of their contextual environment.
1169
 
With the above in mind, the continuation of such reforms must be struggled for by the 
Muslim grassroots in Europe in parallel to nation-states doing much more to promote 
the education of Islamic scholars, who are open to the concept of ijtihad and can provide 
flexibility to the growing population of Muslim youth throughout Europe 
To concisely summarise the above, it is argued that the identity transformation, 
identified within this research project, is an agentic form of resistance to familial and 
community norms in that the move to a “real” Islam is beneficial for young 2nd 
generation Muslims as it enables them to achieve a perceived “higher” recognition to 
God, better recognition and power within the familial sphere, the retaining of 
community recognition by creating a common-ground between Muslim youth, who 
come from a variety of ethno-cultural and nationalistic traditions, and lastly, it also 
enables the youth to identify the civically constitutive elements embedded within Islam 
that facilitates participation within the European democratic sphere.  
Overall, such resistive power conducted through an identity movement enables 
Muslim youth to use the Islamic sources to produce and constitute an Islamic identity 
that correlates positively to the everyday Irish-European context. Furthermore, by 
returning to what is perceived to be the normative condition of their religion i.e., Islam 
as it should be interpreted and practised Muslim youth have gained an interpretative 
resistive power to counteract and struggle against the historical intertwining of 
“negative” ethno-cultural traditions and Islamic values – a conflation that matured 
within the homecountry environment and arrived in Europe through the mental and 
physical cultural baggage of the 1
st
 generation. Such a deformed interaction between 
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culture and Islam established domineering power over others, which thereby that 
legitimized and enforced patriarchal acts within spheres of everyday life such as FGM, 
marital abuse, forced marriages, “honour” killings, or the compulsory wearing of a 
specifically coloured headscarf or garment. By disrupting this fusion, Muslim youth are 
using their individual interpretive and collective resistive power to productively resolve 
a variety of social dilemmas by constituting a “universalised” form of Islamic identity 
that aligns agreeably with civically-attuned normative behaviour.  
 
Resisting societal norms 
 
As represented above, the 2
nd
 generation are resisting a variety of familial and Islamic 
community social norms that do not co-ordinate with a “pure” form of Islamic identity 
nor enable flexibility “to be” oneself in the wider public sphere. Aligned to this is 
resistance to societal norms, particularly the dominant identity standard of what 
constitutes “Irishness”, which inhibits the recognition and performance of a positively 
contributive Islamic identity. Throughout the empirical chapters, there is narrative 
evidence to suggest that resistive agency emanates from within top-down domineering 
and constitutive power relations.  
For example, the narratives indicate that research participants, particularly 
young females, have gained resistive power by reasoning, reinterpreting and reflecting 
upon the relationship that exists between norms transacted between their Islamic and 
ethno-cultural cultural identities within the European context. Of note is that such 
individual forms of resistance do not occur in isolation, but manifest in solidarity with 
others. In this regard, it can be stated that Sunni Muslim youth in Dublin have 
agentically used their Islamic solidarity to each other to find a position for themselves 
within wider society as Irish Muslims. By interacting with others, educated Muslim 
youth have come to acknowledge the difference between homecountry ethno-cultural 
traditions (commonly viewed as Islamic by the immigrant 1
st
 generation) and the 
normative practise of a “pure” Islam that is filtered of “negative” socially traditional 
norms that originate from either Ireland or the homecountry culture. In turn, Muslim 
youth are emphasising an Islamic identity that is civic and enables Muslims to 
participate and contribute to the value-horizon of society. This defiance leads to a de-
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emphasising of ethno-cultural and nationalistic aspects of identity whilst stressing the 
link and interaction between Islamic and civic components. In other words, young 
Muslims are not trying to assimilate to the dominant conception of “Irishness” but are 
making concerted efforts to develop – as Pędziwiatr calls it – a Muslim civicness1170 i.e., 
an identity that is based around the normativity of Islamic identity and participatory 
citizenship that challenges securitised notions of Islam as terroristic and Muslims as 
suspect. 
Within the narratives, there is evidence that young Muslims do view Ireland 
positively and have developed a unique “Irish” identity. In contrast to the dominant 
identity standard of “Irishness”, which is overly nationalistic and rooted in ethno-
cultural traditions, young Muslims have constructed a new form of “Irishness” that 
relies on the civic component of citizenship. In other words, many of these youth lack 
the possibility of being “Irish” in its prevailing form, which is related to being Christian, 
Caucasian, and ethnically “Irish”; so alternatively, such “different Irish” are actively 
promoting a new conception of “Irishness” that falls back on the civic component of 
citizenship i.e., they see themselves firstly as Muslims, who are citizens of Ireland. This 
is where the promotion of an Islamic-civic identity becomes fruitful in gaining 
recognition from the wider societal sphere.  
With regard to the development of an Islamic-civic identity, the narrative data 
has shown that Islamic identity is the most salient identification amongst the research 
participants. It is the core foundational identity, which acts like a prism through which 
the research participants view and enact other identities. It can be argued therefore that 
all other identities revolve around and are regulated by this prime religio-moral identity. 
An example of this relates to civic identity, which is perceived as an element inside or 
as emanating from Islamic teaching and practice. This new elaboration – an Islamic-
civic identity – is agentically operationalised by educated Muslim youth to resist and 
counteract forms of identity that do not create a facilitating environment to resolve 
dilemmas between the recognition and power of social norms and the ability “to be 
oneself” in everyday life and interaction. Once again, in line with McBride’s focus on 
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the recognition of authority,
1171
 such resistance is closely related to the recognitively 
redirecting legitimacy from traditional authorities to a plurality of decentered counter-
authorities that stress how Islam has a civic component that can be utilised within a 
European democratic sphere. This is conducted by the process of filtering “negative” 
cultural baggage and searching for a “pure” form of Islam that heeds to the Islamic 
sources and has the capacity to extract civic principles from an interpretation of such 
primary sources.   
The most illuminating examples of an Islamic-civic identity emanates from 
female research participants, particularly the Muslim civic group within the 1
st
 
generation female discussion group, who place a strong emphasis on their Islamic-civic 
identity to convey to others in their local Dublin district that Muslim women can use 
their individual and collective agency to contribute positively to their locality.
1172
 This 
is narrative evidence to show that Muslim women are using positive power, which 
emanates from their legal recognition as full citizens, to individually empower, resist 
and change socialised norms and skewed perceptions of female Muslims.  
Of note is that such struggles outlined above are inextricably linked to the need 
to be positively recognised as an individual – who whilst the “same” yet “different” to 
others – can positively participate and contribute to the value-horizon of society. 
However, to do this, one must resist the dominance of socialised norms and associated 
pathologies that go against meritocratic democracy in which people are recognised 
equally as citizens and given the equal chance to be recognised for their “particular” 
traits-abilities-achievements. For example, research participants – particularly females – 
recount their various experiences of the prejudice of first impressions,
1173
 which relates 
to the pathological action of misrecognising visible surface-level traits before any 
acknowledgment of a person’s unique abilities, which lie under-the-surface. Although 
the narratives provide a spectrum of socially denigrating experiences, it must be 
acknowledged that the research participants do not passively accept such disrespect and 
forms of domineering power. The narrative evidence shows that individuals use their 
resistive power to counteract discrimination and regain recognition and a positive 
relation-to-self. Small stories by Aamil and Isra highlight how Muslims have taken 
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agentic action to counteract discrimination (whether that is related to Islamophobia, 
racism or sexism), thereby, reclaiming recognition and boosting their sense of self-
worth.
1174
 
Continuing on a positive tone, there is a general perception amongst the research 
participants that Irish society is progressing towards a more meritocratic society in 
which traits are respected, yet overall, abilities and associated achievements are the 
merits that should be normatively recognised and valued as contributing to the value-
horizon of society. Such a view outlines an understanding of social justice as related to 
the equal chance to be recognised for one’s abilities and achievements ahead of how 
one’s surface-level traits differ from legitimised societal norms and dominant identity 
standards. Whilst past cultural configurations of Irish society placed a high value on the 
recognition of “particular” traits that conformed to the socialised norms and identity 
standards prevailing in society, today, a more modern pluralistic Ireland is progressing 
towards a more democratic and meritocratic assessment of people’s “difference”, in 
which abilities and achievements are gaining more traction in terms of what should be 
ethically recognised in terms of how we judge the “particularity” of other citizens in a 
post-traditional society.   
The empirical narratives identify cultural transitional phenomena as the 
interactive microspheres in which meritocratic ability and achievement gain recognitive 
primacy over the pathological misrecognition of surface-level traits, which differ from 
the dominant social norms and identity standard of society. Worth mentioning are two 
narrative examples related to art and sport, respectively.
1175
  
First is Isha and Fusaila’s small story about attending an art exhibition. Then 
twins recount how upon entering an exhibition at an art gallery, they felt the prejudice 
of first impressions as their headscarves identified them as Muslim.
1176
 This created an 
initial awkwardness. However through basic communication, the sisters gained mutual 
recognition as artists from other likeminded people. In the past, although both twins 
have suffered various forms of pathological misrecognition within Irish society due to 
their “differing” skin colour, religion and/or ethnicity;1177 both verify that they feel 
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recognised by others through artistic transitional phenomena that provide an interactive 
common-ground. Within such a playful potential space, an interest and ability in art is 
recognised by the artistic community as beneficial and contributory.  
The second example relates to the narratives of Masud, who is a highly-skilled 
soccer player. He narrates that, although his identity “differs” from those he plays with, 
it is his ability that is recognised and respected on the pitch.
1178
 The playful space of 
soccer enables Masud’s ability to supersede his “particular” traits that diverge from the 
dominant identity standard of what constitutes “Irishness”. For this discussant, his traits 
always have relevance in such situations, but in a positive way, in that spectators of the 
soccer game get the opportunity to see a Muslim man, who has specialised athletic 
abilities that contribute positively to local and national communities.
1179
  
Furthermore, he contrasts the recognition of his abilities on-the-pitch to the 
everyday discrimination he has experienced against his visible traits within socio-
economically deprived areas of Dublin. In these situations, his visible traits are 
misrecognised whilst his unique abilities remain obscured and go unacknowledged.
1180
 
Within these two examples, the transitional phenomena of art and sport – work is a 
similar microsphere – have been identified as the common cultural arenas in which 
individuals, who are the “same” legally yet “different” in terms of surface-level traits, 
can mutually play together within a meritocratic microsphere with the equal chance of 
having their underlying skills and associated achievements recognised valued 
perceptions of others.  
 
9.3 Resolving Recognitive-Power Dilemmas 
 
This section will concisely summarise the pinnacle point that can be taken from what 
has preceded. Recognition is an intrinsic part of the human condition that can be defined 
as a basic need, which implies that individuals and collectives struggle to be recognised 
by others within multiple spheres of everyday life. However as the narrative evidence 
illustrates, recognitive relations always take place within a complex array of power 
dynamics that can be domineering and/or constitutive. In this regard, the interaction 
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between recognition and power has a deep affect on individuals and the possibility of 
attaining recognition and positive relation-to-self. To attain such ethical 
acknowledgement, individuals must negotiate the complex powers that reside within 
each sphere of everyday life that have the authority to legitimate social norms 
determining standards of “normal” action and identity. Such a complex interaction leads 
to social dilemmas in how one can be recognised as “true-to-oneself” within multiple 
spheres of life that are controlled and regulated by a variety of authoritarian powers 
propagating differential norms, actions and identities.   
Such everyday complexity is the pinnacle sociological finding made visible by 
this study and the term recognitive-power dilemmas is a terminological product of the 
research that has been coined to describe the interweaving of recognition and power 
dynamics, which generate everyday dilemmatic situations between varying (sometimes 
competing) norms, actions and identities. To “be oneself” and live an autonomous free 
life as human, the narrative evidence suggests that Sunni Muslim individuals in Dublin 
are striving to resolve recognitive-power dilemmas in order to find a positive 
recognition balance between familial, communal, legal and wider social spheres of 
interaction. To do this, agentic forms of bottom-up resistive power must be utilised to 
struggle – individually and collectively – against domineering and constitutive 
authoritative powers that legitimise a network of social norms, actions and identities 
that are perceived as either pathological or as impediments to the goal of attaining 
holistic social interaction, involving the recognition of one’s “being-in-context”.   
The next chapter – Chapter 10 – concludes the thesis by summarising the main 
findings, assessing how this study contributes to the existing literature, determining the 
research project’s influence on local policy, and recommending avenues for future 
research to pursue.  
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Chapter 10                           Conclusion 
 
To conclude, this section will firstly summarise the main findings, then it will determine 
how this research project contributes to the existing academic literature in relation to the 
experiences of Sunni Muslim individuals in Dublin. This will lead to an outline of how 
the research may prove to have influence and impact upon local policy-makers; lastly, 
recommendations for future research will be concisely listed. The thesis will end as it 
started with a reflective quote from Axel Honneth.  
 
10.1 The Research Findings 
 
In terms of the main findings, this qualitative study utilising grassroot narratives and 
framed by Axel Honneth’s multidimensional modes of recognition (love, legal respect 
and social esteem) demonstrates the complexity of recognition relations by making 
visible a deeper understanding of the experiences of Sunni Muslim individuals in 
Dublin, who utilise the language of recognition to convey their everyday struggles 
within various social spheres.  
The use of everyday narratives within this study actively challenges specific 
academic accounts of Muslim existence within the Irish-European context. Firstly, the 
empirical narratives within this study challenge the standard Taylorian communitarian 
view that assumes religious minority groups simply seek to have their culture and 
associated beliefs positively endorsed by the majority. In contrast to such a position, 
everyday narratives convey how intersubjectivity is pivotal for all human beings, who 
strive to be recognised as the “same” – in terms of being fully recognised as legal 
citizens endowed with “universal” rights and obligations to others – yet also as 
“different” to others – in terms of having one’s meritocratic underlying abilities and 
associated achievements recognised as contributing positively to the generalised value-
horizon of society. In other words, there is a need to be seen “universally” as human and 
to be recognised for one’s meritocratic “particularity”.  
Secondly, the everyday narratives also challenge the security paradigm espoused 
within academia and by media institutions, which too narrowly views Muslims in 
Europe through the lens of political extremism. Unlike other studies that rely on 
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“expert” or elite opinion, this study’s focus on grassroot multidimensional narratives 
provides a voice and holistic understanding of Sunni Muslim experiences as lived 
within the Irish-European context. Such an approach is broader yet it gives a more 
nuanced perspective of recognitive experiences within the multiple social spheres that 
rail against and disrupt securitised notions of Islam as terroristic and Muslims as 
suspect. Such a narrow securitised perspective, which associates Islamic terrorism and 
youth radicalisation to generally cover whole Islamic communities, is an injustice to the 
positively productive and contributory lived reality voiced by the research participants 
within this grounded study.   
Such a multidimensional perspective – focusing on interactions within the love, 
legal and wider societal spheres – enables a deeper understanding of the complexity of 
everyday life. In regard to the above, this study provided a space for research 
participants to vocalise their perceptions of misrecognition and thus identify social 
pathologies that run counter to being positively recognised as a participatory citizen and 
contributory individual. It can be stated that forms of disrespect and misrecognition 
permeate multiple social spheres to varying degrees. The research participants, 
particularly through the use of small stories, verify that misrecognition does negatively 
affect an individual’s relation-to-self leading to a struggle to regain recognition and a 
positive relation-to-self. Such a process can vary and involve violent or non-violent 
action. Such insights make visible the linkage between misrecognition and power. This 
study has identified three forms of power:  
 
 domineering power in terms of public discrimination in the wider societal 
sphere; patriarchy in the familial and community sphere; and exclusionary 
civic stratification within the legal sphere.  
 
 constitutive power in terms of the regulatory process of productively shaping 
the ‘good citizen’ within the legal sphere by undemocratically 
institutionalising civic stratification. As well as the intergenerational 
dynamic of shaping the ‘good Muslim’ within the familial and community 
spheres by regulating the “correct” way to conduct one’s spiritual 
recognition to an abstract transitional phenomena.  
 
 Lastly, resistive power against specific socialised norms and identities 
developed by legitimised traditional authorities within the family, 
community and wider social spheres. Of note is that such bottom-up power 
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emanates from within domineering or constitutive forms of top-down power 
as described above.    
 
With the above in mind, it becomes apparent that recognition and power intertwine in a 
complex fashion. The research shows conclusively that individuals (and groups) need 
and strive for positive recognition from others in everyday life yet they must also 
negotiate the powers that reside within each sphere of interaction. Complicating things 
further is that diverse forms of powers – alongside their legitimised social norms and 
identities – may also compete with similar dynamics within a sphere or externally in 
other spheres of interaction. Such complexity creates dilemmas for individuals, who 
interactively strive to gain positive recognition from various everyday spheres of life. 
This is particularly true for individuals, who “differ” from what is deemed to be 
“normal” within a particular sphere of interaction.   
The most compelling sociological finding emanating from this study relates to 
resistive power, particularly in relation to how the 2
nd
 generation utilise individual and 
collective agency to resist domineering social pathologies and forms of constitutive 
power, which thereby creates space to enact a new Muslim identity that corresponds 
positively to various intersubjective social spheres within the Irish-European context. It 
was identified that there is an on-going identity transformation taking place within the 
Sunni Muslim community in Dublin. This identity movement relates to research 
participants – predominantly 2nd generation – who are actively attempting to return to a 
“purer” form of Islamic identity by filtering-out perceived “negative” forms of ethno-
cultural tradition that are viewed as distorting the “correct” practise of Islam and 
spiritual recognition to God. Such an identity transition relates to recognition in that this 
process is a way to resolve recognition dilemmas that manifest in a variety of social 
contexts. In line with McBride’s linking of recognition and authority, it is a form of 
resistive power in that young Muslims must agentically resist and struggle against 
inflexible social norms and static identities within the love and wider societal spheres by 
bypassing traditional authority figures and redirect their legitimating recognition to a 
plurality of decentered alternative authorities. Advanced media technology facilitates 
such resistance and enables young Muslims to contest the inflexible social norms and 
rigid socialised traditional identities that formulate what it is to be a ‘good citizen’ or a 
‘good Muslim’.  
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By returning to the “real” Islam, such individuals are strengthening their 
recognition to God; enhancing and creating a common-ground to their Islamic family, 
friends and community but also using a deep civic meaning interpreted from Islam to 
gain recognition as active Muslim citizens, who can positively contribute to Irish 
society. This identity transformation helps such individuals avoid total assimilation and 
isolation by enabling the creation of a balanced integration strategy – referred to as 
integration without dilution. This alternative form of integration strategy helps Muslims 
interact within the Irish-European context but with the benefit of maintaining and 
strengthening their core foundational Islamic identity. It does so by placing more 
emphasis on an Islamic-civic identity than a religious identity that accentuates a strong 
link to ethno-cultural or nationalist tendencies. This is a substantial finding as it 
illustrates how recognition, power and identity intersect within everyday life and 
verifies that humans are not static entities but remain dynamic – fluid beings– in 
constant forms of transformation due to the intersubjective interaction they conduct with 
others in the context of their everyday lives. Such findings are pivotal in proving that 
although this identity shift may be perceived as “natural” – when viewed through a 
recognitive narrative lens – it becomes apparent that such transformations are an 
identity construction, which aim to resolve everyday social dilemmas.  
The identification that the subjects under study are attempting to resolve social 
dilemmas proves to be the finding that buttresses the above into a unified argument. 
Following Petherbridge’s constructive criticism about the relationship between 
recognition and power, the empirical narratives illustrate that Honneth’s ethical 
recognition struggles can and should be connected to Foucauldian power struggles, 
which in turn highlights a complex dialectic of struggle, which this study identifies as 
resolving recognitive-power dilemmas. This new terminology emphasises how 
individuals strive for positive recognition; yet simultaneously, they must negotiate the 
authoritative domineering and constitutive powers (plus forms of misrecognition and 
associated social pathologies) residing within interactive arenas that socially regulate 
norms and identities to formulate what is considered “normal” and worthy of 
replication. It is important to stress that such a process as described above does not 
pertain to Muslim individuals alone, but has significance for all humans. In other words, 
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this thesis has attempted to explain a natural and constructed aspect of the human 
intersubjective condition.  
 
10.2 Contribution to the Literature  
 
A key strength of this study is its insightful contribution to the existing academic 
literature. The research into Islamic communities residing in core European countries is 
extensive. However, it predominantly tends to be framed by the communitarian and 
security paradigms. In contra to these views and in line with critical social theory, this 
study utilises an emancipatory intent – supported by narratives of everyday recognitive 
experiences within multiple social spheres – to challenge the standard communitarian 
view that assumes minority groups simply seek to have their culture and associated 
beliefs endorsed by the majority community and the security paradigm that narrowly 
views Muslims in Europe through the lens of political extremism.  
In terms of the existing Irish academic contribution, there is a dearth of literature 
on the experiences of Islamic communities in peripheral European countries, such as 
Ireland. This study fills this gap by productively adding to the scant and limited Irish 
literature. In contra to past research, this project provides an extensive qualitative 
analysis – that discovers thematic narratives from a variety of semi-structured 
interviews and focused discussion groups – to provide a deep and penetrating insight 
into the everyday experiences of Sunni Muslim individuals within multiple spheres of 
interaction. Through participant narratives, this study obtains a multidimensional 
perspective on a variety of struggles that Muslim individuals encounter within private 
and public spheres.  
Therefore with the above in mind, it can be stated that the uniqueness of this 
qualitative study is what gives it its important contributory characteristic. Unlike the 
existing reified European literature or Irish research that lacks substantial theoretical 
framing and relies heavily on top-down opinion, this study uniquely introduces the 
recognition paradigm to the field and supports such a multidimensional frame with 
bottom-up grassroot narratives that bring a deeper and more insightful understanding of 
everyday life as experienced by an understudied religious minority community within 
the Irish-European context.   
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10.3 Policy Implications  
 
Although this study is primarily focused on a specific minority community, it would be 
a mistake to view this study solely as a narrowly focused exploration of individual 
Muslim life in Dublin. By focusing on multiple spheres of everyday life, this research 
project also explores how Muslims live and interact within the Irish context. Thus, 
whilst the thesis provides an individualistic primary insight into Sunni Muslim life, it 
also provides a broader secondary insight into Irish life. By combining a 
multidimensional recognition frame with grassroot narratives, this study has taken a 
snapshot of perceptions, which expand the knowledge base and understanding of a 
religious minority community in time and space, particularly in relation to important 
everyday factors such as relations of recognition and power; identity formation as well 
as integration processes. Stated simply, this study humanises the research participants 
and Muslims generally by providing a space in which their voices can be heard and 
reflected upon. It is this making visible of dormant knowledge and the creation of better 
understanding, which has the potential to affect the attitudes of local policy-makers and 
the initiatives they construct and promote within the Irish public sphere.  
Importantly, this study is local, with a national remit acting as a secondary 
consideration. The sole focus on Dublin implies that policy influence will be localised 
to this area. For the most part therefore, the information within this study will be of 
significant benefit to the four local administrative councils and their respective 
integration departments – Dublin City Council, South Dublin Council, Dún Laoghaire-
Rathdown Council, and Fingal Council – that govern various localities within the 
Dublin region. It is important to note that there is narrative evidence to suggest that such 
local civic institutions are keen to expand their knowledge and understanding of the 
growing Muslim communities within their respective areas of influence. This aim is 
clearly narrated by a high-ranking civil servant attached to the Office of Integration at 
Dublin City Council (DCC). The following statement, related to a wider study on 
Muslim populations in a variety of European cities, acknowledges how the council’s 
Integration Office seeks to gain better knowledge of local Muslim communities by 
trying to understand how individuals within such communities perceive the city they 
reside and live within. The following narrative is worth presenting-in-full as it 
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highlights how local authorities are cognisant of the importance of gaining a more 
nuanced intersubjective understanding of the Muslim perspective: 
 
What we [DCC Integration Office] want to do is to develop, what I called “A 
Muslim Eye on the City”; in other words, to bring the Muslim community 
perspective out of the mosque or out of their community, to get an appreciation 
of how they see the city [of Dublin] now, in terms of its multiple identities, the 
values, or the norms, or the experience. How do they [Muslims] see it and at the 
same time, allow the Muslim community to bring their perspective into the 
open. It’s a kind of two-way process. Let the city see you and let you see the city 
and let you express your perspective...We [DCC] just had this concept that we 
needed the Muslim community to portray itself as part of the city and equally to 
reflect on what their experience of the city is and how they can contribute as part 
of the one identity or multiple identities of the city.
1181
 
 
10.4 Recommendations for Future Research  
 
This study retrieved a deeper knowledge and understanding by examining how the 
research participants perceive recognition relations within everyday social spheres. By 
doing so, new understandings were opened up in terms of how recognition and power 
relate to social struggle and how multiple identities interact to resolve recognitive-
power dilemmas. Importantly from an academic perspective, this study also stimulates a 
variety of potential avenues of further exploration. The following are four 
recommendations for future research – in no particular order or hierarchy of importance 
– that progress towards new critical directions by venturing beyond this preliminary 
study:  
 
 In terms of empirical expansion, can the qualitative findings be explored 
quantitatively to enable generalisations to cover the whole Sunni Muslim 
population in Dublin or throughout Ireland?  
 
 Utilising a cross-comparative frame, are similar recognitive, power and identity 
dynamics occurring within other peripheral and/or core cities throughout 
Europe.  
 
 Whilst this study focused entirely on the “external” Muslim Other, it may be 
worth sociologically expanding the use of a recognitive frame by studying an 
“internal” Other. For example, future research could explore the recognitive 
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experiences of the Travelling community in Dublin or throughout the wider 
Irish context. 
 
 Lastly, this study may also make fruitful connections to the international 
relations (IR) field. With the advent of civil strife in Syria and Iraq and the rise 
of Islamic radicalisation amongst a small proportion of Muslim youth across 
Europe, future research avenues could determine how the sociological findings 
from this study provide relevant insights towards deepening the knowledge and 
understanding of the youth radicalisation process currently taking place within 
the European sphere. In other words, such research may investigate how 
European Muslim youth are influenced and led towards divergent avenues of 
action and identity formation with one path leading to a contributive Islamic-
civic identity and the other path leading to a radicalised, potentially terroristic, 
Islamic fundamentalist identity.  
 
The study will now end as it started by returning to Axel Honneth’s seminal work SfR 
in order to retrieve a quote that reflectively encapsulates how cultural change is an 
important aspect to consider in relation to struggles for recognition that take place 
within a post-traditional society: 
 
Social-structural upheavals in developed societies have so greatly expanded the 
possibilities for self-realization that the experience of individual or collective 
difference has become the impetus for a whole new series of political 
movements. In the long run, their demands can only be satisfied once culture has 
been transformed so as to radically expand relations of solidarity.
1182
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